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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
AN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: INDUSTRY, TRADE, AND FINANCE IN THE
ANTEBELLUM MIND
by
Christopher William Calvo
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Kenneth Lipartito, Major Professor
The purpose of this study is to assess American economic thought during the antebellum
period. Antebellum political economy has been largely neglected by historians. They have
ignored both the valuable contributions made by America’s first political economists to domestic
intellectual culture, as well as the importance of American economic thought in the transatlantic
discourse. A dynamic, sophisticated, and complex political economy marks the antebellum era,
and when studied in its proper context provides insight into how Americans understood the
transformative economic changes they experienced.
This dissertation draws on an extensive body of primary and secondary literature.
Special consideration is given to the more learned articulations of economic thought. However,
recognizing the immature state of the science during the period under investigation works of
various levels of theoretical erudition are referenced. In their attempts to fashion a distinctly
American political economy domestic thinkers entertained a wide range of economic principles.
Contrary to conventional wisdom the Americans were not absolutist in their dedication to British
orthodoxy. Antebellum political economy manipulated British authorities to suit the immediate
concerns of contemporaries, thus spoiling the essence of classical doctrine. This dissertation
makes clear that few Americans accepted classical orthodoxy without important qualifications.
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Classical theory was confronted with its most systematic challenge by protectionists.
Despite protectionism having shaped the course of American economic development, its
theoretical underpinnings have been summarily discounted by historians and economists.
Protectionists, however, afforded the quintessential expression of American antebellum political
economy. This dissertation intends to rescue the protectionists from historical abandon and
reclaim the position of relevance they enjoyed during their own time. The antebellum period also
hosted a fiery set of intellectuals determined to upset the emerging free-market order, exhibiting a
particular disdain for institutions of finance and the industrial ethos. Conservatives from the
North and South aimed to slow America’s march into the modern economy. These elements did
not operate on the fringes of intellectual society, rather they represent something central to the
American discourse and are illustrative of the difficulty attendant to classifying antebellum
thinkers according to traditional notions of economic ideology.
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Chapter I
Introduction: History and Antebellum Economic Thought

American economic thought before the Civil War has attracted very little scholarly attention.
Charles Dunbar set the trend in a widely read 1876 essay by arguing that antebellum American
political economists had contributed “nothing towards developing the theory of political
economy.” Economic discourse in America, he wrote, suffered from a "general sterility."1
Eighty years later Joseph Schumpeter reiterated Dunbar's blanket dismissal in his History of
Economic Analysis. Dunbar's appraisal, Schumpeter wrote, had "not been invalidated by the
information made available by more recent research." The Austrian-import found in the pool of
American economists of the pre-Civil War period, "no first-rate man among them, and they made
nothing of the great opportunity before them."2 The dismissive tones of Dunbar and Schumpeter
gave subsequent generations of historians little incentive to examine antebellum economic
thought.3
This dissertation intends to liberate antebellum political economy from the shadows of
Dunbar and Schumpeter and reclaim for posterity the relevance antebellum thinkers enjoyed
during their own time. American political economists wielded strong influence in the domestic
discourse. They constructed a dynamic body of thought that shaped American perceptions of the
national economic experience and they contributed in significant ways to the formation of
economic policy. They also made important revisions to nineteenth-century economic formulas,
particularly British classicism. Antebellum debates over industry, trade and finance drove an
1

Charles Dunbar, “Economic Science in America, 1776-1876,” The North American Review (January,
1876), pp. 140, 146.
2

Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Oxford, 1954), pp. 514, 519.

3

The criticisms of Dunbar and Schumpeter in part reflect the notion that economists who wrote outside of
the classical and neoclassical traditions did not contribute to the scientific development of the economics
discipline.

1

intellectual wedge between American thinkers. Still, refuting classical orthodoxy was the
decisive element that united antebellum political economy.
The historiography on antebellum economic thought, however, tends to minimize the
differences by painting a broad intellectual consensus. For decades, the literature has been guided
by Joseph Dorfman’sThe Economic Mind of American Civilization, 1606-1865 (1949).
Dorfman’s work makes for an excellent reference, but his analysis is limited to a short Preface
that asserts the consensus narrative of American intellectual history.4 “The most potent
determinant of economic action and thought was world commerce,” Dorfman argued, “the
commerce that gave us treasure, the commerce that brought foreign goods and took our exports,
that profited shipper, middleman, and speculator; the commerce, in short, that created the rich
urban community and enlarged the money economy.” Dorfman conceded other forces at play,
but by the end of the period these had “shifted gradually toward liberalism, democracy, and
agrarianism.”5 The existence of the latter should not be understood as disrupting the commerceoriented laissez-faire consensus, Dorfman noted. “Again and again the farmers as well as the
relatively unimportant laboring class,” Dorfman wrote, “appeared in the arena as the auxiliaries
of rival business factions for which they provided the bucolic pen names signed to ‘capitalistic’
pamphlets.”6
Dorfman’s consensus interpretation implied that antebellum thought was marked by a
near universal acceptance of the laissez-faire model. This interpretation was made more explicit
in his analyses of individual political economists. Dorfman isolates antebellum thinkers who

4

Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind of American Civilization, 1606-1865,vols.I and II (New York,
1946). Book 2, “From Independence to Jackson” and Book 3 “From Jackson to the Civil War” cover the
periods dealt with here. Dorfman also published The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1865-1918,
vol. III (New York, 1949) and The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1918-1933, vols. IV and V
(New York, 1959).
5

Dorfman, The Economic Mind of American Civilization, vol. I, p. ix.

6

Ibid.,vol. I, pp. x-xi.

2

wrote outside the laissez-faire tradition. He also underestimates the subtle, though important
variations within the antebellum free-trade movement, and thus ignores the broader shift away
from classical orthodoxy.
After Dorfman, a full generation passed before any scholar treated in a substantial way
antebellum thought.7 In 1980, Paul Conkin’sProphets of Prosperity modified parts of Dorfman’s
sweeping consensus view. “Except for a common commitment to economic growth and to a
proprietary society,” Conkin argued, “our first economists scarcely agreed on any beliefs or
values.”8 Still, while Conkin identified areas of debate in antebellum thought, the general tone of
his work amounted to a liberal-consensus reading of American intellectual history. Like
Dorfman, Conkin stressed the affinity antebellum thinkers had for British laissez-faire. Indeed,
America lacked a strong intellectual tradition of political economy precisely because domestic
thinkers marched lock-step with British authorities. The Wealth of Nations, Conkin wrote,
“quickly established itself in America as a work of tremendous authority.” The French free-

7

Paul Conkin, Prophets of Prosperity: America’s First Political Economists (Bloomington, IN, 1980).
Besides Dorman and Conkin, there have been other works in the historiography that inform my
dissertation. These are, however, mostly outdated. Michael O'Connor, Origins of Academic Economics in
the United States (1944; reprint New York, 1974); J.F. Normano, The Spirit of American Economics: A
Study of the History of Economic Ideas in the United States Prior to the Great Depression (New York,
1943); Ernest Teilhac, Pioneers of American Economic Thoughtin the Nineteenth Century (New York,
1936); Frank A. Fetter, “The Early History of Political Economy in the United States,” Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society (July, 1943); William Barber, ed., Economics and Higher Learning in the
Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick, 1993); UgoRabbeno, American Commercial Policy (London, 1895);
Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century (1903; reprint, New York,
1974), vols. I and II; Malcolm Rutherford, ed., The Economic Mind in America: Essays in the History of
American Economics (London, 1998); Michael Hudson, Economics and Technology in 19th-Century
American Thought (New York, 1975); Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy
(Ithaca, NY, 1993); James Huston, Securing the Fruits of Labor: American Concepts of Wealth
Distribution (Baton Rouge, LA, 1998); Allen Kaufmann, Capitalism, Slavery, and Republican Values:
Antebellum Political Economists, 1819-1848 (Austin, TX, 1982). Besides Conkin, Hudson, Huston and
Kaufman are the most recent works that offer a fairly sweeping and critical account on antebellum thought.
Hudson and Huston are more topic specific. Kaufman’s work is driven by a Marxist understanding of
economic ideology. He is perhaps the most insightful historian on American economic thought, but his
work is limited to mainly Daniel Raymond, Thomas Roderick Dew and Jacob Cardozo.
8

Conkin, Prophets of Prosperity, p. 312.

3

trader Jean Baptiste Say, Conkin argued, “had an enormous impact.” And Ricardo, according to
Conkin, “had the greatest impact on Americans.”9
This dissertation will show that antebellum political economists articulated serious
reservations, both theoretical and ideological, about the laissez-faire paradigm. As much as
America’s domestic economy grew in accordance with the principles of Adam Smith, the nation’s
economic thought, as it was expressed by the period’s most seasoned academic and public
intellectuals did not subscribe to an absolutist laissez-faire ideology. Antebellum political
economists made significant departures from the free-trade model. And they did so with
complete knowledge of the authority British laissez-faire had in nineteenth-century economic
discourse. Most antebellum thinkers did not try to “domesticate” British classicism; nor were
they, as Conkin argued, powerless “to create their own universe of discourse.”10
American economic thinkers built off the laissez-faire tradition to craft arguments that
comported with the unique economic conditions of their new world. For some, this meant
accepting parts of the laissez-faire model, but with distinctive American twists. Chapters 2 and 3
of this dissertation show that even within the antebellum free-trade movement, there lacked
definitive consensus. American thinkers developed different types of laissez-faire political
economy, each suited to the particular regional interests of the authors. This was especially the
case in the South. Southerners manipulated laissez-faire logic to match Southern traditions. By
the 1830s Southerners realized laissez-faire complimented the ideal of the negative state. They
employed free-trade political economy to strike at the North by attacking protective tariffs and
9

Ibid., pp. 17, 28, 30. Dorfman and Conkin consensus interpretation of American political economy
compliments broader studies of antebellum society that depict a pervasive liberal-democratic-capitalist
order. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought
since the Revolution (New York, 1955), is the authority on this interpretation. Richard Hofstadter, another
consensus historian, argued American history is marked by the “common, bourgeois, entrepreneurial
assumptions of most of the effective forces in American political life and the tendency of these forces to
group ideologically around a Whiggish center rather than to be polarized in sharp ideological struggles.”
The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York, 1948), pp. xxvii-xxxi.
10

Conkin, Prophets of Prosperity, p. 17.
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combating assertions that the state could claim or destroy private property notably slavery.
Smith had denounced slavery, but the ostensible incompatibility between a Southern political
economy of slavery and the enlightened, free-trade moral philosophy of Smith did not stop
Southerners from becoming antebellum America’s chief disseminators of laissez-faire. Nor did
Southerners, hostile to industrialization, see their brand of laissez-faire inconsistent with British
classicism and its emphasis on industry. Free traders in the South shaped laissez-faire into an
intellectual strategy to advance the political doctrine of states-rights, defend an agrarian-based
slave regime, and stall the emergence of a national industrial economy. It was, in short, not the
economic liberalism of the British tradition.
In Northeastern colleges and universities professors taught a brand of laissez-faire
doctrine quite different from the political economy of Southern free trade. In consequence,
laissez-faire in the American discourse was split along regional lines and never united into a
single intellectual movement. The influence of regional institutional and cultural conventions
brought Northeastern free traders closer to the Smithian tradition. The Northeastern free traders
emphasized the moral and religious benefits of market economies. They considered free-trade
political economy as confirmation of a benevolent, Christian deity. Northeastern professors were
typically clergy who might have otherwise distanced themselves from a discipline still linked to
the materialism of David Hume. But because free trade in the Smithian tradition was originally a
branch of moral philosophy, teaching political economy was amenable to the clerical style and
substance of curricula in the Northeast. The sluggish pace with which Northeastern freetraders
removed elements of moral philosophy and religion distinguished their interpretation of laissezfaire from the more secular versions of Southern free trade, and it was in stark contrast to the
political economy of nineteenth-century British classicism. Moreover, the Northeastern clergy
free traders largely rejected, on theological grounds, the pessimism of the classical school. Both
the Southerners and the Northeastern cleric economists drew from British authorities, but the

5

Americans followed an economic logic that was different from laissez-faire as it existed in the
nineteenth-century British discourse.
The divisions between antebellum free traders and British laissez-faire are made more
explicit in the American treatment of Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo. This is the subject of
chapter 4. This chapter demonstrates how antebellum thinkers largely abandoned Malthus and
Ricardo, or manipulated their logic to suit distinctly American conditions. Antebellum economic
and social conditions convinced domestic writers from both the North and South that the theories
of Malthus and Ricardo were simply inapplicable. The few Americans who accepted Malthus
and Ricardo, typically distorted these British authorities to advance their own special political and
social prerogatives. It is not uncommon to find an American writer stressing certain conclusions
of the British economists while flatly denying the legitimacy of others. In this way antebellum
American writers created their own economic discourse out of the raw material of British
classicism. By the 1850s this tendency of American thinkers to twist the British classical
tradition in ways that fit particular political and social agendas had reached its height. This was
especially the case in the South, where the gloomy forecasts of the British pessimists were
employed in a defense of slavery.
The American break from British classicism was largely a response to wide-spread
assumptions about American exceptionalism. Declarations of American exceptionalism hark
back to the colonial period, but during the antebellum era the concept became a central feature of
American intellectual culture.11 The belief in American exceptionalism contributed to an almost
constant invitation for antebellum writers to construct a native political economy. An American
economic renaissance of sorts was heralded, one demanding an economic thought suited to the
historically unique domestic conditions. It was determined that to best appreciate the nature of
11

Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge, 1991); Arthur Ekirch, The Idea of
Progress in America, 1815-1860 (New York, 1951); Carl Russell Fish, The Rise of the Common Man,
1830-1850 (New York, 1927).
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the American economy there required an alternative, nuanced political economy penned by
domestic hands.
The task of creating a system of economic thought designed specifically for the American
experience fell to the protectionists. Chapter 6 traces the intellectual evolution of antebellum
protectionism. Protectionism was the most important development in antebellum economic
thought and it has rightly been designated the American school of political economy. By fusing
together various strains of domestic intellectual, social, economic and cultural history,
protectionists captured the essence of the antebellum economic mind. These writers cherished a
bouyant optimism, a strong commitment to national economic development, and a spirit of
independence from the Old World. The protectionists substituted the pessimism of the classical
tradition with a distinctly American understanding of economic phenomena based on an
economics of affluence.
The popularity of protectionist thought and the practical application of protectionist
policy throughout the nineteenth century illustrates the disconnect between American political
economy and British classicism. For protectionists the exceptional conditions of America made
permanent economic progress possible. By commanding through the will of human agency and
the instruments of state what for the British thinkers was an uncompromising and arbitrary natural
order, the protectionists aimed at catapulting the American economy into an unprecedented
economic condition. Attaining economic and political independence was made possible by
controlling what Smith had referred to as the “natural system of liberty.” In these ways,
protectionists challenged the foundational principles of laissez-faire. But protectionists did not
believe their economic system was at odds with liberal values. Rather they thought that by
regulating markets through tariffs they would increase the personal autonomy of American
citizens and augment national sovereignty. As much as protectionists held in disdain the freetrade ideology, their economic theory managed a defense of an otherwise liberal, competitive,

7

capitalist industrial order. Protectionists believed the tariff was capable of creating an industrial
society with capitalists, machines and workers coexisting harmoniously. The industrial ideal that
protectionists worked toward would avoid the dismal outcomes predicted by Malthus and
Ricardo. In antebellum political economy it was the protectionists, not the free-traders, who
promoted economic modernization and the expansion of industrial capitalism. Chapter 7
investigates the works of Henry Carey, the period’s most important protectionist thinker. Carey
united protectionism into a coherent economic ideology that remains the most significant
contribution to the antebellum economic discourse.
Protectionists offered the most popular and influential antebellum rebuke of laissez-faire.
A far more violent and darker rejection came from a small legion of Southern reactionaries and
Northern laborites. Chapter 5 examines the economic thought of Southern reactionaries and
Northern laborites responsible for the period’s sharpest critique of bourgeois economic ideology.
They include Southern agitators like George Fitzhugh and George Frederick Holmes, and labor
activists like Langton Byllesby and Thomas Skidmore. Although the Southern reactionaries and
Northern labor advocates often operated on the periphery of the domestic economic discourse,
their ideas further showcase the lack of consensus in American thought.
The Southern and Northern radicals also reinforce the argument that antebellum political
economy was not dedicated to the laissez-faire/classical model. They were perhaps the most
intriguing sets of intellectuals in the antebellum catalogue of economic commentators, for they
provoked a fundamental reclassification of ideological alignments by questioning traditional
American values of natural liberty, property rights, personal economic sovereignty and state
prerogative.
This chapter also invites substantial revisions to conventional notions of economic
ideology as they existed within the framework of the antebellum discourse. By combining these
groups into a single chapter, the intellectual relationship between these seemingly adverse

8

economic ideologies are revealed as actually having shared a close affinity. Both groups desired
a complete alteration of the existing economic order. And both groups couched their programs on
a systematic critique of the laissez-faire industrial order. The interpretations of industrial society
provided by the Southern reactionaries and Northern laborites were as dismal as the British
classicists. The Southerners argued that the free market pushed much of humanity into a
miserable condition, marked by exploitation, ceaseless drudgery, and a bare subsistence. Their
opposition to industrial capitalism was based on a Tory-like morality that reflected Southern
paternal values, Southern social and economic institutions, and an attachment to plantation
slavery. The Northern laborites echoed the criticisms of the Southern reactionaries, but their
analyses rested on a nascent socialist political economy then gaining favor in American industrial
quarters. They demanded a redistribution of property, an end to the perceived exploitative
tendencies of industrial labor, the abolition of economic classes, and a radical reconfiguration of
commercial exchange. These groups shared important values and their relationship is indicative
of the rather awkward intellectual alliances that emerged in the antebellum economic discourse.
While the consequences of industry and trade were the most heatedly debated economic
topics of the era, finance inspired the most severe form of panic. Chapter 8 deals with the
antebellum reaction to financial capitalism. This chapter argues that Americans held a variety of
positions in their perceptions of finance, but most coalesced around a strong opposition to the
expansion of financial capitalism. By the Jacksonian era financial institutions were deeply rooted
in the economy, and during this period both the forces sympathetic to and those determined to
resist financial capitalism matured into full-fledged political, social, and intellectual movements.
Historians have paid considerable attention to Americans’ suspicions of finance. However, they
tend to reduce antebellum attitudes into either neatly organized antagonistic camps, or simply
paint with a broad stroke an image of consensus.

9

My dissertation concentrates on a middle variant often ignored in the
historiography─political economists who were otherwise committed to the free market, but clear
in their opposition to financial institutions, fearful of the moral, social, political, and economic
residuals of the expansion of banks, credit, debt, and stock-corporations. The conventional
wisdom on the relationship between advocates of free markets and finance was rare in the
antebellum literature. American commentators on finance operated within ideological parameters
unique to the antebellum period. A separate but related vein in the opposition literature on
finance attempted to fuse a liberal economic creed with classical republicanism. In the
historiography on the revolutionary and early national periods republicanism has attracted
significant attention.12 Still, historians have largely overlooked the subtle differences between
republican critics of finance in the antebellum discourse.13 Nor have historians done justice to the
opponents of finance by representing them as radical outliers. Antebellum critics of finance were
essential components of the era’s economic thought, reflecting an engagement with the virtues of
the free market but with a cautionary element that recognized the dangers of unfettered finance.
America’s response to the development of financial institutions illustrates the dialectic
tensions attendant to the nation’s economic ideology. The aim of my work is to contextualize the
conflicts in which Americans constructed their economic thought. As evidence, my dissertation
draws on an extensive body of antebellum economic literature, with special consideration given
to the more academic, or abstract writings. However, recognizing the period’s lack of
professionalization in the field of economics, I also incorporate fair discussion of more popular
12

Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 1967); Gordon
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (New York, 1969); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975);Drew
McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980).
13

The notable exceptions are Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation: Cultural and Political
Roots, 1690-1860 (Cambridge, 1998); Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of
the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York, 1984);Major Wilson, "The ‘Country’ versus the
‘Court’: A Republican Consensus and Party Debate in the Bank War," Journal of the Early Republic
(Winter, 1995).
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tracts. Economic knowledge was not monopolized by a single group. It was disseminated by
academics, farmers, merchants, craftsmen, mechanics, industrialists, pamphleteers, journalists,
and politicians, many of whom, despite obtaining nothing near to what the present age would
consider sufficient training, were confident enough in their expertise to claim the title of ‘political
economist.’ In the current study the latter term is used liberally, conferred upon those who
contributed to what stands as a large and diverse assemblage of economic knowledge, found in
speeches, memorials, journals, newspapers and academic publications. Perhaps the most difficult
task of intellectual history is patching together the ideas and passages of disparate groups into a
representative whole. This is particularly the case with American economic thought, where sharp
differences encumber the formulation of broad generalizations. Still, intellectual culture in
antebellum America was encouraging and pursuant of an economic discourse, and when
examined closely improves our appreciation of the psychology of America’s homo economicus
and broadens our understanding of the theoretical basis for America’s empire of wealth.

11

Chapter II
Laissez-faire and Moral Philosophy in the Northeast

Only three months before Thomas Jefferson began writing the Declaration of Independence,
Adam Smith published his Wealth of Nations. Antebellum Americans eager to find significance
in the historical connection between Smith and the nation’s founding celebrated the concurrence.1
“The nativity of the science is to be dated from that event, and the coincidence is to be remarked
that it was contemporaneous with our Declaration of Independence in 1776.”2 Today,
conventional wisdom still links the two. "The ideas of Adam Smith,” one historian has recently
written, “helped form the model for the development of the American economy.” Another has
argued that "the United States has consistently come closer to the Smithian ideal over a longer
period of time than any other nation."3 Many of Smith’s recommendations were implemented as
antebellum policy. In the antebellum economic discourse, however, few Americans were
absolutist in their following of Smith.
This chapter explores laissez-faire political economy in the antebellum Northeast. In
contradiction of the conventional wisdom, free-trade thinkers in the Northeast largely ignored the
economic logic of Smithianlaissez-faire. Instead, Smithianlaissez-faire was championed for its
moral consequences. Although Smith is remembered for his economic discussion, his political
1

On the influence of Smith’s Wealth of Nations in antebellum America see Paul Conkin, Prophets of
Prosperity: America’s First Political Economists (Bloomington, 1980), p. 17; Samuel Fleischacker, “Adam
Smith’s Reception Among the American Founders, 1776-1790,” William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 59, no.
4, 2002; Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606-1865 (New York, 1946),
vol. II, p. 512. On the existence of shared ideas between Britain and America generally see Robert Kelley,
The Transatlantic Persuasion: The Liberal-Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone (New York, 1969);
Michael Kraus, The North Atlantic Civilization (Princeton, 1957); Frank Thistlethwaite, The AngloAmerican Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century (New York, 1971).
2

“Political Economy,” The Southern Review (February, 1832), p. 493

3

Roy Smith, Adam Smith and the Origins of American Enterprise: How America’s Industrial Success was
Forged by the Timely Ideas of a Brilliant Scots Economist (New York, 2002), p. 201; John Steele Gordon,
An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power (New York, 2004), p. 67.
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economy was based on moral philosophy.4 The Northeastern version of laissez-faire followed in
this strain of his thought. The clergy-academics of the Northeastern free-trade movement
combined a strikingly cosmopolitan perspective of international trade and a general whiggish tone
to highlight the potential laissez-faire policies had in creating a just and righteous society.
The preference for moral philosophy in Northeastern laissez-faire followed logically
from the socially-conservative institutional and cultural factors distinct to the region.5 Academic
instruction of political economy in the Northeast was taught to college seniors in what was
considered the climax of an early nineteenth-century higher education, a course in moral
philosophy. The subject, according to one historian, “studied human affairs as the realm within
which individuals sought moral improvement.”6 As it was treated in America’s most prestigious
colleges, free-trade doctrine provided a strategy for enhancing material wealth, but it was more
concerned with designing a society founded on sound moral principles.
Smithian economic philosophy blended well with the devout and dutiful nature of
Northeastern curricula. The Scotsman’s emphasis on the universality of free-trade principles, the
benign qualities of the natural economic order, and the cosmopolitan character of free trade that
encouraged mutually advantageous exchange complimented the religious character of
Northeastern academia. Almost all of the region’s institutions of higher learning maintained
4
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close ties with the Church and clergy professors did most of the instruction. Congregationalists
had their Harvard and Yale, the Episcopalians, Penn and Columbia, the Presbyterians, Princeton,
and the Baptists, Brown. Curricula emphasized theology, moral philosophy, biblical studies, and
occasional direction in mathematics and the physical sciences.7
Professors in the Northeast were almost always clerics and their letter of instruction
almost always conservative. The relationship between Church and antebellum academic
institutions worked against the introduction of new curriculum, especially a discipline whose
pioneers were the skeptic David Hume and the deist Smith. American colleges were founded and
funded under the assumption that students were taught civil and religious obedience that aimed at
the maintenance of social tranquility. During the antebellum period colleges continued in this
tradition by operating essentially as aristocratic theocracies.8
When political economy was introduced as an autonomous discipline, it entered stripped
of its radical, materialist associations.9Laissez-faire among the antebellum Northeastern clergyacademics was, in the words of one historian, “a sedative, not a stimulant;” it was employed to
advance “defensive social campaigns.”10 Students were encouraged to answer the merchant’s
calling, rather than the radical agitator’s. Pacifying or discrediting the latter became important as
7
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the Northeast developed industrially. Far from being in the vanguard of intellectual movements,
early American colleges aimed to preserve the established social order.11 The accumulation of
wealth was reward for moral, industrious behavior; while poverty a mark of an individual’s
deficiency.
The religious and moral impulse of Northeastern laissez-faire differed significantly from
most others in the trans-Atlantic free-trade movement. Freeing political economy from theology
and moral philosophy took almost a century longer in America than it did in Britain.12
Incorporating sacred principles into free trade helped popularize the ideology with American
intellectual circles otherwise closed to the nuances of Enlightenment thought. By tying elements
of Christianity to free-trade political economy, the Northeast clergy-academic helped legitimize
the discipline in American institutions of higher learning. If laissez-faire political economy was
censored by some critics for its materialism, presenting free-trade doctrine as evidence of a higher
power facilitated its acceptance as a branch of learning worthy of instruction in America’s
religiously oriented colleges. Just so, Northeastern intellectual culture required political economy
to assimilate religious conventions before the science was permitted to secede as an independent
field of study. Deliverance of American political economy from its theological heritage was no
easy task, it was one of several paradigmatic challenges the discipline faced during its formative
years and it had a profound impact on the evolution of domestic economic thought.
This is not to say American free traders were disengaged from an increasingly secular
economic discourse. Even after the ascendancy of Ricardo, a British evangelical strain of free
11
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trade emerged, touting the moral and spiritual benefits of open markets.13 The coexistence of an
American and British free-trade movement that accentuated the spiritual over the material
illustrates the intellectual ties between the two nations. It also indicates that the Northeastern
clergy-academics influenced the paradigmatic evolution of the nascent science. Contrary to
claims that antebellum Americans made negligible contributions to political economy, the
Northeastern clergy-academics had an impact on the development of free-trade ideology.14 The
political economy of a variety of men illustrates these common ties and developments.
Columbia professor John McVickar exemplified the connection between Christian piety,
moral philosophy and free-trade political economy in antebellum America. Born in 1787 into an
elite New York City merchant family, he entered Columbia at thirteen as a student and graduated
four years later at the top of his class. Ordained by the Episcopal Church in 1812, McVickar’s 47
years at Columbia were preceded by serving as rector of the Church of St. James, Hyde Park,
New York. In 1817 he returned to his alma matter as professor of moral philosophy.15
Throughout his career McVickar worked to popularize free-trade doctrine in America.
He was largely responsible for the American introduction to Ricardo through his 1825 Outlines of
Political Economy, which republished with extensive editor’s notes J.R. McCulloch’s essay
“Political Economy.”16McVickar considered inquiry into laissez-faire principles an opportunity to
reunite American and British minds. “It may serve to moderate the hasty zeal...by showing how
nearly reflecting men on both sides of the Atlantic arrive at the same conclusions, and thus tend to
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draw together two kindred nation, whom an unwise and illiberal policy has too often disunited.”17
But free trade did more than strengthen the bond between America and Britain. For McVickar
laissez-faire was the harbinger of universal fraternity. Free trade aided humanity in its historical
quest to eliminate those evil tendencies that exist between men. “It inclines them to drop the
sword from their hands, by demonstrating to them, that they are about to plunge it into their own
bowels.” Free trade also moderated national hostilities. “It teaches among nations and federative
states,” McVickar wrote, “the all-important lessons of peace and mutual benefits...It unites
nations, not by treatise or federations…but by the laws of mutual interest.”18 What scripture
revealed to be man’s duty, political economy exposed to be in their interest.McVickar believed it
his primary function to bridge the principles of all sciences and divine scripture, for every piece
of human knowledge was evidence of Providence’s design.
McVickar’s interest in political economy was also driven by a desire to employ the
science as a vehicle to spread his theology. Although McCulloch, the eminent Scottish
economists, noted in 1824 that political economy was divorced from the study of ethics─“the
production of wealth is the only question they admit,” McVickar argued for the ethical and
religious consequences for teaching the science.19 “Though it be but the science of wealth, yet
does it show that wealth to be the result of the moral and intellectual, as well as the physical
powers of man. It demonstrates that to man, ignorant and vicious, there is no road to
wealth.”20The economist’s mission was to uplift and enrich individuals.21 “Gold and virtue,”
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McVickar wrote, are not “balanced against each other in opposite scales.” Indeed, he continued,
“the greatest pursuit of wealth is still the greatest safeguard of virtue.”22
At Brown, Francis Wayland gave further form to the link between Christianity and
political economy. Wayland was born in 1796 in New York City. Like McVickar, Wayland
served the church before entering the academy. The five years prior to Wayland accepting the
posts of president and professor of moral philosophy at Brown were spent at the First Baptist
Church of Boston.23 Upon arriving at Brown in 1827 Wayland introduced political economy in
his lectures on moral philosophy and in the following year the subject was included in the
university’s catalogue. Wayland was also responsible for antebellum America’s most popular
economics textbook, The Elements of Political Economy. Published in 1837, it was standard
reading for students. The work went through eighteen editions before the Civil War and sold
nearly 60,000 copies.24
Like McVickar, Wayland employed Smithian principles to strengthen the connections
between laissez-faire and moral philosophy. “The principles of political economy are so closely
analogous to those of Moral Philosophy, that almost every question in the one, may be argued on
grounds belonging to the other.”25 He insisted the natural economic order established a direct
correlation between virtuous behavior and the accumulation of wealth. “The circulation of the
scriptures, the inculcation of moral and religious truth upon the mind of man, by means of the
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Sabbath schools, and the preaching of the gospel, are of the very greatest importance to the
productive energies of a country.”26 ‘In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread’ was
characteristic of Wayland’s doctrinal disposition. “If a man complain because God made him to
labor; it is a difficulty which the complainant must settle with his Maker.”27 In his discussion of
paupers and poor relief, Wayland concluded “the fault lies, not in their wages, but in themselves.”
And he continued logically, “of course, the correction must come, not from a change in wages,
but from a change in habits.”28 Connecting laissez-faire to a Protestant ethic, Wayland believed
free-trade political economy compelled the masses to righteous and industrious behavior.
For Wayland, free trade was also proof of a providential order. Although separated by
wide distances, people required each other for sustenance. Thus, Providence constructed a
cosmopolitan trade regime that compelled humanity to cultivate a Christian fraternity. The laws
that governed universal exchange were established by God, scientifically observable, and
designed so “that men should live together in friendship and harmony.”29 The theory of
comparative advantage was akin to divine revelation. “From this universal dependence, we learn
that God intends nations, as well as individuals, to live in peace, and to conduct themselves
towards each other upon the principles of benevolence.”30 Free traders like Wayland held an
enlightened world view of international relations, where nations worked peaceably toward
reciprocal benefit. The Northeastern free-traders looked externally, beyond America’s borders, to
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a benign global market coordinated to foster a humanitarian ethic and weaken those prejudices
which disposed men to acts of war and national rivalry.31
Wayland’s positive view of the economic order broke with the pessimism of nineteenthcentury British classicism. His spiritual commitments drew him closer to the more optimistic
Smith. Humanity, Wayland argued, was not destined for the dreary existence predicted by
Malthus and Ricardo. Although Wayland favored agriculture as “the most healthy
employment...attended by the fewest moral temptations,” he did not believe industrialization
hastened labor’s demise.32 The providential order intended for each successive generation to
enjoy greater material prosperity. Improvement is the permanent condition. Through the more
efficient application of labor, the discovery of new technologies, and augmented investments of
capital, those who in earlier times might expect to suffer privations enjoyed comfort. “It is thus
that a society, age after age, grows rich, and each successive race of men leaves the world more
richly provided with means and facilities of production, than it found it.”33
An attachment to Christian ethics drove a wedge between Wayland and the British
classicists in still other ways. In his seminal piece on moral philosophy Wayland reverted to an
almost pre-modern form of economic thought when he offered a critique of self-interest. Selflove was sometimes least productive of social and individual happiness. The economic order was
not calculated “to secure the happiness of any single individual,” Wayland found, “and he who
devises his plan with sole reference to himself must find them continually thwarted by that
Omnipotent and Invisible Agency which is overruling all things.”34
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Wayland and McVickar represented a religious vein in American economic thought that
dates to the colonial period. Theological and ethical imperatives played a powerful role in early
American political economy.35 The economic literature of the colonies emphasized the role of
clerics in maintaining an orderly and hierarchical society to counter the increasingly
commercialized nature of social relations. Northern colonists calculated a 'just price,' applied the
golden rule of the Old Testament to economic exchange, and filled broadsides with anti-merchant
rhetoric critical of the corruptive and anti-social tendencies of trade and money. Influential
thinkers like John Winthrop of Massachusetts interpreted scripture to defend public over private
economy, state surveillance and control over the distribution of wealth, and struck against the
notion of buying cheap to sell dear.36 Winthrop also found interest sacrilege. Lend money to
those least able to repay, and later forgive the insolvent debtor, or better, consider your loan an
act of Christian charity.37 Pennsylvania Quakers also believed religious doctrine paramount when
directing economic policy. Sumptuary laws were not uncommon, and some expected the Church
to take the lead role in guarding against inflation.38
McVickar’s discussion of criteria for restricting free trade illustrates the lasting influence
Christian moralism had on Northeastern economic thought. “If...individual gains may be pursued
to the detriment of national wealth,” McVickar wrote, “then must the guardians of the national
35
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welfare be ever upon the watch against individual encroachment.”39 The conditions McVickar
presented for limiting free enterprise included “those necessary preparations for a state of war.”
But McVickar struck a tone reminiscent of colonial times when he censured “home speculation,”
as well as those occasions when “individual profits are....extracted from the miseries of other,
from the vices and passions of society.”40
The transition from medieval scholasticism to secular rationalism was for American
political economy a cumbersome trail. Wayland and McVickar gave sharp expression to the
historical dialectic between Christianity and economic thought. They employed the
moral/economic philosophy of Smith to facilitate acclimation of free-trade principles to
prevailing social and cultural institutions in the Northeast. In doing so, the Northeastern freetraders signaled their opposition to the analytical transformations within the laissez-faire
tradition.41 McVickar and Wayland did not hold fast to the methodological developments
ushered in by the more secular Ricardo. Instead, they resorted to divine explanation and
standards of moral propriety.
McVickar and Wayland conformed to the social prerogatives of clerical elements
committed to employing laissez-faire toward the construction of a pious society. This was a
consequence of the prolonged association between academic and Church institutions in the
antebellum Northeast. It was also owing to Northeastern academics approaching political
economy from the disposition of a moral philosopher. The inability of McVickar and Wayland to
recognize that laissez-faire was splitting from its Smithian roots and moving closer to nineteenth-
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century technical modes of analysis illustrates the region’s reticent intellectual culture. In this
sense, free-trade political economy was not in the avant-garde of social and intellectual change.
The Northeastern political economists did not have a domestic monopoly on the
instruction of the budding science. The South developed its own distinct form of free-trade. And
like the Northeastern brand, the Southern version reflected the region’s intellectual heritage,
social customs, and institutional traditions. Institutions of higher learning in the South were
decidedly secular. And while the South emphasized a practical, policy-oriented brand of free
trade that illustrated the region’s anti-intellectual culture, the Northeastern economists celebrated
the merits of metaphysical erudition. Neither did the Northeastern economists exhibit a rigid,
doctrinal commitment to anti-statism. Although the Northeastern free-traders celebrated
individual enterprise and were generally suspicious of legislative initiatives, they did not employ
laissez-faire as a vehicle to advance states-rights ideology.
As an intellectual movement, antebellum free-trade was divided by sectional lines. A
disassociation existed between free-traders in the North and South. Despite advocating the same
policy, neither side seemed interested in what the other was saying. The emphasis paid to moral
philosophy by the clergy-economists was difficult to reconcile with the pro-slavery influence in
Southern free trade. In consequence, the American free-trade movement was missing an element
of cohesiveness. A division, both politically and intellectually, that likely inhibited the
promulgation of free-trade policy during the antebellum era.42 The division also limited the
dissemination of British classicism in the domestic discourse, leaving open a cerebral void in the
American economic mind that was ultimately filled by the protectionists.
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Chapter III
Free Trade in the Slave South

The laissez-faire movement in the South arose in a fundamentally different environment than the
Northeast. The Southerners adapted free-trade ideology to reflect their own particular
intellectual, cultural, and institutional traditions. In contrast to the religiously-inspired
Northeastern political economists, laissez-faire thinkers in the South ignored Smithian moral
philosophy. The Southerners pushed free-trade political economy toward secular analysis,
discounting appeals to a higher power and deflecting concerns of ethical responsibility in favor of
practical policies.1
Most critically, slavery was at the center of Southern free-trade political economy. Still,
the region’s attachment to laissez-faire complimented a broader Southern ideology. Free trade
offered Southerners a device to preserve the region’s political strength in national affairs. The
latter was thought to have been secured by the South’s economic relevance, which rested on the
perpetuation of slavery. By the 1830s laissez-faire evolved into an economic appendage to
states-rights political doctrine. Thomas Cooper and John Calhoun cemented the association
during the nullification crisis.2 As the nation drew closer to the Civil War, the bond between
states-rights and free trade became almost inseparable. Furthermore, laissez-faire was also
adjusted to accommodate the anti-industrial bent of Southern economic culture.3 In this regard,

1

Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810-1860 (Chapel
Hill, NC, 2004), vol. II, p. 888.
2

For the nullification crisis, see Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy (New York, 2005), pp.
374-379; Arthur Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1946), pp. 34, 95-96; John Ashworth, Slavery,
Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic, Volume I: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1860
(Cambridge, 1995), pp. 135-136, 202-203, 333-335; Harry Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of
Jacksonian America (New York, 2006), pp. 117-119, 129-131; Merrill Peterson, Olive Branch and Sword:
The Compromise of 1833 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1982).

24

the Southern free-trade movement was radically different from all other free-trade movements in
the trans-Atlantic discourse.4 The Southern version of laissez-faire drew heavily on an American
agrarian tradition and sponsored a program of national economic development friendly to
Southern agrarian institutions.5 In short, free-trade thought advanced the slave interest, but it
corresponded well to other components of the Southern mind.
Thomas Cooper was the principal intellectual force behind the Southern free-trade
movement. Born in 1759 in London, Cooper emigrated to the United States in 1794. He first
won notoriety in America through a series of stinging attacks in 1799 on President John Adams.
Cooper scoffed at the administration’s Sedition Act, the same act under which he would be
charged with libel. In 1800 he served a six month prison sentence for an article published in the
Northumberland, Pennsylvania Gazette.6Cooper went on to teach at Carlisle College (Dickinson)
and later the University of Pennsylvania. He eventually settled in Columbia as professor of
chemistry at South Carolina College. In 1821 he became the college’s president, a position held
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until 1834. Cooper died five years later in Columbia, South Carolina. He was praised by
Jefferson as “the greatest man in America in the power of the mind.”7
Cooper’s seminal economic treatise, Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy, was
published in 1831 during the midst of the nullification crisis. In 1828 President John Quincy
Adams signed into law the so-called Tariff of Abominations. The tariff galvanized Southern free
traders and transformed tariff policy into a debate over the nature of representative government.
Cooper’s Lectures propelled him to the fore of the national discourse over trade policy. He
became, along with Calhoun, the symbolic head of South Carolina’s nullification movement.8
More than any other Southerner, Cooper merged laissez-faire and states-rights into a
single doctrine. By doing so, he illustrated the intimacy between the political and the economic
in Southern thought. Just so, he established in the antebellum discourse a defense of the negative
state with an economic logic rooted in the philosophical skepticism of Smith.9 Like Smith,
Cooper questioned man’s capacity for rational thought. "Temptations, from caprice, from
prejudice, from flattery, from temporary excitements...from imperfect apprehensions of the
questions before them…[and] from sudden impulse," he wrote, drive humanity to irrational
behavior and obscure comprehension of an enlightened self-interest. "When I was young,"
Cooper reminisced, "I took for granted, that every man, and every body of men, would act
7
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uniformly on the obvious motive of self-interest. I was mistaken. The fact is otherwise; not in a
few, but in a majority of cases.”10
Cooper and Smith shared a cynicism toward the legislator’s capacity to judge the
interests of individuals. This skepticism served as a foundational principle for laissez-faire
economics. Smith, however, never explicitly tied his philosophical skepticism to political theory.
Cooper broadened the scope of Smithian laissez-faire to be inclusive of all policy─political,
social, and economic. Cooper’s suspicions of man’s intellectual capacities were intensified in his
discussion of elected officials. Legislators, Cooper wrote, "promiscuously chosen, who have
neither the same means of minute information, the same imperious motives to use them, or the
same experience," should exercise deference in economic matters, for "every man who has
dedicated his whole time and attention to the business by which he supports himself and his
family, must have more perfect and accurate knowledge."11
From this point Cooper constructed a case against the positive state. Having already
attacked the practical value of legislative judgments, Cooper denied the moral and historical value
of nations. The tendency of philosophers to exaggerate the importance of states by finding in
them “some existing intelligent being” drew Cooper’s ire. The state was simply a means to
secure the well-being of individuals. “Every nation is composed of its individual citizens; the
terms nation, state, community, are words merely─they do not denote any thing separate from the
individual members whose aggregation and association has received these names.”12 Nations
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were no more than associations of men, created to “protect nothing but the laws affording a
common protection.”13
In the antebellum economic discourse, Cooper offered the strongest case for the negative
state. He combined philosophical skepticism and the discounting of state authority with two key
economic principles. First, Cooper presented a narrow definition of what constituted national
wealth. He argued national wealth was simply the aggregate of that which is possessed by
individuals. “The wealth, the capital of every nation, is nothing else than the aggregate of the
wealth and capital of the individuals who compose it.”14 Second, his political economy was
based on the “buy where you can buy cheapest” principle. “If I can buy of my neighbor any
commodity, cheaper than I can make it at home, I save the difference of expense of buying it; and
I am more profitably employed in making some exchangeable commodity for my neighbor.
Cheaper than he can make it, then by making the article that I want from him.”15 Cooper aimed
to shape the economic and political narratives over the legal exercise of state authority. An
individual-centered definition of wealth devalued the role of political institutions. And the “buy
where you can buy cheapest” tenet undermined state prerogatives in establishing restrictions on
trade.
By diminishing the role of the state Cooper united his political and economic thought.
He also made nullification the natural adjunct of his version of laissez-faire. Restrictions on trade
were contrary to economic logic, “founded on fraud, misrepresentation, and intrigue on the part
of monopolists,” and thus politically void.16 Cooper vilified protectionists and their supporters in
Congress as perpetuators of legislative corruption. Neither represented political legitimacy.
13

Cooper, Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy, p. 253

14

Cooper, Two Tracts, p. 7.

15

Ibid., p. 5.

16

Cooper, Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy, p. 219.

28

Protectionists were like any other special interest group, anathema to republicanism, damaging to
individual liberty, and the executors of aristocracy in the modern age.
The anti-statism in Southern political economy corresponded to theoretical developments
in the nineteenth-century laissez-faire movement. In the trans-Atlantic discourse, laissez-faire
was increasingly wedded to liberal politics. In Britain, for instance, laissez-faire was associated
with a larger set of values consistent to social, political, and economic freedoms.17 But Cooper’s
attachment to Southern institutions also drove him to articulate a version of laissez-faire without
reference to industrialization. Moreover, he celebrated traditional agrarianism. “If any
profession is to be fostered, let it be the tiller of the earth, the fountain head of all wealth, and all
power, and all prosperity.”18 “The whole system,” Cooper wrote of manufactures, “tends to
increase the wealth of a few capitalists, at the expense of the health, life, morals, and happiness of
the wretches who labor for them…we want in this country, no increase of proud and wealthy
capitalists.”19 Cooper’s agrarian brand of laissez-faire was an anomaly in the nineteenth-century
discourse, especially after David Ricardo had championed industrial interests.
Cooper’s tirade against industry symbolized the larger debate in antebellum literature
over the trajectory of the American economy. During the middle decades of the antebellum
period two incompatible national economic and political programs had emerged. Protectionists
encouraged the rapid industrial development of the North. Southern free traders imagined a zerosum game, whereby Northern industrial development undermined the plantation economy and
empowered Northern politicians with the legislative authority to hasten the demise of slavery.
The Southern attachment to states-rights and free trade, and the intellectual and policy creation of
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nullification as a viable option came in part as a response to the increasing influence
protectionists wielded over trade policy.20 In their defense of Southern institutions, economic
thinkers like Cooper drew on long-standing free-trade values that accentuated the political
consequences of economic policy. In the antebellum period, the Southern version of laissez-faire
evolved into one of the most important political challenges to federal authority. By doing so, the
Southern free traders adapted an ideology initiated by the enlightened Smith and grounded in a
compassionate moral philosophy to protect slavery.
More than any figure John Calhoun popularized in the public discourse the connection
between laissez-faire economics and slavery.21 Born in 1782, Calhoun matriculated at Yale and
the prestigious Tapping Reeve Law School in Litchfield, Connecticut. He had a long and
distinguished career in national politics stretching from 1811 to his death in 1850. He served
terms in the House and Senate, was Vice President under two administrations, and was Secretary
of War and State. He was one of the most important political figures of the middle period and the
most sophisticated theoretician to serve in Congress. Under Jackson, he led South Carolina in the
nullification crisis. It was then that Calhoun provided the intellectual foundation for Southern
secession.
Calhoun loaded Cooper’s economic analysis with political and sectional overtones. In
speeches, papers and letters written during and after the nullification crisis, Calhoun integrated
selective principles of laissez-faire into a tightly woven political doctrine. He developed an
intellectual affinity for laissez-faire; but he was more concerned with the political ramifications
of economic policy than its theoretical rationale. Calhoun employed the standard assumptions of
laissez-faire as a defensive strategy aimed at preserving the South’s economic and political
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significance in national affairs. Like Cooper, tariffs were the target of Calhoun’s ire. Also like
Cooper, Calhoun extended his criticisms of tariffs into an anti-statist and anti-industrial political
economy.
The Tariff of Abominations was the catalyst in the development of Calhoun’s economic
thought. When the tariff was signed into law in 1828 the planter economy of South Carolina was
reeling from western migration and exhausted soils. Calhoun wrote a friend that summer that
“my property has ceased to give profits, which I believe is true of 9/10 of our planters.”22 He
nailed tariffs as the cause of this malaise. “The whole of our profits are intercepted at the
customs House, through high duties on what we consume,” Calhoun wrote.23 “We are the serfs of
the system,” Calhoun charged, “out of whose labor is raised, not only the money paid to the
Treasury, but the funds, out of which are drawn the rich reward of the manufacture and his
associates in interest. Their encouragement is our discouragement.”24
Like most Southerners, Calhoun saw the tariff through a sectional lens. The tariff,
Calhoun figured, enriched the North at the expense of the South. It served as a bounty for
Northern labor and a tax on Southern consumers. “The very acts, which imposes the burden on
the consumers gives to the labor of one section the power of recharging and more than recharging
the duty, which cannot be shifted to the shoulders of others.” For every cent paid in tariffs
Northern labor was awarded higher prices for their products and thus higher wages. “Almost
every man to the North, let his employment be what it may…hopes to receive more from the
tariff by the increased price of his labor, or his property than what he pays in duties, as a
consumer.”25 Since trade was merely a transfer of commodities and labor, paying an additional
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tax diminished the exchange value of Southern commodities and labor. This weakened the
South’s competitive advantage. Tariffs burdened the South with added costs on articles necessary
in the production of staples, undermining the region’s capacity to contend with foreign producers.
Furthermore, by diminishing the number of goods imported into America, the tariff restricted
access of cotton producers to foreign demand. Duties on imports were equivalent to taxes on
exports. British textile manufacturers, Calhoun argued, would only consume in Southern cotton
an amount equal to what Americans purchased in British wares.26
Calhoun’s economic reasoning illustrates the sectional tone of Southern economic
thought. Southerners believed the tariff made them dependent upon either heavily taxed British
imports or Northern manufactures. The necessity, forced upon the South by tariffs, of having to
resort to the latter incensed Calhoun. Legislation imposing habits of consumption to create
pecuniary advantages for a specific class of producers reeked of privilege. “You compel an
exchange with you by taxing our exchanges with the rest of the world…”27
With the theory of nullification Calhoun raised particular principles embedded in freetrade economics into a full-fledged political doctrine. In essence, he advocated an ideology that
synthesized states-rights and laissez-faire. He interpreted tariff legislation as having grown from
practical measures to stabilize the revenue and remit government debt into policies that doled out
privilege to the North and enhanced the authority of national institutions. The tariff, Calhoun
lectured Congress, “extracts from the South a large portion of the proceeds of its industry, which
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bestows upon the other sections, in the shape of bounties to manufactures.”28 Calhoun added to
his argument principles of classical republicanism. Excessive duties gave the national
government revenue to spread patronage and ultimately corrupt the republican character of the
American polity. It made no difference that tariff legislation was promulgated by a democratic
legislature. According to Calhoun, majority rule was the most dangerous form of all
governments. “No government, based on the naked principle, that the majority ought to govern,
however true the maxim in its proper sense, under proper restrictions, ever preserved its liberty
even for a single generation.”29 Calhoun’s constitutional reasoning brought him to nullification.
The reserved rights of the states implied “a veto or control within its limits on the action of the
General Government, on contested points of authority,” or put simply, the right to nullification.30
Laissez-faire complimented other important factors in Calhoun’s political philosophy.
Like Cooper, he challenged the positive state. “That all governments are actuated by a spirit of
ambition and avarice, and that there is a universal tendency in consequences to the abuse of
power, be the form of government what it may, monarchical, aristocratical, or republican, and
which, if unchecked, must lead to tyranny and oppression, is a truth so well established by
uniform experience, that it may be considered an axiom in political science.”31 Calhoun’s distrust
of government extended beyond the conventional republican fears of legislative abuse of power
and corruption; like Smith he doubted the legislator’s ability to manage the economy.32 Writing
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in the Southern Quarterly Review, Calhoun cautioned, “In view of the errors to which legislators
are subject…it appears to us that the benefits that may flow from it are more than
counterbalanced by the ill consequences that may arise from unadvised attempts to foster an
unnatural growth, which no care or protection can naturalize.” However genuinely interested the
impartial, seasoned legislator might be, the intricate webs of commerce spread throughout and
beyond the American economy made any attempt at supervision impossible. “The ramifications
of trade are so extensive, the circumstances that combine to make any manufacture in this or that
position, likely to succeed, or the contrary, are so numerous, that it is altogether beyond the grasp
of human intellect to adjust to nice calculation.”33
Calhoun’s thought also reveals the dialectic between a staunch dedication to laissez-faire
and a commitment to agrarianism. Southern free traders like Calhoun were part of an earlier
eighteenth-century trans-Atlantic free-trade tradition grounded in agrarianism.34 Smith had
decried the harmful social ramifications of industrial labor, and he noted the economic
efficiencies of agricultural pursuits.35 Accommodating laissez-faire to manufacturing and
machine-based systems of social production was hardly Smith’s intention.
It was not until Ricardo’s defense of manufacturers that an association between free trade
and industrialization emerged. Ricardo’s position was owed to historical circumstances then
evolving in nineteenth-century Britain, much like the Southern commitment to free trade was
determined by peculiarities in the American condition. Free trade in Britain was, according to
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one historian, the product of “vast cultural dimensions.”36 Those credited with synthesizing the
maxims of Smith, Malthus and Ricardo with the industrial order were not academics, but a mixbag of manufacturers and political entrepreneurs. When industrialists reckoned free trade in
agriculture would cheapen the cost of British labor and thus make its manufactures less
expensive, they launched a campaign that elevated laissez-faire to orthodoxy.37 British freetraders targeted the Corn Laws. By the early nineteenth century Britain’s growing population and
increases in domestic grain prices brought the Corn Laws to the fore of domestic politics. In
1839 free-trade activists organized the Manchester based Anti-Corn Law League. The League
matured into a political machine the likes of which had never before been seen in Britain and
shortly after its establishment spun off a subsidiary organization popularly known as the
Manchester School of Economics. These two groups popularized laissez-faire in British
intellectual and political culture and brought an air of respectability to the industrial sector.38 The
campaign against the Corn Laws was provided further impetus by Parliamentarians interested in
advancing the industrial superiority of Britain, or in the words of Joseph Hume, MP, “render all
the world tributary to us.”39 When the Corn Laws were repealed in 1846 it signaled a marked
shift in public opinion over trade policy.40 From this point free trade was increasingly considered
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the policy most effective at developing Britain’s industrial economy, and has since affixed
laissez-faire ideology to the industrial order.
While free trade metamorphosed into a doctrinal instrument of modern industrialism in
Britain, in the South it was attached to an agrarian regime. Conversely, the landed aristocracy in
Britain defended tariffs with arguments against laissez-faire ideology that mirrored almost
verbatim those employed by antebellum protectionists, the difference being that American
protectionists championed industrialization.41These differences indicate both the variance
attendant to ideas in their historical context, as well as the malleability of nineteenth-century
political economy to serve divergent interests. Southern free traders borrowed concepts from
British classicists, but only those that suited their particular regional context.
Like Cooper, Calhoun pushed the Southern free-trade movement against industry and
away from the style and purpose of free trade in the Mancunian tradition. Calhoun also tied his
defense of slavery to agrarianism, which the rapidly industrializing North increasingly
challenged. At the same time, industry, according to Southern doctrine, also undermined the
republican experiment by radicalizing the working class and destroying America’s social
structure. On the floor of the Senate Calhoun warned of the dangers posed by the twin evils of
industrialization and urbanization. “I hold then, that there has never existed a wealthy and
civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live on the labor
of the other.”42 Wages would sink below levels of subsistence, until civil strife descended on the
North, “between the capitalists and operatives for into these classes it must, ultimately, divide
society. The issue of the struggle here, must be the same as it has been in Europe.”43 Northern
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workers were quickly realizing their condition was comparable to, if not worse than the chattel
slave. Leveling elements would inevitably seize the private property of all Americans. These
fears prompted Calhoun to propose a partnership between conservative ‘gentlemen’ of the North
and Southern planters. Southerners would work to silence labor if Northern capitalists helped
hush abolitionists.
There was, however, more to Calhoun’s proposed union between Northern capital and
Southern slaveholders. Calhoun’s version of laissez-faire was compatible with classical
republicanism. He feared most an alliance between capitalists─manufacturers and bankers for
Calhoun─and the federal government. As Lacy Ford has pointed out, “Calhoun fought in defense
of economic liberalism against a potentially reactionary alliance of government and capital.”44
He dreaded equally the revolutionary inclinations of industrial workers as he did the ability of
capital, wielding the powerful arm of state, to exploit the working class and subvert the
republican nature of American government.45
Calhoun’s Tory-like disparaging of industrialization, couched in a Jeffersonian agrarian
idealism, represented a prominent strain in the American free-trade tradition.46 It compels
historians to refigure conventional associations between laissez-faire and industrial capitalism.
The Southern version of laissez-faire was not, in twenty-first-century parlance, anti-capitalist.
But it was aimed at perpetuating economic institutions as they existed, resisting the forces of
economic modernization, and thwarting the North’s desire to catapult America into the industrial
age.
In the antebellum economic discourse the champions of free trade provided some of the
strongest arguments against industrialization. The relationship between Southern laissez-faire
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and agrarianism marks a breach between the domestic free-trade movement and British
classicism. American freetraders followed an alternative course in the intellectual and historical
development of laissez-faire political economy as it passed from Smith to Ricardo. In short,
laissez-faire in the American discourse broke from the British authorities.
In antebellum America there co-existed two forms of laissez-faire ideology that were
fundamentally incompatible with each other.If the United States did indeed symbolize in practical
terms the ideal of free-trade economy, the nation did not harbor a singular, synthesized expression
of free-trade ideology, rather there were multiple articulations. Neither did America’s free-trade
political economists conform to the widely recognized theoretical authorities of the trans-Atlantic
laissez-faire tradition. The Southerners in particular, existed on an isolated laissez-faire
intellectual plane. Although the Southern free traders adopted a more secular methodology,
something the Northeastern academics were reluctant to do, the Southern version of laissez-faire
failed to incorporate the values of the Mancunian tradition. Neither did it emphasize Smithian
moral philosophy. The highly politicized nature of Southern thought compelled men like Cooper
and Calhoun to engage the laissez-faire discourse pursuant of interests and ideas that were
radically different from all other nineteenth-century free-trade political economists.
The American free-traders were, in this way, awkwardly arranged. The Northeastern
brand was bound to an intellectual tradition that by the early nineteenth-century had largely
expired. And the Southerners, prone to resourceful theoretical inventiveness, chartered their own
laissez-faire course. Although the origins of both the Northeastern and Southern free-trade
brands were Smithian neither maintained an absolute commitment to the Scotsman, and they were
less interested in devoting themselves to the British authorities who succeeded Smith.
The latter is exhibited in the following chapter. Antebellum Americans were obstinate in
their treatment of Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo. Like the Northeastern and Southern
packaging of Smith, the Americans who reviewed Malthus and Ricardo were not theoretical
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purists; they manipulated, detracted, and essentially rejected the British giants. The belief in
American exceptionalism, which almost every antebellum American subscribed to, inhibited
domestic thinkers from consenting to the sometimes apocalyptic forecasts of Malthus and
Ricardo. In consequence, a distinctly American political economy emerged; one that did not
depend on tradition, nor seek out intellectual precedent. American free-trade literature discovered
its own discourse, suited to the American experience and fit for the American mind.
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Chapter IV
Progress and Poverty: Malthus and Ricardo in America

The flexibility of Adam Smith’s principles facilitated the accommodation of laissez-faire to the
cultural traditions of both the Northeastern and Southern free-traders. Thomas Malthus and
David Ricardo, however, took laissez-faire in a new direction, one that did not easily conform to
American intellectual traditions. Most antebellum Americans rejected the pessimism inherent to
the economic reasoning of Malthus and Ricardo. Domestic conditions simply denied the dismal
forecasts of Malthus and Ricardo. This chapter will review the American treatment of Malthus
and Ricardo during the antebellum era, with special emphasis given to those who wrote in the
laissez-faire paradigm.
Smith launched political economy into the mainstream of the trans-Atlantic public
sphere. In 1805, the first academic post in the world bearing the name of the nascent science was
established at the East India College in Hertfordshire, England. The position was awarded to
Thomas Malthus. Malthus was born in the 1766 in south England. At eighteen he enrolled at
Jesus College, Cambridge for a career in the clergy. Shortly after graduation, Malthus was
ordained in the Church of England. He became something of a celebrity following the 1798
publication of his Essay on the Principle of Population.1 The work went through six editions
during Malthus’ lifetime, each with important revisions that reflected contemporary criticisms of
the book as well as changes in Malthus’ perspective. He published several other works in
political economy, but he is largely remembered for his work on population.
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In the Essay, Malthus condemned much of humanity to a life of depravity and
melancholy. Providence arranged natural laws without regard to the happiness of humanity,
Malthus concluded. The most insensitive and pressing of nature’s dictate was the rapidity with
which humanity populates the earth and the inability of the food supply to keep pace.“These two
laws,” Malthus wrote, “ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to have been
fixed laws of nature; and, as we have not hitherto seen any alteration in them, we have no right to
conclude that they will ever cease to be what they are now.”2 Man increases its numbers
geometrically, but the means of subsistence increase by arithmetical progression, or simple
addition. Confronted with this ominous calculation, Malthus penned what has become his most
famous passage:
A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence
from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if society do not want his
labor, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no
business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for
him. She tells him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he do
not work on the compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up and
make room for him, other intruders immediately appear demanding the same
favor. The report of a provision for all that come fills the hall with numerous
claimants. The order and harmony of the feast is disturbed, the plenty that before
reigned is changed into scarcity; and the happiness of the guests is destroyed by
the spectacle of misery and dependence in every part of the hall, and by the
clamorous importunity of those who are justly enraged at not finding the
provisions which they had been taught to expect. The guests learn too late their
error, in counteracting those strict orders to all intruders, issued by the great
mistress of the feast, who, wishing that all guests should have plenty, and
knowing that she could not provide for unlimited numbers, humanely refused to
admit fresh comers when her table was already full.3
Malthus predicted little better for the United States. In America, where labor was well
compensated, the masses might avoid immediate suffering, but, he cautioned, “It may be
expected that in the progress of the population of America, the laborers will in time be much less
2
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liberally rewarded. The numbers will in this case permanently increase, without a proportional
increase in the means of subsistence.”4
Malthus was widely referenced in the antebellum discourse, but with few exceptions,
Americans rejected Malthusian population theory. Malthusian population theory was not,
however, in the words of one historian, “a side attraction.”5 Antebellum free traders accepted
Malthus as a central figure in British laissez-faire, but they developed an independent logic based
on the belief that American conditions existed without historical precedence.6 Antebellum free
traders integrated a distinctly American understanding of population growth into a wider defense
of laissez-faire. In the antebellum discourse, laissez-faire was not rigidly confined to the
strictures of a single paradigm. Rather Americans engaged laissez-faire with a sense of
intellectual autonomy.7 The Americans recognized that some principles of British classicism
suited the domestic context, while other principles did not. This was particularly the case in the
South where Malthusianism was manipulated to vindicate the region’s social, political, and
economic institutions.8 It was not uncommon, however, for Southerners who were sympathetic to
Malthusianism to simultaneously reject other tenets of classical doctrine. The American
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treatment of Malthus was remarkably varied and illustrative of the malleability of laissez-faire in
the antebellum discourse.
Benjamin Franklin’s 1751 "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind and the
Peopling of Countries" was the first serious attempt made by an American to deal with population
theory.9 American conditions, Franklin argued, prevented redundant numbers. Even if the
population doubled every 25 years, a rate calculated by Franklin and one that proved true until the
Civil War, there was no need to fear overpopulation. “Notwithstanding this increase,” Franklin
wrote, “so vast is the territory of North America, that it will require many ages to settle it
fully...”10 With a seemingly infinite supply of land, labor would not compete for dwindling
resources. Rather wages would be kept high enough to afford a decent standard of living. “A
laboring man,” Franklin found, “can in a short time save money enough to purchase a piece of
new land...whereon he may subsist a family.”11 Rules suitable for Europe, Franklin concluded,
were inapplicable to America.12 Thus, population studies "formed on observations, made on fullsettled old countries, as Europe," Franklin wrote, "will not suit new countries, as America."13
Franklin’s ideology was more pragmatic than dogmatic, and he was hardly a laissez-faire
type. Still, Franklin set the tone for antebellum treatment of population theory. The underlying
tenet that motivated the breach between the Americans and Malthus was American
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exceptionalism. By emphasizing American exceptionalism, the antebellum free traders signaled
their willingness to pursue an alternative economic narrative. On some occasions, the belief in
American exceptionalism led to sacrificing the internal consistency of their logic. If free-trade
political economy delineated axioms applicable to all, then historical conditions were immaterial.
But the Americans acknowledged the potential for some laws, in this case population, to bend
according to prevailing circumstances. The natural order could be compromised, and the
otherwise holistic system of laissez-faire political economy be made to account for the American
experience.14
The belief in American exceptionalism dominated Northern treatment of Malthus.
Northeastern clergy freetraders rejected Malthus for its apparent skepticism in God’s
benevolence.15 Protectionists countered Malthus with an explicitly optimistic vision of American
economic development.16 The protectionist rejection of Malthus was based on several points of
criticism. First, protectionists quelled contemporary anxieties by arguing that even if the
Malthusian trap was possible, overpopulation was not “for centuries to come.”17 Few antebellum
Americans could find any benefit in restricting domestic population growth.18 Besides, western
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lands provided a ‘safety-valve’ for redundant labor. Second, Malthus considered each increase in
humanity as an addition to the pool of consumers, but he failed to calculate the potential each
human addition had for increasing production levels. Population pressures spurned Americans
toward greater industry, advanced specialization, led to the mechanization of labor, and
ultimately a more effective cultivation of the soil. Combined, these developments occasioned
higher yields and higher wages.19 Population density was not something to fear; rather it was a
reflection of American progress. The future promised higher standards of living as production
gains would outpace population numbers.20 Or, put differently, the accumulation of capital would
outpace population growth. Finally, protectionists argued that Malthusian overpopulation was
evident only in countries with corrupt political and social institutions.21 The European masses
faced a population crisis because their governments were instruments of the aristocracy. Reared
in aristocratic England, Malthus was incapable of imagining the benefits afforded to ordinary
citizens under a democratic-republican regime. For protectionists, democratic legislation was the
cure to all economic evils.22
Northern optimism on American population growth was carried into the antebellum
South by J.D.B. De Bow, a central figure in Southern political economy. Born in Charleston in
1820, he moved to New Orleans as a young man where in 1846 he established the popular journal
that carried his name. Two years later he was appointed professor of commerce and statistics at
the University of Louisiana (Tulane). In 1853 De Bow was made head of the United States
19
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census. His three-volume The Industrial Resources, Statistics, &c, of the United States and More
Particularly of the Southern and Western States published in 1854 was a monumental
achievement in statistical economics.23
A Southern nationalist and a staunch supporter of slavery, De Bow’s chief concern was
advancing the economic interests of the South. De Bow illustrated how a devotion to regional
interests combined with a general optimism in antebellum conditions shaped the Southern
treatment of Malthus. Although dedicated to laissez-faire principles, his economic philosophy
maneuvered around the Malthusian trap. The republican nature of America’s polity cultivated
particular “habits” that engendered a robust industrious spirit, he believed. Southerners were
compensated for their virtuous commercial and industrial character with augmented provisions of
capital and increased wages. Thus, labor and capital were afforded a constant improvement in
their condition.24
Southern free traders like De Bow broke from the British classical tradition in significant
ways. They operated on a fundamentally different understanding of the natural order. In the
process they effectively established a radically different paradigm distinguished by a genuinely
Southern appreciation of economic phenomena. De Bow’s enthusiasm over the development of
the Southern economy was couched in a sectional tone. The natural order, De Bow argued,
issued laws “just as fixed and unalterable as those that presided over the motions of planetary
masses, or that regulate chemical affinities.”25 But for the South, nature’s system did not promise
the dismal circumstance described by Malthus. Indeed, the natural order, at least as it existed in
the South, offered charitable bounties. De Bow discovered an alternative state of nature in the
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antebellum South. The laws governing the Southern universe were benign, providing opportunity
rather than peril.
This appreciation was grounded in Southern optimism. Southerners had perfected the
exploitation of nature. “Speed the plow” De Bow ordered, “raise the capacity of the earth, say
we, to satisfy the requisitions of a rapidly augmenting population.” Southern labor commanded
nature’s treasures, accumulated a vast reserve of capital, and evaded the population crisis that
troubled Malthus. “The innate faculty of our people to subdue the physical world, their energy
and self-reliance, their habitual disregard of discomfort, difficulties and dangers, have made other
nations say of us, that we alone could instill heroism in the common pursuits of life.” De Bow
touted the industrious spirit of Southerners and celebrated the region’s natural resources. “Let
two blades of grass shoot up where but one grew before. Let one man conduct the previous
operations of two men.”26
De Bow’s economic thought captures Southern political economy in many ways.
Although he rejected the Malthusian paradigm for the South, he saw the North in darker terms.
De Bow is illustrative, in the words of his biographer, of one “reared in an era when the South
grew conscious and fearful of its inferior position in the union.”27 Employing Malthusianism as
an intellectual strategy to defend Southern institutions, he considered the population of the
industrial North moving inevitably toward redundancy. “The mining and manufacturing
operatives of the North...labor there from early dawn until after candle-light, from one year to
another, for a miserable pittance, scarcely above the starvation point and without hope for
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amelioration.”28 But in the South, slavery provided a social and economic safety-valve.29 The
region’s slave-based agrarian economy inhibited the development of industry and thus prevented
the Malthusian cycle from operating. Slavery raised wages for Southern white workers, raised
the status of free labor in the South, and precluded Southern labor from finding “employment in
crowded cities and…competition in close and sickly workshops and factories, with remorseless
and untiring machinery.”30
The peculiar uses of Malthusianism in the South found another clear expression in
George Tucker. Tucker was born into a prominent merchant family in Bermuda in 1775. He
moved to Virginia to study law under the tutelage of his uncle, St. George Tucker. He later
served six years in Congress between 1819 and 1825 and was appointed by Thomas Jefferson to
professor of moral philosophy at the University of Virginia.31 Tucker died in 1861 just two days
before the attack on Fort Sumter.
Like De Bow, Tucker failed to recognize nineteenth-century convention that bound
Malthus with laissez-faire universalism. Early in his career, Tucker offered what stood as the
earliest critique of Malthus, only to have later, in the words of one historian, “out-Malthus
Malthus.”32 His version of laissez-faire was malleable, driven by a will to defend the South’s
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peculiar institution. Tucker’s economic thought is indicative of the Southern tendency to avoid
theoretical discipline, as well as the inability of American freetraders to formulate a consensus.
“The laws of population, as laid down by Malthus must be considerably modified,” Tucker wrote,
for “it is clear, then, that moral causes─probably by producing a slight retardation of
marriage─constitute the operative check in the United States, and that the extraordinary facility of
subsistence which exist here, seems to exert no influence.”33 His early criticisms of Malthus
rested on a belief in a benevolent system of natural liberty. “Liberty seems to have been
productive of so much good in whatever it has been fairly tried....that we are encouraged to hope
it would not occasion a mischievous excess of population.”34 Tucker’s natural economic order
was markedly different from that described by Malthus. Large populations stimulated human
progress through increased specialization, a more effective exploitation of markets, and by
encouraging literature and the fine arts. The whiggish tone of Tucker’s thought was combined
with American exceptionalism. The young nation existed in unprecedented historical
circumstances. “There is seldom a day that the most indigent person among us does not eat
animal; and it is next to impossible for many to suffer seriously here from the want of
employment.”35 He attributed these conditions to the prudent character of America’s republican
citizenry. Population checks in America operated as subtle, voluntary social forces. In short, the
American experiment was atypical.
Tucker’s population theory grew more Malthusian as tensions between North and South
intensified. Tucker’s optimism was replaced by Malthusian fatalism in a set of correspondences
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with the well-known Boston protectionist Alexander Everett, a Northern anti-Malthusian. These
were published in the late 1840s and widely circulated in Everett’s Democratic Review. “I have
read much, and thought much, on the subject,” Tucker wrote, “and have persuaded myself
that...Malthus’s premises are in the main true...”36 Tucker struck a Malthusian tone with Everett,
arguing that the natural limitations on fertile land coupled with humanity’s propensity to multiply
would depress labor to subsistence levels. With civilization came decay as redundant numbers
exerted a slow, agonizing effect on the food supply; passing from animal, to vegetable, to grain,
and eventually potatoes. “Food cannot go on increasing,” Tucker reasoned.37 Labor would suffer
disproportionately as provisions dwindled to a quantity barely able to support life.38
Other Southerners, mainly Thomas Cooper and Thomas Roderick Dew, were more
consistent in their application of Malthusianism to fit the Southern narrative. Southern political
economists, according to Dennis Hodgson, “were attracted to Malthusianism…because it allowed
them to project a bleak future for the ‘free-labor’ system.”39 As the nation drew closer to Civil
War Southerners manipulated Malthusian logic and laissez-faire principles to argue the failure of
free-labor society and bolster the legitimacy of Southern slavery.40 Cooper engaged the latter
36
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tactic, as we saw in chapter 3, in writings during the nullification crisis. On population, Cooper
warned that man’s “tendency to increase is a law of nature: it may be checked, controlled,
counteracted: by natural causes, by artificial means; but it can not be stopped.” Cooper wrote in
contrast to the prevailing optimism of antebellum culture, “if there be more human beings than
food to support them, some of them must starve.”41
In Cooper’s political economy Malthusianism fit neatly into his larger narrative of the
failure of Northern society and the moral superiority of slavery. Slavery acted as a positive check
against overpopulation.42 Northern free society allowed its mud-sills to multiply with wanton
rapidity, but in the South masters managed slave numbers and, if necessary, restricted their
generation. Furthermore, because capital (master) in the South owned its labor, the slaveholder
was more likely afford slaves a decent subsistence to labor since by doing so he improved his
own assets.43
Thomas Roderick Dew developed Southern Malthusianism into a formidable defense
against state-sponsored regulation of slavery. Born in 1802 into prominent a Virginian slaveowning family, by the 1830s Dew was, in words of one biographer, a “Southern touchstone” of
pro-slavery philosophy.44 In 1827 Dew returned to his alma matter of William and Mary as
professor of history, metaphysics and political economy.45 He was elected president of the
college the following year and served in this capacity until his death in 1846. A free-trade
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fundamentalist, Dew instructed his students from the Wealth of Nations. “The South,” one
historian writes, “sat in his classroom and was told what to think.”46
Dew’s population theory advanced an anti-statist, laissez-faire maxim that aimed at
justifying the Southern slave prerogative. He employed Malthusian rationale to strike at federal
and state legislation to regulate slavery. For Dew, Malthus provided evidence of the authority of
market outcomes. The free-trade regime was not only nature’s prescribed economic order, but it
was also consistent with Southern slave interests.47 The principles of laissez-faire, Dew argued,
“may truly be compared to the great law of gravity in the material world; powerful in its agency,
frequently counteracted by other forces, but in consequence of its constancy and steadiness of its
operation, overcoming every other power in the end.”48The slave population adjusted to a natural
economic order that was beyond the scope of legislatures, thus statutes designed to check the
slave population would be countered by natural, market-oriented directives.
Dew’s understanding of population growth was communicated in his Review of the
Debate in the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832. He argued against a proposal to collect
funds intended for purchase of the state’s slaves for future deportation or colonization. Since,
according to Dew, “Malthus has clearly shown population depends on the means of subsistence”
the sluggish pace at which Virginia’s white population increased would grind to halt, as taxes
diminished the availability of the basic necessities. State-sponsored purchases of slaves would
instead augment demand, luring enterprising masters to breed slaves at prodigious rates, thus
counteracting the purpose of legislation. “The energies of government,” Dew charged in the
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Virginia legislature, “are for the most part feeble or impotent” in their attempts to counter the
inexorable natural economic order.49
As the Civil War drew closer, Dew and other laissez-faire Southerners increasingly
adapted Malthusianism to their own ends. They employed the logic of Malthusian population
theory to highlight the positive effects slavery had on mitigating redundant numbers. American
political economists made more profound adjustments in their treatment of Ricardo.50 By the
mid-nineteenth century reputable political economists could not write on economic matters
without discussing Ricardo. “Ricardo’s influence on economic thought in the United States of
the nineteenth century,” Joseph Dorfman wrote, “was enormous.”51Dorfman’s assessment glosses
over the intricacies of the antebellum economic discourse. Antebellum free-traders treated
Ricardo in a similar fashion to how they handled Malthus. Southerners balked at accepting the
totality of Ricardo’s doctrine, while most Northerners were unable to find a practical application
of Ricardian principles in the American economic environment. The lack of intellectual
commitment to Ricardo is further indication that British classicism did not dominate the domestic
discourse. By the middle decades of the antebellum period the Americans developed a sense of
intellectual autonomy from the British authorities, one that encouraged a break from classical
orthodoxy and the construction of a distinctly native laissez-faire political economy.
Ricardo was born in London in 1772. The third of seventeen children, at fourteen he
joined his father on the London Stock Exchange. Shortly thereafter, Ricardo renounced his
Jewish faith to marry a Quaker. In the process he was estranged from his family. Ricardo began
his own brokerage business, made a fortune, and retired at age forty-two to become a country
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gentlemen in Gloucestershire. In 1819 he became a member of the House of Commons
representing Portarlington, Ireland, a seat he held until his death in 1823. By chance at age
twenty-seven, Ricardo came across Smith’s Wealth of Nations. This was his first exposure to the
subject, and, in his own words, he "liked it so much as to acquire a taste for the study."52
Ricardo brought a new level of theoretical abstraction to nineteenth-century economic
thought and he did more than any other economist to articulate classical orthodoxy. He wrote on
a wide range of economic topics, but his theories on distribution─mainly rent, wages and
profits─distinguished his writings. In his 1817 Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
Ricardo defined rent as "that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for
the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil."53 Rent is paramount to Ricardo’s
analysis since it determines income distribution. When population expands greater sums of labor
are required to cultivate less fertile lands. As it becomes more difficult to extract food from
marginal lands the costs of labor, food, and rent increase. Over time labor competes for a smaller
real wage and is forced to plow less fertile soils. “The fate of the laborer will be less happy,”
Ricardo wrote, “he will receive more money wages, it is true, but his corn wages will be reduced;
and not only his command of corn, but his general condition will be deteriorated, by his finding it
more difficult to maintain the market rate of wages above their natural rate,” i.e., the Iron Law of
Wages.54
Labor is not the only sector disturbed by increased rents. Because labor’s compensation
is determined by a wages-fund, what the manufacturer pays in wages is subtracted from profits.
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As food costs eat away at profits, manufacturers face declining returns. “Each man may, and
probably will, have less absolute quantity; but as more laborers are employed in proportion to the
whole produce retained by the farmer, the value of a greater proportion of the whole produce will
be absorbed by wages, and consequently the value of a smaller proportion will be devoted to
profits.”55 Tensions between rents and profits, combined with Malthusian overpopulation, keep
labor at subsistence levels and diminish profits for manufacturers. Capital, Ricardo posited, “will
diminish with every diminution of profit, and will cease altogether when their profits are so low
as not to afford them adequate compensation for their trouble,” i.e., the Law of Diminishing
Returns.56 In the Ricardian system, capitalist and labor and the proprietors of land are at odds,
precipitating social conflict. “The interest of the landlord is always opposed to that of the
consumer and manufacturer.”57 Ricardo’s version of the natural order confined commercial
society to the same rules that command the behavior of plants and animals.58 Market forces are
comparable to scientific formulas that are ungovernable, indiscriminate in their application, and
“rendered permanent by the powers of laws of nature.”59
The American treatment of Ricardo was as varied and critical as the antebellum
discussion on Malthus. There were a few staunch Ricardians, mainly Thomas Cooper, John
McVickar, and Francis Wayland, who repeated with slight variations the teachings of the
Englishman. Their adherence to Ricardo was not determined by the same type of sectional biases
that influenced the American reception of Malthus. Protectionists, on the other hand, flatly
rejected Ricardo. Protectionists envisioned a dynamic economy, one quite different from the
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static model presented by Ricardo. Americans were destined for prosperity, increasing returns,
and had yet to settle the continent’s most fertile lands. Neither was America home to a
monopolist class of landlords, as Ricardo had observed in England. Moreover, capital, labor, and
agriculture coexisted in perfect harmony. Finally, Ricardo’s theory of distribution was a bridge to
laissez-faire, a logic naturally at odds with protectionist ideology.60
The immediacy of industrial development in the North brought upon its free-trade
political economists a special urgency to review Ricardo’s work. More than any Northern
economists Henry Vethake exhibited the sharpest appreciation of the Ricardian system. Born in
1790 in British Guyana, Vethake moved to the United States at an early age. He enjoyed a long
and illustrious academic career, teaching a variety of subjects and serving in various capacities at
a number of Northeastern institutions. These included Columbia, Queen’s College (Rutgers),
College of New Jersey (Princeton), Dickinson, University of the City of New York (New York
University), and the University of Pennsylvania. A well-regarded intellectual in his own time,
Vethake was awarded honorary degrees from the College of New Jersey and Columbia, edited an
entire volume of Encyclopedia Americana, and was considered the first professor in America to
teach students political economy. He died in 1866 as professor of Mathematics at Philadelphia’s
Polytechnic College.61
Vethake’s 1838 Principles of Political Economy drew heavily from Ricardo.62 But his
sensibility to American exceptionalism precluded Vethake from accepting the totality of
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Ricardo’s system. He was, according to John Turner, “not...limited by the orthodox teaching.”63
Vethake echoed the underlying optimism that marked domestic intellectual culture. His optimism
did not rely solely on a materialistic foundation, however. Like many of his colleagues teaching
in the Northeast, Vethake was a devout man. His belief in a benevolent creator provided the
spiritual inspiration for his economic optimism. The economic order, Vethake wrote, was
governed by an “Author of nature…co-operating” with humanity to ensure that individuals
enjoyed the greatest amount of happiness possible.64 An unwillingness to admit that God
rewarded the pious worker and industrious capitalist with economic and social disorder convinced
Vethake of a more positive economic future.
Religion was not the only factor that influenced Vethake’s thought. His economic
thought reflected the social and political context of the era. Vethake’s academic posts in the
Northeast brought him in proximity to the epicenters of American industrialization. There he
discovered, contrary to Ricardo’s England, capital and labor working in harmony, encouraging
prosperity and social stability rather than poverty and social strife. The entrepreneurial ethos that
characterized antebellum culture prevented Vethake from forecasting the class tensions explicit in
Ricardo’s work. A Jacksonian Democrat, his ideal was a middle-class society where laissez-faire
benefitted those of an industrious spirit. Vethake was drawn to political economy in part because
the discipline offered practical lessons to improve the condition of labor without having to resort
to the politician’s “superficial views of expediency.”65 But Vethake also made clear that his
political economy was not geared toward radicalizing labor. Contrary to labor militants that
employed Ricardo’s labor theory of value for revolutionary designs, Vethake’s was geared
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toward subtle reforms.66 He anticipated an alternative industrial course, one with increasing
returns to manufactures that had the potential to soften labor’s transition into the industrial age.67
Vethake’s liking for moderation is obvious in his treatment of distribution. His theory of
distribution was heavily influenced by a belief in American exceptionalism and a Jacksonian
ideology of equal opportunity industrial capitalism. Vethake rejected Ricardo’s three-tiered
economic class structure, for “the same person may unite in himself the characters of landlord, of
capitalist, and of laborer, or of any two of them.”68 The opportunity for social mobility, and even
more, the parity of land distribution in the antebellum economy drew Vethake further from
Ricardo and closer to the traditions of American political economy.69
While Vethake adapted Ricardian principles to the burgeoning industrialism of the
North─and in a context of Yankee piety, the Southern treatment of Ricardo was not as clearly
tied to the region’s institutional and cultural traditions. A few radical fire-eaters interpreted
classical doctrine as evidence of an impending collapse of free-labor society, but the more
objective, academic economists found little relevance in Ricardo’s writings to conditions in
America.70 Like most Americans, the Southerners were not categorically committed to the
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classical paradigm. Jacob Cardozo illustrates this point. He provided the South’s most learned
and critical review of Ricardo.
Like Ricardo, Cardozo was of Sephardic Jewish heritage. He was born in Savannah,
Georgia in 1786, but he spent most of his life in Charleston. There he published the free-trade
organ The Southern Patriot.71He ran the paper until his death in 1873. As a journalist, according
to one biographer, he exercised tremendous influence on public opinion and he “reveals Southern
intellectual thought at its highest level.”72
Cardozo’s 1826 Notes on Political Economy was written largely in reaction to the
growing trans-Atlantic Ricardian consensus.73 “We are...convinced that if the principles of this
theory,” Cardozo wrote of Ricardian orthodoxy, “should be adopted as texts for lectures in our
Colleges and Universities, it will greatly retard the progress of this important science among
us.”74 He challenged the two most fundamental precepts of the Ricardian paradigm. First,
Cardozo rejected the labor theory of value. He argued that intellectual conventions and European
conditions gave the labor theory of value its authority in nineteenth-century political economy. In
European societies where land was becoming increasingly less productive, economists overstated
labor’s importance in wealth creation. The determinant of value was, according to Cardozo,
never absolute; rather it was decided by a myriad of factors.75
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Second, Cardozo attacked Ricardian rent. He was far more optimistic than the
Englishman. “What evidence is there, that skill, science and ingenuity are not, in all stages in the
progress of society, able to overcome the natural inferiority of the soil which refuses to yield,
without the co-operation of these powerful human aids, an increase of the means of
subsistence.”76 Cardozo also attacked Ricardo for integrating into his rent theory a Physiocratic
bias that exaggerated the importance of land and agriculture.77 “The larger portion of the produce
of the soil transferred, in the form of rent, in consequence of the social arrangements that have
taken effect throughout Europe, has given rise to the idea of a net surplus that is peculiar to
Agriculture.” This prejudice reflected an implicit social value common to European societies
where land was monopolized by an aristocratic regime. “But...where more natural arrangements
prevail, there is no surplus for rent, in the sense of this term as it is generally understood.”78
Cardozo’s criticisms of Ricardian rent were expanded to cover more generally the
methodology by which political economists conducted the science. He emphasized the role of
historical circumstances in economic analysis, understood political economy as culturally
specific, and he rebuked Ricardo’s claims of universality. Cardozo drew on American conditions
for evidence to disprove Ricardo’s so-called natural economic laws. He was one of the only free
traders in the antebellum period to explicitly call for an absolute American divorce from
European models. The British authorities, Cardozo discovered, had formulated economic
principles without considering American conditions. Cardozo advocated for the construction of a
distinctly American political economy. The nascent science, Cardozo wrote, could be more
properly investigated here than in Europe since American “institutions and laws have done less to
76
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derange the natural order of things than where a vicious social organization has resulted either
from military violence or a selfish policy.”79
The political economy of Vethake and Cardozo exemplified the American reception of
Ricardo. The Americans were not passive recipients of classical doctrine. Ricardo was not,
contrary to the historian Paul Conkin, “domesticated.” Neither did the Americans attempt, as
Conkin claims, to “amend and revise” Ricardo’s system “in ways that only illustrated how much
they remained within the same analytical tradition.”80 The Americans operated on an alternative
paradigm. Vethake’s theological doctrine was simply more optimistic than Ricardo, and Cardozo
initiated his economic analysis from a radically different set of precepts.
In the process of refuting Malthus and Ricardo, the Americans forged a new brand of
laissez-faire, one that paid special consideration to domestic conditions. The failure to fall in line
with the Malthusian/Ricardian paradigm does not exclude the antebellum economists from the
trans-Atlantic free-trade movement. Rather it illustrates the lack of consensus within that
movement.81 The tent under which liberal thinkers found shelter was broader and more complex
than traditionally believed, welcoming a plurality of personalities whose understanding of the
laissez-faire ideal varied considerably. In the antebellum discourse it was perfectly acceptable to
be anti-Malthusian, anti-Ricardian, and yet still be labeled a free trader. The treatment of Malthus
and Ricardo in the domestic laissez-faire discourse is also indicative of how many antebellum
free traders did not take seriously the perils the British economists had linked to industrialization.
Overpopulation, class warfare, and other dangerous features of free-market industrialization were
attributed to the aristocratic qualities of British political and social systems. These dangers were
neutralized by the exceptionality of American circumstances.
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As the following chapter will show, however, the belief in American exceptionalism was
not shared by all. The forecasts of Malthus and Ricardo were taken seriously by minority sects.
These groups rejected contemporary notions of American exceptionalism, rebuked bourgeois
values, rejected Malthus and Ricardo, and decisively broke from the American versions of
laissez-faire economics. Although divide by regional lines, they expressed an affinity of ideas
that provides a rather intriguing expression of the intellectual course of American economic
thought. In the South, George Fitzhugh and George Frederick Holmes struck at Smith, Malthus,
Ricardo and all that was sacred to free-trade ideology. In the North, the Jacksonian-era race
toward industrialization cultivated the philosophical origins of American socialist thought.
Combined, the Southern reactionaries and Northern laborites formed something of an intellectual
alliance, encouraging a radically alternative social, political, and economic system, and providing
antebellum American with its most definitive theoretical challenge to the free-market paradigm.
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Chapter V
The Crisis of Free Society: The Southern and Northern Reactionaries

By the mid-nineteenth century American economic thinkers paid increasing attention to the social
externalities of industrial capitalism. In the North, a small but vocal group of labor advocates
demanded profound alterations to the industrial economy. They appealed to segments of society
outside of academia and government, mostly urban workers frustrated by market economies. The
Northern laborites exemplified antebellum working-class mentality and they made important
contributions to an organic, domestic version of early socialist thought. Langton Byllesby and
Thomas Skidmore were the foremost representatives of this group. They found something akin to
an intellectual alliance with Southern pro-slavery theorists, such as George Fitzhugh and George
Frederick Holmes, who offered broad denunciations of bourgeois institutions. The philosophical
inconsistencies of British classicism, the degradation of labor in industrial society, the callousness
of market competition, and the emerging class stratification in the North serviced pro-slavery
attacks on the free-labor regime. Both the Northern laborites and Southern pro-slavery writers
struck at the core of classical/free-trade orthodoxy.
This chapter examines antebellum economic thinkers who articulated the sharpest rebuke
of the free-trade model. The Northern laborites and pro-slavery reactionaries further indicate the
lack of a laissez-faire consensus in the domestic discourse. The expansion of industry and the
political conflict surrounding slavery provoked passionate challenges to the intellectual authority
of laissez-faire. As the Civil War approached, the anti-market literature, particularly in the South,
grew more hostile to social and political institutions associated with laissez-faire. The Northern
laborites and pro-slavery reactionaries were not intellectual outliers either; they represented an
essential element in the American discourse.
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The sectional divide in American politics exacerbated the divisions in American political
economy. Southerners grew increasingly unreceptive of laissez-faire industrial ideology.
Southern free-traders expressed latent hostility toward industrialization, but the criticisms by
Southern free-traders like Calhoun and Cooper were moderate, almost affable censures when
compared to the militant denunciations of Fitzhugh and Holmes. The radical pro-slavery authors
of the 1850s offered the period’s most profound rejection of laissez-faire ideology. British
classicism, industrialization, and all attendant bourgeois institutions were condemned for their
lack of morality and abandoned as a mode of thought and policy. American industrialization,
these critics insisted, engendered social, moral, and psychological transformations that Southern
gentlemen found culturally distasteful, ethically offensive and socially hazardous. In their proslavery literature, Northern ‘wage slavery’ subjected white operatives to ceaseless drudgery based
on the exploitation of man by man. Northern labor subsisted under conditions even worse than
chattel slaves. Pro-slavery thinkers dismissed claims of American exceptionalism and argued that
white American labor would be reduced to paupers.They returned, effectively, to the forecasts of
Malthus and Ricardo.1
To Fitzhugh and Holmes fell the task of articulating pro-slavery ideology in its most
essential form. Their writings hardly constituted a well-honed scientific study, but this should not
discount their significance. Pro-slavery anti-free-trade thought wielded powerful influence in the
South. “You, [Henry] Hughes, and I,” Fitzhugh reported to Holmes, “have revolutionized public
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opinion at the South on the subject of slavery.”2 Their Southern contemporaries took them
seriously. “My friends tell me that I lead the Southern mind,” Fitzhugh wrote President James
Buchanan in 1858.3 Although Fitzhugh was prone to exaggeration, he and Holmes were indeed
at the fore of pro-slavery philosophy.
Fitzhugh was born in 1806 near Brentsville, Virginia. He received little beyond a
common education, rarely traveled, and spent much of his time reading from his personal
collection of books and pamphlets. Before the Civil War Fitzhugh held minor government posts
in the Attorney General’s office and during the conflict he worked with the Southern Treasury.
In the Reconstruction era he served alongside an ex-slave as an associate judge in the Freedmen’s
Bureau. He later moved to Kentucky, and then Texas where he died in 1881. In the pre-war era
Fitzhugh’s ideas circulated widely in articles written for De Bow’s Review and in his two main
works published in the 1850s, Sociology for the South and Cannibals All!. 4
Fitzhugh’s critique of laissez-faire political economy was the platform from which he
developed the foundational principles of Southern plantation ideology. “He stripped away many
of the contradictions and hesitations and brought those assumptions into the open,” one historian
wrote, “he took a major step toward the formation of a coherent slaveholders’ world view.”5
Fitzhugh’s attack on laissez-faire economics offered a sweeping censure of bourgeois society. He
provided the theoretical superstructure for the most radical and confrontational elements within
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the pro-slavery movement. In the process, Fitzhugh assailed not only the Northern free-trade
regime, but the entire edifice on which liberal America stood.
First, Fitzhugh struck at the liberal assumption of the “Right of Private Judgment,” or the
right to personal intellectual sovereignty and the right to act on that judgment. For Fitzhugh, the
right of private judgment was the glue that held together the liberal ideological matrix.6 He
blamed the “enthusiastic speculative philosopher” Thomas Jefferson for disseminating values that
were both socially and morally dangerous. There were natural and universal rights, Fitzhugh
argued, chief among these was the right “to be taken care of and protected, to have guardians,
trustees, husbands, or masters; in other words, they have a natural and inalienable right to be
slaves.”7 He mocked personal sovereignty and self-reliance as impractical ideals. Indeed,
Fitzhugh estimated that nineteen out of twenty individuals were incapable of self-care. The one
in twenty was fitted for authority, the others for slavery. “The weak in mind or body require
guidance, support and protection,” and it is the obligation of society’s leaders to afford them
protection.8 The protection of the weak was for Fitzhugh what constituted the sacred moral tenet
in conservative government. “Instead of relaxing more and more the bounds that bind man to
man, you must screw them up more closely,” Fitzhugh demanded, “that, instead of no
government, you must have more government.”9
The significance of Fitzhugh in the antebellum economic discourse lies in the extent to
which he inverted the logic of laissez-faire ideology. He carried the rudimentary axioms of
laissez-faire to their logical conclusion, illustrated their theoretical inconsistencies, and
accomplished what he considered was the overthrow of the entire system of free-trade political
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economy. Although Fitzhugh dubbed Smith “absent, secluded, and unobservant,” he did share
with the Scotsman deep skepticism in the human intellect.10 While Smith’s reservations were
buried in his moral philosophy and generally raised only in discussions on mercantilist policymakers, Fitzhugh gave explicit and exaggerated expressions of skepticism that went beyond
heads of state to ordinary individuals. Ministers and monarchs were badly mistaken in their
understanding of the economy, but so too, Fitzhugh argued, were the hewers of wood and drawers
of water. The common man was incapable of rationally calculating an enlightened self-interest.
“Nature has made them slaves,” Fitzhugh wrote, “to protect men, not merely from wrong and
injustice from others, but from the consequences of their own vices, imprudence and
improvidence.”11
Showcasing the internal inconsistencies of laissez-faire ideology was one of Fitzhugh’s
main pursuits, but he also took special pride in supplying a litany of inflammatory moral
declamations on the socially abusive features of free-market society. In the decade preceding the
Civil War, he participated in an increasingly aggressive campaign against the free-labor system.
Slavery advocates argued that the Northern industrial regime was morally bankrupt. Fitzhugh’s
target was again Smith. The Wealth of Nations, which Fitzhugh judged the most influential book
since the Bible, substituted for Christian piety a struggle for survival where the cunning exploit
the obtuse. “A beautiful system of ethics this,” Fitzhugh noted sarcastically, “that places all
mankind in antagonistic positions, and puts all society at war.”12 The danger of Smith’s
teachings, according to Fitzhugh, is its recommendations for both an economic and moral system.
“The morality...is one of simple and unadulterated selfishness,” Fitzhugh complained. “The
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public good, the welfare of society, the prosperity of one's neighbors, is, according to them, best
promoted by each man's looking solely to the advancement of his own pecuniary interests.”13
Fitzhugh’s writings helped introduce in the antebellum discourse sociological and
psychological approaches to understanding the transformations wrought by industrial capitalism.
His Sociology for the South was the first American treatise having in its title the term ‘sociology.’
The subtle, underlying cultural factors that constituted the relations between industrial capital and
labor elicited Fitzhugh’s attention. His description of labor’s condition in some ways anticipated
Marx and it drew strong parallels to antebellum Northern labor literature.14 Labor’s woes
evidenced the debased moral character of free-market regimes. Fitzhugh found industrial labor in
a miserable state, locked in satanic mills toiling without end, living hand to mouth, and
susceptible to the abuses of capital. “We do not know whether free laborers ever sleep. They are
fools to do so; for, whilst they sleep, the wily and watchful capitalist is devising means to ensnare
and exploit them.” Capital stalks labor, into “every recess of domestic life, infects its food, its
clothing, its drink, its very atmosphere, and pursues the hireling, from the hovel to the poorhouse, the prison and the grave. Do what he will, go where he will, capital pursues and
persecutes him.”15 Capital’s exploitation of labor is driven by greed, is methodical, organized,
and efficient, with booty taking the shape of profits won from a “moral Cannibalism” that free
society celebrated as the gentleman’s reward.
In the antebellum economic literature Fitzhugh was the most unequivocal in rejecting
free-market society as an economic model for the South. Writing in the 1850s, Fitzhugh and
most of the Southern intelligencia looked to European rebellions of the 1840s as the North’s
13

Ibid., p. 20.

14

Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, pp. 168, 184-190; John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism,
and Politics in the Antebellum Republic, Volume I: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850 (Cambridge,
1995), pp. 230, 232.
15

Fitzhugh, Cannibals All!, pp. 202-203, 18, 16.

68

future. Free labor, Fitzhugh wrote, is growing more cognizant of “their own numbers and
strength,” so that “all the reasoning in the world will not satisfy them that they who produce every
thing should starve, in order that a handful of lords and capitalists should live in wanton waste
and idle luxury.”16 Although equality and liberty were promised to bring unprecedented benefit
to the masses, it was precisely this segment of society that suffered under free-market regimes.
“The little experiment of universal liberty that has been tried for a little while in a little corner of
Europe, has resulted in disastrous and appalling failure.”17
As the Civil War approached, radical Southerners like Fitzhugh amplified their warnings
of social revolution in the industrialized world. The specter of labor insurrection helped buttress
Southern claims that slavery was the most effective form of social organization. In Britain, free
markets drove wages to subsistence levels. In Ireland, John Bull starved Irish peasants. In
France, the people enjoyed liberté, égalité, fraternité, but lacked bread. And in the American
North, labor was without a “home of his own; he is insecure of employment; sickness may
overtake him at any time and deprive him of the means of support; old age is certain to overtake
him, if he lives, and generally finds him without the means of subsistence; his family is probably
increasing in numbers, and is helpless and burdensome to him.”18 Liberty and equality, what
Fitzhugh called “new things under the sun,” had given license to the rich to oppress the poor.19
Fitzhugh’s critique of industrialization drew the Southerner into an awkward intellectual
alliance with trans-Atlantic socialism. “We, too, are a Socialist,” Fitzhugh declared.20 The
affinity Fitzhugh and other pro-slavery writers of the 1850s entertained for socialism is one of the
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peculiar features of antebellum economic thought.21 Fitzhugh, Marx and other socialists
expressed sharp opposition to industrial capitalism at almost exactly the same time. The lines
separating European and domestic socialists from conservative reactionaries in the plantation
South often blurred. Fitzhugh’s Tory-like disparagement of laissez-faire was influenced more by
Carlyle than Marx, but it indicated the extent to which the pro-slavery theorist was willing to
stretch his logic to defend Southern institutions, as well as the intellectual elasticity of the
antebellum conservative-reactionary mind. Fitzhugh’s attraction to socialism was, however,
mainly for rhetorical purposes. “I never read a socialist author treating his subject
philosophically in my life,” he wrote in 1855.22 Social unrest, precisely the type advocated by
socialists, was for Fitzhugh and other like-minded pro-slavery agitators a perilous evil. He was
after all an agent of the planter elite who read with horror reports on the European revolutions of
the 1840s.23
Fitzhugh penned most of his writings after the uprisings of 1848. Part of his defense of
slavery rested on its ability to cultivate harmonious relations between masters and slaves. The
“benign and protective institution” promoted a mutuality of interest between labor and capital.
Slavery “begets domestic affection on the one side, and loyalty and respect on the other.”24 Only
under slavery were the masses, blacks and whites, guaranteed security and happiness. The
institution sheltered labor in sickness, and in infancy and old age. Slavery provided a caring,
paternal master compelled by moral and social norms to protect the weak and poor. “We tell
those who ask for or require protection and support that ‘they must submit to be controlled, for
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that price of security has ever been, and will be, the loss of liberty.”25 The master will defend his
slave, Fitzhugh wrote, as he would any of his personal possessions. “A man loves not only his
horses and his cattle, which are useful to him, but he loves his dog, which is of no use. He loves
them because they are his.” Such was the omnipotent design of Providence, Fitzhugh discovered,
to make “the selfishness of man’s nature the protecting aegis to shield and defend wife and child,
slaves and even dumb animals.”26
In the antebellum economic discourse Fitzhugh’s writings encapsulated the philosophy of
the American planter reactionary. He took pro-slavery ideology to its furthest conclusions. The
pro-slavery voice grew more belligerent as the period came to a close. Driven by political
pressures, Southerners like Fitzhugh employed an increasingly boisterous tone in their attacks on
laissez-faire ideology. By 1860 the rift between North and South was as palpable in the period’s
economic discourse as it was in politics. Fitzhugh’s attacks on industrial capitalism rattled
American bourgeois culture and the aggressive character of his writings presumably helped field
an army in defense of planter institutions.
In the post-war period Fitzhugh wrote articles for De Bow’s Review, predicting the spread
of “Yankee isms” in the North. “We have little hope for the future,” Fitzhugh lamented, “the
American Republic is near its end.” The nation’s only hope rested in a “conservative
reaction....effected by the untrammeled aid of the South.”27 Although a radical voice in the eyes
of twenty-first-century historians, Fitzhugh was not an outlier. In the 1850s scores of pro-slavery
‘fire-eaters’ challenged the emerging industrial-capitalist regime.28 The most systematic and
learned analysis of this group came from George Frederick Holmes.
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Holmes was born in 1820 in British Guiana and educated in England before arriving in
America at age eighteen. At age twenty-eight he ascended to the presidency of the University of
Mississippi. He was by then widely recognized as an authority in social and political thought.
His time at Mississippi was brief, however. Much of the remainder of his career was spent at the
University of Virginia where he taught for 40 years until his death in 1897.29
In countless articles published in the South’s most influential journals, Holmes presented
the most mature Southern refutation of laissez-faire in the antebellum discourse. Holmes’
criticisms were more profound than Fitzhugh’s. He was not, however, as Eugene Genovese
called him, “an overrated pedant.”30 The methodical and tempered nature of his writings helped
communicate analyses of Northern bourgeois society in scholarly assessments. This imbued
Holmes’ writings with an element of objectivity that was missing from the propagandist style of
other Southern fire-eaters like Fitzhugh. Holmes stood closer to the planter-cavalier model than
any other Southern thinker. He desired a social order absent of market values and he rejected
unequivocally the fundamental principles of free-market industrial capitalism.
Holmes’ critique of bourgeois ideology assumed several forms. He was especially
interested in the social developments attendant to the emergence of large-scale industry. But
Holmes also paid special notice to the development of laissez-faire as an intellectual movement.
Free-trade political economy, Holmes argued, lacked the basic standards by which methodical
28
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inquiry is customarily handled and could therefore make no claims to scientific objectivity. Even
the most central concepts─capital, labor, and value─lacked precise definition. “The obscurity
and fluctuation of their terms arise from the previous want of lucidity in their conceptions, and
they generate in the progress of speculation further obscurities and fluctuations, and very
frequently fallacies which are neither discerned nor suspected.” Holmes contended that political
economy could not reach definitive conclusions, “the house is built upon sand,” he declared.31
Challenging the theoretical basis of laissez-faire was a technique that pro-slavery writers
used to undermine the Northern free-labor regime. Free-trade ideology, according to Holmes,
was symbolic of the degenerated nineteenth-century liberal mind. Like most antebellum
Southerners Holmes was suspicious of liberal intellectual culture. The South grew less and less
tolerable of Enlightenment ideas.32 This anti-intellectual disposition resonated in Southern
economic thought. “We are, indeed,” Holmes declared in the Southern Quarterly Review, “no
great believers in ‘the march of the intellect,’ in the nineteenth century.”33Laissez-faire political
economy was the most conspicuous and harmful philosophical fiasco of the era, Holmes insisted.
Indeed, Smith, Ricardo and Malthus were little more than charlatans clothed in learned dress,
servants to the prevailing industrial order. Their treatises gave a false air of theoretical prestige to
“the Gospel according to Mammon,” helping legitimize the impetuous desires of humanity by
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inventing an ideology marked by “the immediate gratification of the most important
number─Number One.”34
Holmes also launched antebellum America’s most systematic critique of the
psychological consequences of free-markets. His writings indicate that the differences between
the North and South in antebellum America were as much cultural and they were economic. In
free-market societies, “individual life is swallowed up in....business avocations:─the lust of gold
is the main-spring of....actions.”35 The human spirit was transformed, according to Holmes, its
mental faculties reconstructed as monetary scales. Moral conventions were determined not by
tradition or ethic, but the ability to satisfy pecuniary wants. When material gain becomes the
governing spirit of human existence, Holmes wrote, society “rapidly degenerates into a curse.”36
The moral and spiritual necessities of the human race were disregarded, “ideas of obligation and
duty have given place to gain and expediency:─immutable right and unchangeable wrong are
measured and tested by the surplus or deficit of their aggregate money returns.” Cast in the allengrossing chase for wealth, the individual has “overlooked everything else.”37
Like many pro-slavery critics of industrial society, Holmes appealed to Northern workers
in his writings. Holmes highlighted the exploitative tendencies of industrial capitalism,
strengthening the intellectual bond between socialists and the conservative planter elite.
Although his analysis of free labor was geared toward elevating the moral position of slavery,
unlike Fitzhugh, Holmes harbored a sincere affinity for socialist programs. “The first grand aim
then of social amelioration,” he wrote, “should be to establish a more thorough and equal
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distribution of the means of sustaining life─of productions─by a natural, healthful, and orderly
modification of the laws of property.”38 His interpretation of the historical development of labor
was consistent with socialist thought. The transition from slave to feudal to free labor was
initiated once capitalists realized the latter optimized profit. “The more it has been released from
legal restrictions or deprived of legal protection,” Holmes wrote of labor, “the worse has become
the condition of the laborer, the more precarious his support, and the more stringent and crushing
the pressure of the circumstances─that ever burning circle of fire─by which he is surrounded.”
The emancipation of serf and slave was prompted not by a pious, enlightened heart, but from
capital recognizing new opportunities to exploit labor with scarcely any attendant responsibilities.
“The principle which occasioned the substitution of free for slave labor was the prospect of
diminished expenditure and increased gain...Look into their declamations, contemplate their
tactics, survey the whole literature of political economy, and it will be manifest that the real
argument is simply that free labor is cheaper and more productive or profitable than slave
labor.”39
For Holmes, industrial capitalism was incompatible with conservative Southern culture.
Even so the social and moral cannibalism inherent to industrial regimes undermined the interests
of humanity. Southern reactionaries imagined themselves global crusaders charged with rescuing
humanity from the perils of industrial capitalism. “It is to be feared that capital is applied most
diligently to the procurement of a cheaper substitute for human labor, and to its exclusion. The
steam man is the competitor of the human man.”40 The freemarket employs the wonders of
science and technology toward the manipulation of the masses. Laissez-faire political economy
turned human exploitation into a technical science, soliciting the most efficient methods to profit
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at the expense of others. Echoing Malthusian pessimism, he prophesized if the industrial machine
continued its then current pace, it will “reach speedily the limit when the masses, not of one
country, but of the whole commercial world will be pauperized, and unable to keep up with the
production…and enfeebled by disease so as to be unable to supply the physical force required for
the creation of the raw material.”41
Holmes’ critique of capitalist exploitation serviced pro-slavery claims that the North
marched inevitably toward social revolution. Calhoun’s prediction of worker unrest discussed in
chapter 3 was a persistent line of argument employed by radical Southerners against free labor,
and as the nation drew closer to Civil War, pro-slavery thinkers highlighted contemporary
incidents of worker strife in the North and abroad. “The different classes are arrayed against each
other,” Holmes warned, “the rich dread and scorn the power of the masses…The multitudes envy,
hate, and menace the wealth:─they threaten agrarianism or the less sweeping remedies of
violence and fraud:─for they feel that inherent discrepancy has grown into bitter hostility and
inexplicable wrong.”42 Slavery was the obvious alternative. Nineteenth-century reports on the
condition of free labor illustrated that the Southern slave was far better off than the factory
operative. Holmes voiced the Southern maxim that slavery was a positive good; chiefly because
the institution accomplished what no other economic system could. It brought the interests of
capital and labor together.43
Pro-slavery reactionaries like Holmes and Fitzhugh engaged the free-market discourse to
defend slavery, but they also took the opportunity to launch broader criticisms of political
liberalism. In the antebellum literature lengthy expositions on political theory often accompanied
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economic inquiries. This was especially the case in the radical pro-slavery writings where
political economy was part of a multi-layered attack on Northern institutions. Holmes and much
of the conservative planter elite expressed deep hostility toward liberal political ideology. In the
mind of the Southern reactionary, laissez-faire political economy and the doctrine of political
individualism were intellectual siblings. “But the cry of the capitalists for the Laissez faire
system,” Holmes wrote, “in order that their acquisition of gains might be unrestricted, has led to
the supposition that the entire absence of political restraints was the Utopia of political
organization, and the surest evidence of Democratic principles.”44 The tendency of nineteenthcentury theorists to unite into a single movement economic and political liberalism threatened
social stability. Laissez-faire economics, Holmes argued, finds some truth “within the narrow
range of their legitimate application; but when we see it wrenched from its just employment, as
an explanation of the increase of wealth, into a cannon for the government of nations,” it
engendered social catastrophe.45
By the 1850s radical pro-slavery authors were denouncing everything associated with
Yankee culture. Like Fitzhugh, Holmes elaborated what other opponents of the liberal creed had
only hinted at. “There is one great delusion of political economy, not as a science, but as a
practical rule, that it conceives the world will steadily pursue what is best, not what seems best.”46
For Holmes, laissez-faire and the doctrine of individual sovereignty left society open to chance.
He also expressed radically anti-liberal views on private property. In this regard, Holmes
illustrated the extent to which reactionary Southern economic thought was divorced from
American liberal traditions. “The wants of society,” Holmes wrote, “have outgrown received
formulas; that the existing elements of social organization have in consequence been thrown into
44
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fatal anarchy and discord.”47 The social transformations wrought by political individualism and
industrial capitalism required that nineteenth-century intellectuals rethink their most fundamental
assumptions on the moral responsibilities of property ownership. Property was not sacred,
Holmes concluded. “In all ages, the forms in which it [property] must be confined, have been a
legitimate subject of legislative and constitutional enactment.”48
The economic writings of Holmes indicate that laissez-faire was not the dominant
paradigm of the antebellum period. Holmes was not an anomaly in an otherwise laissez-faire
American economic discourse either. Antebellum economic thought was inclusive of a wide
range of conflicting ideological platforms. These differences were amplified as the nation came
closer to the Civil War. This is not to say that the political economy of radicals like Holmes and
Fitzhugh was compelled into existence by political imperatives. The radical pro-slavery literature
contains ideas central to American conservative thought that predate the 1850s.49
The Civil War destroyed Holmes’ vision of America. He interpreted the conflict as a
“crusade of anarchy, corruption, and agrarianism.”50 Holmes predicted the North was headed
toward a military dictatorship. At Lincoln’s death he forecast that the internal contradictions of
Northern society would unleash “all the furies of agrarianism and anarchy.”51 After the war
Holmes took the oath of amnesty and returned to teaching and writing at the University of
Virginia. His obituary in the American Historical Review noted the professor had “published
little, but was of note as a teacher.”52 Despite Holmes’ contributions to the social sciences after
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the Civil War the anti-market thrust of his writings vanished during the Gilded Age and he was
only recently rescued from historical oblivion.53
Holmes, Fitzhugh and the other radical pro-slavery writers who abhorred the doctrines of
classical political economy represented important facets of the antebellum economic mind. “The
reactionary enlightenment” of radical pro-slavery ideology was, as Louis Hartz wrote, “the great
imaginative moment in American political thought.” The ideology was not however, rejected or
neglected as Hartz argues.54 Rather it was defeated by the superior numbers and resources of the
North. And contrary to liberal consensus historiography, the radical pro-slavery writers were not
aliens in an otherwise free-market intellectual environment. The North had its own cohort of
critics that issued sharp rebukes of laissez-faire doctrine. Although the Northern radicals were
often times abolitionists and prescribed reforms that were quite different from the pro-slavery
authors, the two groups shared an explicit desire to reconstruct America along pre-market values.
The Northern anti-market thinkers, like the Southern pro-slavery radicals, contributed important
conceptual tools that challenged the fundamental principles of laissez-faire ideology.
The postponement of an American edition of Marx’s Communist Manifesto until 1871
did not prevent circulation of socialist literature in America. European labor radicals that
migrated to the United States after the revolutions of 1848 found in the industrial North a
burgeoning working-class movement. In the 1820s trade and craft associations organized two
separate Working Men’s Party, one in Philadelphia and the other in New York. The leadership
consisted mainly of independent journeymen, but the party rank and file included artisans from a
variety of industries, as well as dock workers, wage laborers, and even small merchants. They
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sponsored public education reform, the 10-hour day, the abolition of imprisonment for debt and
the end of prison labor.55
Labor reformers in the 1820s and 1830s focused a great deal of energy on land reform.
Increasing rents and the concentration of land ownership that were central components to
Ricardo’s analysis attracted American labor to land redistribution schemes. The early American
agrarian movement worked largely in unison with the labor movement and often shared the same
leadership. But the agrarians tended to advance reforms sympathetic to free-market ideology.
Their chief accomplishment, the Homestead Act of 1862, was considered by advocates a
fulfillment of the principles of 1776 and in the mode of a Jeffersonian middle-class ideology.56
Labor-intellectuals from the agrarian movement injected ideas into the debate that were
entirely incompatible with bourgeois institutions.57 Chief among these was Langton Byllesby.
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Born in Philadelphia in 1789 Byllesby was just an infant when his parents died of cholera.58 He
served as an editor for a local newspaper in Western Pennsylvania before moving his family to
New York City. There Byllesby worked as a journeyman proofreader for Harper Brothers. In
1826 Byllesby wrote Observations on the Sources and Effects of Unequal Wealth. The work,
according to one historian, was “the first angry American economic treatise,” initiating “a
tradition of class-conscious economic advocacy by those who identified themselves with an
American working class.”59
Byllesby assumed the task of articulating the concerns of the disaffected journeyman
mechanic. His political economy gave voice to a burgeoning working-class ideology. He did
not, as some historians have claimed, advocate a moderate strain of agrarianism.60 Land
redistribution was part of his program, but it was ancillary to a comprehensive reorganization of
the urban, industrial economy. Byllesby’s economic thought was set in an alternative paradigm
from the classical model. Indeed, he sought the complete overthrow of the market economy, or in
his words, “revision of the present system of the arts of life; and distribution of the products of
labor.”61
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Byllesby’s work is as much a critique of industrial capitalism as it is a systematic inquiry
in political economy. He was, however, familiar enough with the nineteenth-century economic
discourse to structure his criticisms of laissez-faire on the very principles that serviced classical
doctrine. He began his analysis with reaffirmations of the Ricardian labor theory of value.
“Labor alone is the source of all wealth,” Byllesby declared.62 But in the current free-market
system “the products of labor belong to almost any other than the producer, who generally obtains
from the application of his power no more than a bare subsistence.”63 The sequestering of labor’s
wealth into the hands of a parasitic few forced the American worker into a condition comparable
to the chattel slave. Moreover, it cemented the class stratification that marked America’s
industrial quarters.
Byllesby was one of the first Americans to attribute class hostilities to free markets. He
anticipated Fitzhugh and Holmes by more than two decades. Byllesby emphasized the role of
four free-market institutions that in his view were responsible for aggravating class relations and
precipitating inequities in the distribution of wealth. He struck first at the banking industry.
Byllesby anticipated Jackson’s war on banks by declaring financial institutions the main culprits
in effecting economic inequality. Financiers perpetuated an assembly of frauds on the working
class. The moneyed interests combined with middle-men and merchants, or those engaged in
what Byllesby called “trafficking,” forcing labor to exchange its products for a fraction of their
worth.64 Commerce, or the various stages separating labor from consumers was tantamount to
theft since it failed to compensate workers with wages equal to the labor spent in the production
process. Byllesby also challenged the ethical propriety of profits. All profit, he declared, was a
morally depraved value exploited from labor. Finally, Byllesby predicted that machinery would
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hasten unemployment crises, reduce wages, weaken consumer purchasing power, and initiate
general gluts. Thus, according to one historian, Byllesby was one of the first American political
economists to investigate the effects of technology on unemployment and the distribution of
wealth.65
The reforms suggested by Byllesby would have abolished the market system. His plan
for an “Association for Securing Equal (or Mutual) Advantages (or Interests)” designed a
program of “equalization.”66 This included the organization of society into industrial
communities in the form of joint-stock corporations. These labor associations harnessed the
productive powers of industry, secured high employment, provided just reward for labor, and
eliminated poverty. Labor should, Byllesby figured, when combined with industrial machinery,
find four to five hours a day sufficient for the production of subsistence. Under the new regime
trade would be based rightfully on the principle of reciprocity, all would have equal entitlement to
the land, inheritance abolished, and interest prohibited.
Byllesby’s economic system was not, as Joseph Dorfman has suggested, designed to
defend the laissez-faire ideal. Neither was Byllesby simply protesting “against privilege and
invidiousness.”67Dorfman’s liberal/consensus reading of Byllesby─that the laborite incorporated
“business promotion with socialist rhetoric” is based on the latter’s spoof on the opponents of
patents.68Dorfman’s assessment failed to recognize the seriousness of Byllesby’s proposals.
Neither does Dorfman provide adequate explanation for how the revolutionary reforms suggested
by Byllesby could be reconciled with the free-market antebellum economic order.
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Like the Southern reactionaries, Byllesby’s political economy was antithetical to the
laissez-faire model. Unlike the Southern reactionaries, however, Byllesby was committed to a
socialist agenda. He admitted an intellectual debt to the British neo-Ricardian/Ricardian
Socialists, in particular the Scottish economist John Gray. The neo-Ricardians/Ricardian
Socialists extrapolated principles from Ricardian political economy, mainly the labor theory of
value, to undermine the logic of classical doctrine. The neo-Ricardians/Ricardian Socialists
argued that since the value of commodities equaled the quantity of labor embodied in them, yet
capitalists apportioned the lion’s share of income through interest, rent, and profits, then labor’s
compensation was unjustly appropriated. Their ideas were developed during the first-half of the
nineteenth century and eventually found a more acute exposition in the works of Marx.69After
having read Gray, Byllesby found a clear “similarity of ideas” and rushed to include protracted
quotations from Gray’s Lecture on Human Happiness (1826) in his own Observations.70
Byllesby’s work must be treated beyond the context of the Jacksonian war on monopoly
and banks. Antebellum economists were deeply engaged in the trans-Atlantic discourse and often
exchanged ideas with European thinkers. Byllesby’s work is indicative of an antebellum
working-class ideology growing increasingly hostile to free-markets. As one historian has noted,
“with Byllesby...we witness the acceleration of a fundamental shift in language and
sentiment...toward a recognition that a deeper matrix of exploitation and unequal exchange for
labor was responsible for the plight of the mass...”71
The socialist impulse behind Byllesby’s thought also appeared in Thomas Skidmore’s
work. Son of Connecticut farmer, Skidmore spent his early adult years searching for work in the
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Northeast. In 1819 he settled in New York City, educated himself with the works of Jefferson,
Locke and Rousseau, and became active in local politics. Journalist, teacher, printer, carpenter,
and listed as a “machinist” in the catalogues of New York’s Working Men’s Party, the otherwise
obscure craftsman had by 1830 became the intellectual head of the antebellum labor movement.
He died in 1832 of cholera at age forty-two.
Skidmore articulated the most mature expression of working-class antagonisms toward
laissez-faire ideology.72 His criticisms were as incendiary as Fitzhugh’s. In his 1829 The Rights
of Man to Property! Skidmore proposed radical transformations to the antebellum economy. He
scoffed at the notion of private property, attacked the foundational principles of classical doctrine,
and aimed to reconstitute society along pre-bourgeois capitalist lines. Skidmore intended, in his
own words, to “entirely remodel the political structure of our state, and make it essentially
different from anything else.”73
Skidmore’s criticisms of free-market institutions were developed into an economic
doctrine entirely at odds with laissez-faire ideology. He advanced what he described as a
political economy pursuant of rational ends, taking basic though radical economic assumptions to
their furthest logical conclusions. According to one historian, Skidmore contributed to
“something of a theoretical breakthrough” for antebellum working-class ideology.74 His first
target was the labor theory of value. Although labor adds value to property, it does not imply
property rights. “Why will not labor bestowed upon property in possession give title: Because the
property itself, is another’s, and before any labor can be honestly bestowed upon it, that other,
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who alone owns its, must give his consent.”75 From this premise, Skidmore demanded the
abolition of private property. All men have equal claim to the earth’s resources. “The soil,”
Skidmore declared, “belongs....equally....to all who are found upon it.”76 Only through the
community’s consent can property rights exist. Property rights are not sacred. Rather they are
entirely conventional. Moreover, the accumulation of property by one should never inhibit
another’s claim to subsistence, for this entailed a violation of the most basic human right. The
latter incensed Skidmore and other laborites of the Jacksonian era. Under bourgeois property
rights, he wrote, “a part, and that a very large part, of the human race, are doomed, of right, to the
slavery of toil, while others are born only to enjoy.”77
The transformative effects of Skidmore’s program separated his economic ideology from
other laborites. Skidmore called for immediate working-class revolution. “Is it not time for the
people,” Skidmore asked, “those who have rights as well as the rich, to interpose on their
behalf?” His measures were directed explicitly at the rich. “Let us look then upon the rich man,
as he has been, or as he now is, among us, rather as a curse, than as a blessing, rather as a
something, himself, which it is proper to exterminate…Nor let the word exterminate, be thought a
harsh one. Both rich and poor ought to be exterminated: the latter by being made what we call
rich; and the former by being brought to the common level.”78 The urgency of Skidmore’s
political economy was precisely the type of extremism that Southern reactionaries feared and led
them to infer the failure of free society. To “unclench the hand of avarice, and make it give up its
dishonest possessions,” Skidmore urged a radical reconfiguration of the antebellum economy.79
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The first practical step in Skidmore’s project was the abolition of inheritance. An
individual’s lease on property ended with death. Just as succeeding generations do not interfere
with the destiny of those who have come before them, the dead have no claim over the destiny of
the generations that follow them. God’s resources shall be returned to a common pool upon an
individual’s death. “The system which I thus place before the world,” Skidmore declared, “will
rigidly maintain the principle, that no man or generation of men, have property, or the disposition
of property, either as to who shall own, or shall not own it, or as to the use that shall be made of
it, one moment after they cease to exist.”80 Every adult member of society was entitled to the
property of the deceased, placing each on an equal footing at the entrance of mature life.
The revolutionary character of Skidmore’s agenda is difficult to exaggerate. He
advocated a complete alteration of antebellum property rights. Skidmore, as one historian wrote,
“carried the questioning and ambitious temperament of the American artisan radical to new
heights...in a relentless assault on institutions and hierarchies even his most radical predecessors
did not challenge.”81 To suggest, as Dorfman has, that Skidmore pursued “business ends” is
inaccurate.82 Rather Skidmore expressed working-class hostilities toward the laissez-faire model.
Dorfman’s evaluation is based in part on Skidmore’s support for tariffs. Dorfman failed to
understand that Skidmore understood protective tariffs as a means to curtail what he perceived
were the harmful effects of international competition. Skidmore’s protectionism was not
intended to advance the interests of industrial capitalists.
Neither is it entirely accurate to represent Skidmore’s political economy as alien to an
American free-market ideology consensus. In the antebellum economic discourse there were
dozens of working-class intellectuals who echoed Skidmore’s resistance to industrial capitalism
80
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and laissez-faire political economy. He found a receptive audience, too. On October 19, 1829 he
presented his ideas to a New York’s Working Men’s Party convention. The party endorsed
Skidmore’s reforms and nominated him a candidate for the New York state assembly. When the
final tallies of the 1829 election were counted Skidmore was short of victory by only twenty-three
votes.83
The Northern laborites and Southern reactionaries presented antebellum America with the
most penetrating critique of the laissez-faire model, both as an intellectual system and a practical
social/economic system. They constructed alternative paradigms to understand economic
phenomena and both aimed to reconstitute the American economy without bourgeois capitalist
institutions. The cerebral alliance between the two may be owed to what Holmes called the
“anarchy and confusion” of the nineteenth-century discourse.84 Far from working under a freemarket consensus, the antebellum economic mind lacked clear ideological parameters.
It is also possible, within the context of the antebellum discourse that both groups
genuinely believed they were advancing humanity’s cause. The slave system advocated by the
Southern reactionaries and the socialism of the Northern radicals sought to liberate the masses
from the physical drudgery of industrial labor and the mental slavery of the cash nexus. In the
antebellum discourse ‘liberal’ was largely appropriated by those who followed a Smithian brand
of free-market economics. However, the Northern socialists and Southern reactionaries
constructed economic visions that claimed to optimize human freedom. “The Socialists, the
Communists” Holmes wrote, “are precisely those who most loudly proclaim their desire to
establish a concentrated and consolidated government, which shall constantly interfere in all the
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affairs of private life...Yet this is...an indication of the progress of freedom.”85 Socialism
promised, according to Holmes’ interpretation, emancipation from market forces, the end to
labor’s suffering, and mitigation of conditions that classical doctrine described as inevitable. In
the logic of socialists like Byllesby and Skidmore, freedom from the natural economic order of
Smith, Malthus and Ricardo represented the ultimate form of human liberty.
For the Southern reactionaries freedom was interpreted as safety from capital’s exploit
and security from want. The differences between the socialist understanding of liberty and that of
the Southern reactionaries may be obvious to twenty-first-century historians. But in the context
of antebellum economic thought the distinctions were not clear. “Socialism proposes to do away
with free competition,” Fitzhugh wrote, “to afford protection and support at all times to the
laboring class; to bring about, at least, a qualified community of property, and to associate labor.
All these purposes, slavery fully and perfectly attains.”86 For Fitzhugh slavery was the most
perfect form of socialism.
It was in this intellectual setting that American protectionism emerged. Protectionists,
like the free-traders, the Northern laborites and the Southern reactionaries, constructed a political
economy that promised to augment American freedoms. They argued that by restricting Smith’s
‘natural system of liberty’ in international trade Americans would find their economic freedoms
enlarged. In the antebellum discourse it would not have appeared especially contradictory for
protectionists to argue for an economic system that preserved individual economic freedoms
while simultaneously sealing off the domestic market from foreign competitors. Protectionists
were, in this sense, championing an economic order that offered a different set of freedoms from
those proposed by the Northern laborites and Southern reactionaries. Within the protectionist
framework, restrictions were conceived as liberal, in the same way that the abolition of property
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rights and the enslavement of the masses were perceived as human emancipation. When taken
together, the various strains in American political economy illustrate that the domestic discourse
functioned in its own particular cerebral sphere, one that can not be accounted for without
reference to antebellum intellectual traditions.
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Chapter VI
Protectionism: An American Political Economy

The domestic treatment of Smithian free trade varied between regions, and Malthus and Ricardo
were widely refuted by antebellum thinkers who wrote in the laissez-faire tradition. The
Southern reactionaries and Northern laborites presented economic ideologies outside of the
American mainstream, and neither organized into a bona fide school of political economy. In
consequence, antebellum Americans expressed the desire for a distinctly native political
economy. Protectionists believed they offered just that.
Protectionism was the antebellum period’s most successful challenge to classical
orthodoxy. It was also antebellum America’s main contribution to the trans-Atlantic discourse.
Alexander Hamilton fathered the movement, but it was not until the 1850s that protectionist
thought was united under a coherent ideology by Henry Carey. During this period protectionism
went through several stages of theoretical development. At each juncture, protectionists
incorporated principles at the core of antebellum economic, political, and social culture. These
included American exceptionalism, free-labor entrepreneurialism, national industrial
development, and economic, political, and ideological independence from the Old World.
This chapter traces the intellectual development of antebellum protectionism. It identifies
the origins of several key points of protectionist criticisms of laissez-faire economics, and shows
how protectionism reflected important intellectual and cultural elements of the antebellum
economic experience. Protectionism was the period’s most authentic brand of American political
economy. The progression of protectionism as an economic ideology corresponded to several
seminal political and economic events of the period. Nationalism and domestic economic
security were the principles that undergirded protectionism during its formative years.
Throughout the antebellum period, protectionism was centered on questions of American
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sovereignty. The War of 1812 encouraged protectionists to elaborate on Hamilton’s nationalist
assertions. The collapse of the domestic economy following the peace at Ghent led protectionists
to refine and expand their positions. These included the so-called infant industries argument, the
claim that industrialization bolstered agricultural production, and the notion that tariffs benefitted
American labor. The economic arguments were, however, secondary to assertions that
protectionism secured the republic’s political independence from Britain.
Protectionist thought was given additional stimulus during the nullification crisis. The
spread of free-trade economics in the domestic discourse forced protectionists to sharpen their
economic reasoning, become more critical of laissez-faire political economy, and connect
economic policies to larger questions about the role of government in the antebellum economy.
The nullification crisis also pushed protectionists to devise a more organic system of thought.
Finally, the instability that characterized the antebellum economy during the 1830s and 1840s
gave protectionists further impetus to polish the case behind high tariffs. By the 1850s the ideas
of earlier protectionists were cultivate into a well-structured economic ideology that was
ultimately crystallized in the writings of Henry Carey.1
Protectionism was also the economic ideology of American industrialization. It promised
Americans industrial hegemony and economic security without the social hazards forecast by
Malthus and Ricardo. In this way, the protectionists also anticipated the course of American
politics. Originally aligned with the Whigs, Republicans later featured protectionism in their
platforms before, during, and after the Civil War. Protectionist arguments provided Whig and
Republican legislators the economic logic behind some of the world’s highest tariffs of the

1

The tariff played an important role in hostilities between North and South. Richard Bensel, Yankee
Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (Cambridge, 1990), p. 73, argues
the tariff, along with other economic measures advanced by Republicans just prior to secession, aimed at
undermining the Southern economy; Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf, Nations, Markets, and War: Modern
History and the American Civil War (Charlottesville, VA, 2006), pp. 174-177, argue the tariff was central
to the antagonistic views over national economic development.

92

nineteenth century.2 But the protectionists also had a keen eye for American history. They
argued British laissez-faire was incompatible with the course of American history, and developed
instead what they regarded as an alternative grounded in the exceptional conditions of the
American experience.
Although historians recognize the importance of tariffs to antebellum politics, they have
largely ignored the ideology that undergirded protectionist thought.3 Much of what has been
written on protectionism is by economic historians who approach the subject with a free-trade
bias.4 These tend to minimize the value protectionists contributed to the antebellum discourse
and they fail to appreciate protectionism as a cohesive economic ideology. They argue that the
protectionist movement was orchestrated by industrialists, who for pecuniary advantage
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converted Congress into a paper mill for special interest legislation.5 While producer interests did
contribute to tariff legislation, this interpretation gives much greater credence to free-trade ideas
than Americans at the time did, and it ignores the complex of interests and thinkers who
developed and supported the protectionist position.
The development of American protectionism began with Hamilton’s 1791 Report on
Manufactures.6 In it, Hamilton dispelled what was then the popular Physiocratic convention on
the advantages of agriculture and the disadvantages of manufactures. Conditions in America, he
admitted, gave the appearance that the nation was perfectly suited for agrarian pursuits, but that
agriculture should be allotted, Hamilton argued, "any thing like an exclusive predilection, in any
country, ought to be admitted with great caution."7 Hamilton’s rebuke of Physiocracy was in
essence a swipe at Jeffersonian agrarianism, and it helped establish legitimacy to industry in the
domestic discourse. Second, Hamilton explained how the expansion of manufactures
complimented agrarian economies by affording an "extensive domestic market for the surplus of
the soil."8 Western and Southern agriculture was assured a steady home-market from Northern
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industry, thus cementing the union into a harmonious economic and political relationship. Third,
encouraging manufactures would increase America’s productive capacity. Compared to
husbandry, industry employed more machinery and capital, and it advanced the specialization of
labor. Industry also brought idle women and children into the workforce. Finally, to critics who
charged that tariffs inflated the price of manufactured wares, Hamilton reasoned that tariffs
increased the number of domestic manufactures, enhanced competition, lowered prices, and
prevented the establishment of monopolies.9
Nationalist and statist overtones saturate Hamilton’s writings on tariffs. For Hamilton
protectionism was as much a political doctrine as it was an economic policy. His brand of
protectionism enhanced the economic authority of the sovereign. Hamilton linked a nation’s
political strength to its economic power. The surest path to defending American sovereignty was
a strong domestic economy independent from international markets. This, Hamilton argued,
would promote wholly American political institutions free of European influence. National
security and national culture were central to Hamilton’s protectionist program.10
The generation of economic writers who lived through the War of 1812 picked up and
elaborated on Hamilton’s economic nationalism. The conflict with Britain incited an insurgent
nationalism that was precipitated by what contemporaries believed was an economic and political
rivalry with Britain.11 Few could ignore the recurrent military hostilities between America and
Britain. It was also evident that London and Washington engaged in a kind of commercial Cold
War, both sides competing for markets and vying to better the other in their respective capacities
for industry. Throughout the antebellum period, protectionists exploited nationalist and anti9
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British currents then prevalent in American culture.12 Much of protectionist ideology hinged on
anxieties that Britain threatened America’s political and economic sovereignty. "We were," an
American protectionist testified, "as much bound to Britain after the Revolution as before."13
Perceptions of Britain provided the superstructure on which protectionists based their theoretical
claims. "What all have at present most to fear,” a protectionist warned, “is the industrial
supremacy of England."14 Britain was master of the economic universe to be guarded against
with all that America could muster. "The gigantic power of England…the wonder of the world,"
that mighty nation was powerful enough to bring the world to its knees.15 "All states," a
protectionist reported, "have a common interest in defending themselves against the damage that
England, enjoying world economic supremacy, can arbitrarily inflict upon their industries."16
Protectionists gave special emphasis to Britain’s ability to undermine American
sovereignty through economic imperialism. "Well might Napoleon dispense with arms when he
had conquered the world; and well might Mr. Huskisson recommend free-trade when it would
make the world tributary to England."17 The notion that British commercial policy intended an
economic "war of extermination" drummed up fears, and protectionists were keen on
manipulating this worry.18 Parliament, one protectionist wrote, sought to "revive the old system
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of colonial dependence," capturing the young nation with a "manufacturing and commercial
yoke." Economic policy was critical to assuring national sovereignty. Free trade with Britain
meant Americans would essentially "cede their political power in order to render British
productive and political power omnipotent."19
More than any figure Mathew Carey infused protectionist thought with an Anglophobic
tone. Dublin born in 1760, Carey worked as a pamphleteer campaigning for Irish independence
in his youth. In 1784 Carey’s essays caught the attention of royal authorities who issued warrants
for his arrest. He fled for America and eventually settled in Philadelphia. There he became one
the nation’s leading publishers and one of the founding members of the pro-tariff Philadelphia
Society for the Promotion of National Industry.20 Carey was one of the principal figures in the
early protectionist movement. He died in 1839.
Carey did little to refine the economic logic behind protectionist ideology. However, the
Anglophobic tone of his writings became a permanent staple in antebellum protectionist thought.
Carey’s works emphasized the need to protect American markets from British economic
imperialism. His brand of protectionism was geared primarily at inciting anti-British fervor.
American political culture was especially receptive of Carey’s economic nationalism following
the War of 1812. British industrial power, according to Carey, threatened America’s
independence. He wrote frequently of Irish suffering under British rule, cautioning Americans of
the dangers that came with failing to guard their economic sovereignty. By opening its markets,
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the United States, according to Carey, "have voluntarily adopted the colonial policy of
England."21 All were aware of the current commercial warfare that existed between the United
States and Britain. "It was vain for any man to shut his eyes against the active rivalship and
persevering hostility of British manufacturers."22
Carey’s anti-British tune was carried into the latter half of the antebellum period by
Calvin Colton. Born in 1789 in Massachusetts, Colton graduated from Yale and was later a Whig
propagandist. He became something of a celebrity among Whigs with his partisan, ten-essay
Junius Tracts published in 1840. His major literary accomplishment, however, was a six-volume
work The Life and Times of Henry Clay in 1846.23 He died in 1857.
Colton’s seminal economic treatise Public Economy for the United States (1848) offered
little akin to refined analysis. Instead, Colton stroked the nationalist key by exposing what he
believed were British commercial policies aimed at colonizing the United States. It was "simply
a question of justice, as the American revolution was a war of justice―and precisely, identically
the same interests are at stake now as then. 'Free trade' would give up all which American
independence acquired―all that is worth having."24 Colton believed he had uncovered British
plans to sabotage America in Parliament debates. Lord Henry Broughman, an influential British
statesman, was a favorite culprit for Colton. He believed Broughman’s speeches evidenced a
British plot. Speaking to the House of Commons in 1816 on the state of American industry,
Broughman declared “it was well worth while to incur a loss upon the first exportation in order
by the glut to stifle in the cradle those rising manufactures in the United States which the war had
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forced into existence contrary to the usual course of things.”25 In this light, protectionists like
Colton pictured the British threat; economic imperialists bent on undermining American
sovereignty by exploiting the republic as a metropolis does its colony.
The threat of British economic imperialism was amplified by a supposed intellectual
offensive on the American mind. Protectionists grew paranoid over the circulation of British
laissez-faire on domestic soil. Carey estimated the works of Adam Smith and the French free
trader Jean-Baptiste Say to have sold over 7,000 copies in America. These works, according to
Carey, were intended "to paralyze our industry, and, to a certain degree, to render the United
States virtually colonies of the manufacturing nations of Europe."26 Protectionists pointed to
sinister forces to account for the dissemination of British laissez-faire in the domestic discourse.
Free traders were instruments, accused one protectionist, of "British manufacturers and their
agents and representatives."27 British free-trade imperialists had infiltrated Washington. "Our
anti-tariff politicians," another wrote, "are as much playing into the hands of the English, in all
their measures, as if the words were put into their mouths by England, and our laws penned by
her too…No two nations ever existed, that could have played into each other's hands so
completely, as this country and England."28
Colton, Carey and other protectionists sensed something akin to British intellectual
imperialism. Before Smith, the British wrote exclusively in the mercantilist tradition. But once
Britain became an industrial power its economists advocated laissez-faire. British cunning and
deceit explained the transformation. "The doctrine of free-trade is a fraud, imposed upon the
25
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world by pensioned writers for the benefit of Great Britain chiefly, which originated the
fraud…Dr. Smith did not begin his Wealth of Nations till he was seduced from his high dignity at
Glasgow...and became a beneficiary of the British government."29 With no American author was
this belief held stronger to than by Colton. Smith, the "pensioned economist," perpetuated a
"great conspiracy against mankind." "Was he not paid for it?" Colton asked. "And how should it
happen that nearly all British writers on this subject, from Adam Smith down to this time, and
nearly or quite nearly all the lecturers of the universities, and almost the entire periodical
press…should have become one solid phalanx of Free-Trade advocates…This, certainly, is a very
extraordinary spectacle."30
Protectionist suspicions over the legitimacy of laissez-faire were added to by nineteenthcentury British trade policy. Although British writers were at the fore of the laissez-faire
movement, London promulgated mercantilist policies.31 For centuries, one protectionist reported,
Britain kept her ports "hermetically sealed…If every bale and parcel of manufactures from every
part of the world had been infected with the plague."32 Now that Britain was the industrial
hegemon its economists clamored for free trade.33 "Here is the misfortune," Colton wrote, "the
trick, as it might, with more propriety and truth, be called: Great Britain is the Jew, that has
furnished other nations with books on political economy, to suit herself―not such as she follows,
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but such as she wishes them to follow, and they are quoted in argument by American free-traders,
who are, by this means, Jewed." The spread of laissez-faire literature was projected to advance
British interest, so that she might "become the richest nation in the world―in that way, the most
powerful―and to maintain that ascendancy." Free trade, another wrote, "had not been intended
for home consumption. It had been intended for export."34 Modern historians find some
legitimacy in this claim. "The parliamentary free traders," according to one historian, "strove not
so much to achieve a cosmopolitan system…but to preserve Britain's industrial predominance,
and, if possible, to achieve a virtual monopoly for a British Workshop of the World."35 An
industrial and commercial Pax Britannica accomplished through free-trade policies and the
proliferation of laissez-faire doctrine was according to protectionists calculated to undermine
America’s economic independence, and thus its political sovereignty.
Protectionist criticisms of British free-trade imperialism were typically combined with
charges that laissez-faire political economy lacked scientific rigor. Smith was consistently
targeted by protectionists. "Whilst he treats,” one protectionist wrote, “detached matters with
great ingenuity and experience, his system, considered as a whole, is so confused and distracted,
as if the principal aim of his books were not to enlighten natives, but to confuse them for the
benefit of his country…"36 Carey found that "in no science, are the general maxims of mere
theorists more delusive, and more distrusted, than in political economy. This branch of
knowledge is yet in its infancy...Its principles are not yet established. Those which have been
considered as the most fixed, have been overthrown; those which have been taught as selfevident, are questioned; and the whole are subject of ardent discussion." Carey quoted Smith’s
34
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Wealth of Nations at length, arguing certain passages contained "much sophistry and unsound
reasoning…and there is likewise, as in all the rest of the doctor's work, a large portion of
verbiage, which is admirably calculated to embarrass and confound common understanding, and
prevent their forming a correct decision."37
Protectionists also disparaged Smith and other laissez-faire economists for having
indulged in speculative abstractions. Smith’s background as an Enlightenment philosopher
predisposed the Scotsman to metaphysical assumptions on human psychology and morality that
clouded his assessment of economic systems. "The casual association of its teaching with moral
philosophy,” one protectionist alleged, “is the circumstance to which is to be attributed that
metaphysical bias, manifested by almost all Economical writers, in their method of investigation,
and which has conducted them to such vague, hypothetical, and unsatisfactory results."38
Deductive reasoning was, protectionists charged, a critical flaw in laissez-faire methodology.
Public policy and a stronger regard for the empirical sciences were for protectionists important
analytical tools in economic inquiry. "This science is in its nature essentially practical, and
should be treated in a plain, practical way. Adam Smith, Mr. Say, and others who wrote upon
this subject, were too abstract and theoretical for common use."39 Carey found Smith "to have
been duped by his own system."40 A sophist confused by webs of abstractions and an idealist
cosmopolitanism out-of-touch with real-world conditions. A "fool's gold," Colton wrote, "born in
a closet" with assumptions passed off as natural laws, able only to "prove itself by itself."41 The
freetrader was a "speculative professor, who concocts abstract theorems of political economy in
37
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his closet." A doctrine "profligate, false, and absurd," based on "dreamy hallucination, made up
of fallacies, sophistical assumptions," and unsound reasoning.42 "It is against such visionary
projects, that we have raised our hands," Carey declared, "it is to warn you from the closet
speculations of theorists, to invite you to common sense practice, founded on the nature of
things."43
Protectionist criticisms of the metaphysical tone of laissez-faire were indicative of the
pragmatic bent of antebellum intellectual culture. The American knack for common sense was
raised above the 'book wisdom' of laissez-faire philosophers. Distrust of the privileged, cloistered
philosopher formulating abstract theories in an Ivory Tower was American custom. This attitude
informed protectionist critiques of laissez-faire. By placing in the fore regard for American
conditions and keeping as a central goal for economic inquiry the discovery of practical policy,
protectionism conformed to domestic intellectual traditions.44 Protectionism, according to one
historian, was an "economics of the street."45 The experimentalist, utilitarian, and policy-oriented
tradition of Hamilton was raised above the ‘enlightened economics’ of Smith and the abstractions
of Ricardo.
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The cultural tendencies that shaped protectionist skepticism of laissez-faire philosophy
were reinforced by antebellum political events. During the Jacksonian era anti-intellectualism
reached new heights. The egalitarian thrust of democracy engendered a culture where academics
were suspect. A political mileu with an "I'm-as-good-as-you population" of equals raised few
men's knowledge to esteemed levels.46 Alexis de Tocqueville noted this distinctly American
quality. The "independence of the mind" led Americans "to mistrust the judgment of others, and
to seek the light of truth nowhere but in their own understanding. Everyone then attempts to be
his own sufficient guide, and makes it his boast to form his own opinions on all subjects."47
Accustomed to distrust the scholar's counsel, knowledge was sought not in books or philosophy
but in home-grown intuition and folkish wisdom.
The pragmatic style of protectionist thought reflected American culture. But to reconcile
the anti-theoretical, more pragmatic bent of antebellum culture with their own demands for
scientific rigor protectionists incorporated into their works a bounty of economic data.48
Protectionists extolled the value of historical details in political economy. It served the dual
purpose of toughening their claims to scientific legitimacy while simultaneously challenging the
methodological approach of free-trade ideology. In doing so, the protectionists championed a
methodological revolution in economic inquiry. While laissez-faire was based on "the invisible,
the mysterious, the fluctuating internal nature" of moral philosophy and deductive reasoning,
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protectionism "pursued the opposite method; to have started from facts, and not assumptions."49
Protectionists steered economic inquiry away from abstraction. Argument by deduction,
protectionists believed, had skewed objective analysis and widened the gap between political
economy and the positive sciences.
Historical statistics were for protectionists a natural bridge to economic history.
Blending economic history with theoretical economics is one of the lasting contributions
protectionists made to the trans-Atlantic discourse. The Historical School, that is, the enrichment
of economic study by emphasizing history, institutions, sociology, politics, and culture became a
seminal feature in American economic thought for the second-half of the nineteenth century. The
historical economics movement materialized in 1885 when the American Economic Association
adopted principles that stressed the historical economics of antebellum protectionist literature.50
Friedrich List is considered "the earliest example on American soil of the Historical
School of Economic thought."51 Born in 1789 in Württemberg, List came to the United States in
1825 fleeing Prussian arrest for inciting German nationalism. He settled first as a farmer near
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, then Reading where he worked as a journalist until his return to Europe
in 1832. After a series of literary and business failures List fell deathly ill and in 1846 committed
suicide. List is remembered as the architect of the Zollverein, a customs union that brought
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eighteen German states under a single trade regime. In the words of one List scholar, he was "the
driving force behind the Zollverein…In a very real sense he was the Alexander Hamilton."52
During his American sojourn List became a leader in the protectionist movement.53 By
emphasizing historicism and a more relativist approach to economic theory, List further cemented
protectionist ideology to American intellectual currents. For List, political economy comprised
three distinct fields─philosophy, politics, and history. He argued that history was critical to
political economy since it encouraged the formulation of economic theory based on national
history.54 List expanded on the theoretical basis of the Hamiltonian matrix by renewing the
association between national economic growth, industrial might, and political sovereignty. List
imparted his vision in a series of letters prepared for the protectionist Harrisburg Convention in
1827. The letters were syndicated in over 50 newspapers and later compiled in his Outlines of
American Political Economy.
As with Hamilton, List brought questions of national sovereignty to the fore of his
political economy. "Between the individual and the whole human race there is the nation," List
wrote.55 Citizens were bound to a common will that obligates individuals to contribute toward
national economic power. Political sovereignty, List argued, rested on a nation’s ability to
control its economic destiny free from foreign, mainly British influence. Though expressed in
economic terms, List's nationalist ideals were more political. They reflected a cultural statism
52

Louis Snyder, The Roots of German Nationalism (Bloomington, IN, 1978), pp. 17, 2; W.O. Henderson,
List, Economist and Visionary, 1789-1846 (Totowa, NJ, 1983), p. 145.
53

William Notz, "Frederick List in America," p. 264; Ugo Rabbeno, American Commercial Policy
(London, 1895), pp. 346-347; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 807-812; Henry William
Spiegel, The Growth of Economic Thought (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1971),pp. 421-424; Charles Gide and
Charles Rist, History of Economic Doctrine, From the Time of the Physiocrats to the Present Day (New
York, 1915), pp. 379-395; Seligman, Essays in Economics, pp. 15-16; Laurence Laughlin, "The Study of
Political Economy in the United States," The Journal of Political Economy (December, 1892), pp. 6-8.
54

Friedrich List, "Introduction to the National System of Political Economy," Life of Friedrich List, pp.
290-292.
55

List, National System of Political Economy, p. 263

106

typical of nineteenth-century German thought and an inclination growing within American
protectionist circles. List argued the nation-state deserved special notice in political economy.
"National economy," what List labeled his brand of economic thought, "teaches by what means a
certain nation, in her particular situation, may direct and regulate the economy of individuals…to
increase the productive powers within herself…a world within herself, in order to grow in power
and wealth."56
List’s influence in antebellum protectionism is indicative of the importance nationalist
sentiment played during the formative years of the movement. List emphasized the role of the
state in industrializing economies. Protectionists argued industrial development, and thus
economic independence from stronger, more mature economies like Britain, required
developmental policies aimed at advancing national industrial evolution. To achieve this end,
domestic industrial forces required instructions from central government cognizant of the
historical differences between nations. "Every nation,” List argued in direct contrast to the
universalism of free trade, “has its particular political economy."57 British laissez-faire, List
argued, discounted the concept of nationalism and ignored the responsibility of the nation-state in
advancing growth-oriented policies.58
List’s national political economy helped refresh in antebellum protectionism a
Hamiltonian/realist perception of international relations. Protectionist ideology took as a basic
assumption a Hobbesian view of international relations. This was a diametrically opposed world
view from British laissez-faire.59 Free-traders posited a world moving toward peace, harmonious
trade, and a fraternal order where nations were obsolete. "In the actual world," List wrote,
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humanity was divided into nations violently competing for economic power.60 To defend
American sovereignty from foreign aggression List advocated well-measured trade policies that
favored national industry over personal interests. Laissez-faire only considered "how the
economy of the individual and of mankind would stand if the human race were not separated into
nations." Failure to appreciate the essential correlation between individuals and nations, and
moreover the centrality of the nation-state in the modern world, List found laissez-faire
misguided by "a chimerical cosmopolitism, which does not comprehend nationality, and has little
regard for national interest."61 List elevated the nation over the individual. In his communalistic
brand of political economy, coordination and cooperation at the national level were essential.
Economic policy ought to promote national concerns, nurture a nation's productive powers, and if
necessary, restrict personal behavior. "An individual, in promoting his own interest, may injure
the public interest; a nation, in promoting the general welfare, may check the interest of a part of
its members. But the general welfare must restrict and regulate the exertions of individuals."62
The emphasis protectionists gave to national economics marks an important ideological
breach with the laissez-faire tradition. List was not concerned with maximizing private wealth.
He believed there was a higher, national calling for the burgeoning science. Rather than instruct
individuals on how to amass personal fortunes, political economy should focus on national
economic policy. The writings of List and other antebellum protectionists stressed the interplay
between economic and political institutions. "The Scot's theory,” List wrote, “in spite of the very
name they chose to give their science, they will make us believe that there is nothing of politics in
political economy. If their science is properly called 'political economy,' there must be just as
much 'politics' in it as 'economy,' and if there is no 'politics' in it, the science has not got the
60
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proper name, it is nothing else than economy."63 Protectionists challenged the standard free-trade
maxim that political and economic inquiries were two distinct fields of study.64 Political
economy, List argued, "should be concerned as much with politics as with economics."65
On this point List was not entirely original. His visit to the United States came just after
the publication of the first treatise on political economy written in America. Daniel Raymond
published in 1820 his Thoughts on Political Economy. Raymond issued a second edition with
significant revisions under the title The Elements of Political Economy in 1823. John Adams
wrote to Raymond that he had "never read any work upon Political Economy with more
satisfaction," and that the book stood as "a proud monument of American literature.”66 Still,
Raymond’s work did not reach a wide audience. Only 750 copies were issued and of that number
over 200 were sold at auction. Born in Connecticut in 1786, Raymond attended the prestigious
Litchfield Law School and eventually settled in Maryland where he was accepted to the bar in the
Baltimore County Court. In 1842 he moved to Cincinnati and established a weekly paper, but the
endeavor lasted less than six months. He died in 1849 of cholera.67
A romantic nationalist sentiment guided Raymond’s economic thought. He treated
economics from a research paradigm squarely at odds with the laissez-faire tradition. "Political
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economy is a science which teaches the nature and causes of public or national wealth…the
means of promoting a nation's wealth…"68 Raymond anticipated List by censuring free traders
for being fixated on the individual accumulation of riches. "Instead of treating public economy
they in fact treat private economy; instead of talking about nations they talk about individuals."69
Private economy reflected an individual’s temporary, pecuniary interests. Political economy, on
the other hand, was for Raymond the science of the legislator. In Raymond's vernacular, political
economy took into account that a nation might last into perpetuity. The science was not a secondrate branch of knowledge for private interests; rather it dealt with more important issues that
effected national conditions and the public's well-being.
Raymond’s definition of what constituted political economy illustrated the ideological
differences between protectionism and laissez-faire. By confusing private and public economy,
the free traders had also obscured the differences between national and individual wealth. For
Raymond, private wealth and national wealth were radically different concepts. "It is most
unfortunate that for the science of political economy, that the word wealth has been applied
indiscriminately, to nations and to individuals."70 Private wealth was defined by Raymond as an
individual’s possession of property to obtain the necessities and comforts of life. National wealth
was comprised of a number of elements─political, economic, social and cultural─that contributed
toward national production in the present and future.
The basic error regarding individual and national wealth led to other points of confusion
regarding private and public interests, according to Raymond. Laissez-faire assumed what was
good for the individual was beneficial to the nation. Raymond found this association erroneous.
An individual's interest could be opposed to a nation's interest, just as the nation's prosperity may
68
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be detrimental to an individual's private economy. "The sophistry of Dr. Smith's reasoning
consists in a great measure,” Raymond wrote, “in his not discriminating between national and
individual interests. He considers the interests of some particular class of citizens, as identical
with the interests of the nation, when in reality they are, perhaps, directly opposed."71 The failure
of laissez-faire to provide clear direction for legislators on how best to increase national wealth
originated in its reasoning from individuals to nations.
Like Hamilton, Raymond’s political economy transmitted the concerns of a newly
independent nation still debating the role of the sovereign. Personal economic freedoms were not
sacred, particularly if they undermined national interests. Government had the right and
obligation to place the national economy ahead of its citizens. "It is ever to be remembered,”
Raymond wrote, “that the public interests are paramount to individual interests…that when a
political economists has shown that public and private interests are opposed...the interposition of
the government is necessary─he cannot be required to prove that private interests ought to give
way─this is to be taken for granted."72
Both List and Raymond echoed antebellum nationalist currents, particularly in the North,
by emphasizing the role of government in the development of emerging economies. But it was
List who entreated Americans to recognize that the United States was perfectly situated to assert
its economic independence. Indeed, America was presented with an “unexampled” opportunity
to control its economic destiny. "The condition of this nation cannot be compared with the
condition of any other nation," List declared.73 Like many antebellum foreign visitors, List
articulated a feeling that the American experience offered something positively different. A
number of laissez-faire thinkers employed American exceptionalism to counter Malthus and
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Ricardo. These laissez-faire economists did not, however, make American exceptionalism a
foundational element of their ideology.
More than any antebellum school of economic thought the protectionists made American
exceptionalism a central tenet in their political economy. Protectionists combined socially
accepted notions regarding the exceptionality of America's historical, political, and economic
conditions to challenge classical assumptions and construct an explicitly optimistic economic
philosophy.74In doing so, they aligned protectionism with a seminal feature of America culture.
Unlike the antebellum free traders, the protectionists relied heavily on American exceptionalism
to advance their understanding of economic phenomena, but they also incorporated the concept to
defend their vision of economic development.
Protectionists pointed to several political, social, and cultural elements that contributed to
America’s distinct historical standing. First, the nation’s democratic institutions promised
unprecedented economic opportunity. Protectionists reflected antebellum cultural assumptions
regarding the wide-spread benefits of democracy, and they incorporated the economics of
democracy into their ideology. Protectionism grew increasingly popular in the 1830s and 1840s
precisely during the so-called ‘Age of Democracy.’75 Protectionists believed democratic
government was genuinely responsible to the people's demands. "Government is instituted to
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guard the interests of the nation confided to its care," Carey wrote.76 Carey considered the tariff
an honest effort to defend through democratic means the economic prerogatives of constituents.
In this way protectionism revealed the nation's political milieu and might be considered a form of
economic democracy. Their confidence in democratic institutions was premised on a belief in
American exceptionalism. The United States was the first nation with an enlightened majority
willing to sacrifice their economic interests for the common good. But the United States was also
exceptional because its legislators were responsive to voters. British laissez-faire mistakenly
assumed that political interference in the economy was adverse to the public's interests.
Protectionists argued that the anti-statist tone of laissez-faire was a natural reaction to experiences
under the Old Regime. However, Americans had no reason to dread state meddling in the
economy. The constitution itself, Colton posited, was "enacted for the purpose of establishing a
protective policy…to protect the persons and rights of people."77In protectionist ideology the
strong arm of government was not feared.78 A positive state promoted prosperity, facilitated
industrial development, and served as a paternal figure in the economy. Its principal function was
to aid the people. For Raymond, this meant providing Americans with employment. “So it is the
duty of the legislator to find employment for all people, and if he cannot find them employment
in agriculture and commerce, he must set them on manufacturing."79
The historical uniqueness of American democracy made for economic and social
conditions that were equally distinct. Protectionists celebrated these distinctions as essential
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qualities of American exceptionalism. The absence of aristocratic institutions fashioned a
landscape free of rank and hereditary privilege, abound with social mobility, and an equality of
access to a vast continental expanse where every citizen could fulfill republican dreams of
proprietorship and economic independence.
American exceptionalism also contributed to protectionist understanding of the historical
uniqueness of domestic labor. The celebration of American labor was palpable in Northern
economic literature. The American worker, if protected by high tariffs, had no reason to fear the
dismal conditions described by Malthus and Ricardo. Indeed, in an American fortress no sector
of the population was promised greater prosperity than the laboring classes. By the 1850s labor
was raised to the pinnacle of American economic, social, and political life, especially in Whig
and Republican circles.80 Labor was thought as an instrument for self-advancement, the source of
all value, the fountain of improvement and the cause of civilization's progress. Labor was not
demoralized by endless competition, nor the unfortunate result of Adam’s curse. Rather, it was a
dignified calling eagerly and voluntarily responded to by all.81
Free-labor ideology was one of the sacred principles of protectionism, and it brought
protectionists further in-line with American cultural traditions.82 The use of free-labor mythology
in protectionist thought was not a form of industrial/capitalist apologetics. Neither was it a
dishonest effort to capitalize politically on the assumptions of naive workers. Instead,
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protectionists hoped tariffs would soften the social externalities of industrialization.83
Protectionism was as much a social creed as it was an industrial one.84 Protectionist sympathy for
labor illustrated a producer/collectivist mentality that was shared by many antebellum Americans.
They argued British laissez-faire overestimated the importance of distribution and therefore failed
to acknowledge that the essence of men lay in the fruits of their labor. Malthus and Ricardo
taught that labor was an instrument of capital, the human spirit behind labor’s production a
materialistic reaction to satisfy base desires. “In the eyes of modern political economy he [labor]
is nothing, and can be nothing, because it takes no note of the qualities by which he is
distinguished from the brute.”85 For protectionists man was a producer first, then a consumer.
The protectionists however, did more than purport a germane version of free-labor
ideology. They infused the labor theory of value with moral authority. The American worker,
Colton argued, “occupies an elevated, influential, honorable position."86 To toil was the
American fashion, that which provided one distinction. "Labor, work, is the spirit, the genius of
the American people. It was so from the beginning by of necessity; it became a fixed habit of the
community; and has ever been a part of the morale of the country."87 The founding of the new
republic had ushered "a new era of labor…the true millennium of labor."88 Only after the
revolution from Britain was labor able to exercise its long-dormant republican virtue. "The
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breaking of the British scepter was the installation of American labor in its rights; it was the
foundation of an empire of working men; and from that hour labor has been the great political
power of the country. The event was a jubille─the jubille of labor."89 The political leverage
provided domestic labor with social and economic power. In the American republic of labor, the
worker was not simply the handmaiden of capital. Labor acted as an "independent agent."90
Indeed, capital courted labor; it was dependent upon labor; labor was its master. In this
environment labor, "does not accept a price imposed but commands its own price."91Capital,
however, had nothing to fear about labor’s power. Domestic conditions made anxieties over class
conflict a moot point. Protectionists were keen on dispelling Ricardian assertions of class
conflict.
In their celebration of free labor, protectionists presented a radically different narrative
from classical orthodoxy. Protectionists assumed a progressive American working class that took
advantage of the nation’s easy upward mobility. Indeed, capital and labor shared identical
interests; they were essentially one in the same.92 High tariffs engaged workers and capitalists in
a mutually beneficial relationship where increasing wages corresponded to augmented production
and did not infringe on profits. "That the interests of the capitalist and the laborer are thus in
perfect harmony with each other," one protectionist reported, "as each derives advantage from
every measure that tends to facilitate the growth of capital."93 Writing in 1844, Colton declared
"That every American laborer can stand up proudly, and say, I AM THE AMERICAN
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CAPITALIST, which is not a metaphor, but a liberal truth."94 The social and economic divisions
imagined by British free traders did not exist in America. In protectionist thought, there was no
reason for labor to rebel, and thus no reason for capital to shrink from the laboring masses. By
strengthening labor, the rule of law and the sanctity of property were not jeopardized.95 Indeed,
higher wages, according to one protectionist, promised "a steady improvement in the condition of
both laborer and capitalist. That the former, while enjoying a constantly increasing measure of
the comforts and conveniences of life, experiences a constantly increasing facility in becoming
himself a capitalist."96
In protectionist logic, the power of labor was made possible by the availability of western
lands. The safety-valve theory, widely accepted in Northern intellectual culture, was a standard
assumption of antebellum protectionism. It is also another clear indication that features of
American exceptionalism were critical to protectionist ideology.97 The condition of domestic
labor was unique precisely because it had access to an expanse of unclaimed territory. Access to
Western lands inhibited European-style pauperism for American workers by affording labor an
alternative. The safety-valve concept contributed to protectionist arguments that American
industrialization would follow a course that was fundamentally different from that posited by
British laissez-faire.
Protectionism reflected American economic culture in still other ways. Protectionism
was the only school in the antebellum discourse that championed the rapid and comprehensive
industrialization of the American economy. The exceptionality of American historical
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circumstances, the unique conditions of domestic labor, and the harmony that existed between
labor and capital contributed to protectionist optimism over the expansion of industry. Contrary
to the Southern free traders, the Southern reactionaries like Fitzhugh and Holmes, and the
Northern laborites, industrialization promised wide-spread benefits. Industrialization guaranteed
national economic and political sovereignty. Carey argued that industry advanced society by
cultivating the sciences, the arts and literature, and served as "the only sure foundation of national
virtue, happiness, and greatness."98 Manufactures were, according to one protectionist, "the great
agents and tokens of the increase of national opulence, and the progress of civilization."99
Neither did domestic labor have anything to fear over industrialization. Industrial workers gained
the most. According to Colton, industrial labor was provided “the best state of health in body and
mind…What industrial calling has not its quiet aspects by day, and its refreshing sleep at
night?"100
Despite protectionist glorification of industry, many Americans believed the nation’s
future wealth rested on its comparative advantage in agriculture. Protectionists were, therefore,
compelled to explain how industry could advance without threatening agriculture's place in
American culture. Indeed, America was such an exception that agriculture and industry could
development in harmony. The growth of industry subtracted from what protectionists believed
was an overstocked labor supply in agriculture. This increased domestic demands for the farmer's
labor. Industrialization also provided a home market for agrarian produce. Operatives in search
of food, as well as industrialists in search of raw materials, guaranteed a steady market for
domestic agriculture. To bring, in the words of one protectionists, "the loom and the anvil to take
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their natural place by the side of the plough and the harrow."101 Carey argued that without an
industrial sector the future of American agriculture was jeopardized.102 Farmers and planters saw
their products carried from port to port seeking buyers, expending great costs in transportation,
and ultimately sold at dock-side auctions. Foreign markets were glutted with American
agriculture, precipitating a fall in commodity prices and the exhaustion of domestic soils. "The
system of foreign trade, of itself, necessarily tends to impoverish the land already under
cultivation…in order to maintain its rate of production."103 The expansion of domestic industry
even benefited Southern planters. "It will then have a home market," one protectionist declared,
"there is no interest that ought to hail the establishment of manufactures louder than this."104
The home-market argument posited not only the preservation of agriculture's
predominance, it also served commercial interests. Protectionists crafted arguments that appealed
to a variety of economic sectors. They assured the public that merchants and industrialists were
not rivals competing for a fixed income fund. Rather industrialization expanded the merchant's
share of national wealth by opening new trading opportunities. Coastal and internal trade would
increase if food staples and raw materials from the South and Mid-West were provided industrial
markets in the Northeast.105
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The emphasis given to the home-market drew protectionists into the logic of isolationism.
"Protection looks homeward. Free trade, under existing circumstances, looks abroad."106 The
isolationist tone of protectionist thought was colored with a patriotic zeal that reflected
antebellum notions of nationalism and Anglophobia.107 No nation’s economic sovereignty was
assured without a self-sufficient, interdependent domestic market. "Home consumption, and a
home market," Raymond wrote "is, therefore, always to be preferred to a foreign one."108
Economic isolationism was consistent with an over-arching view that the world was a dangerous
place. "The occasional occurrence of war…must be calculated on as inevitable." In protectionist
ideology international markets were characterized by conflict and fluctuation. "Every alternative
year," one protectionist figured, "has been on an average a year of war."109Protectionists called for
Americans to shun the outside. "All people must look at home first, and stop not short of
securing the home market in its fullest extent to themselves…The home market is like an
inherited patrimony; we may claim it as belonging to us, as of right ours."110
Isolationism in the protectionist context was a by-product of American exceptionalism.
"No nation, ancient or modern,” Carey argued, “ever possessed more solid advantages than are
here enumerated."111 Colton agreed, declaring "Never, in the history of the world, did a nation
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occupy such a position, or have within its reach such means of wealth and power, as the United
States."112 The exceptional conditions existing in America afforded the potential for absolute
economic independence. "As if America were not a world in itself, and able by its ingenuity and
skill to supply every luxury, as well as every necessity," Colton wrote.113
Protectionists grew increasingly isolationist both economically and intellectually as the
antebellum period came to a close. "For the most part, ours is a different world from theirs,"
Colton declared, "things here started different, have grown up different, and are different."114
This attitude reflected a domestic desire to break from the Old World. Raymond believed his was
the first economic treatise for the new nation. He aimed to divorce America, in his own words,
"from the fetters of foreign authority─from foreign theories and systems of political economy."115
The American school, as the protectionists called themselves, believed Old World economists
were too prejudiced by their social and political institutions to devise economic theory applicable
to the American experience. "It is morally impossible from the social position of European
economists,” Colton wrote, “that they should be able to adopt a system of political economy to
America."116Laissez-faire ideology was simply irrelevant in the United States. Neither did
laissez-faire convey an accurate understanding of economic phenomenon. American conditions,
according to Raymond, engendered markets of the purest form, unaffected by corrupt human
institutions and artificial impediments. Here the clearest manifestations of the natural economic
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order allowed American thinkers “much greater advantages for studying the science of political
economy than Europeans."117
The New World demanded a new political economy that reflected the distinct history and
reality of the American economic experience. For many Americans protectionism was that
system. As we see in the following chapter, Henry Carey crystallized protectionist ideology by
bringing a sense of intellectual continuity to the variety of positions that made up the lexicon of
antebellum protectionism. In doing so, he provided the antebellum period with its most
formidable theoretical challenge to laissez-faire economics, one that for many Americans
represented the sharpest expression of the native economic mind.
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Chapter VII
Henry Carey, Nature, and the Destiny of Man
Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to
maintain and reproduce so must civilized men, and he must do so in all
social formations and under all possible modes of production. With
this development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of
his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy
these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in
socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their
interchange with Nature, bringing it under the common control, instead
of being ruled by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the
least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and
worthy of, their human nature.1
Henry Carey united protectionist ideas into a coherent ideology. He was the most
important thinker of American protectionism. More than any other antebellum
economists, he drove protectionist thought to its furthest logical conclusion. Carey
borrowed from a variety of antebellum intellectual and cultural sources to construct what
stands as the most complete repudiation of British classicism. By highlighting American
exceptionalism, free-labor ideology, nationalism, and an optimistic vision of the natural
economic order, Carey penetrated the paradigmatic foundations of free-trade doctrine and
presented an economic narrative that was radically different from the British model. His
political economy was based on a whiggish interpretation of the American economic
experience. It reflected important antebellum beliefs of America’s economic destiny.
Carey’s works epitomized not only the protectionist brand of American political
economy, but in many ways his writings encapsulated the most authentic expression of
the antebellum economic mind.
Born in Philadelphia in 1793, Carey was the eldest son of Mathew Carey. His
interests in political economy were sparked as a boy perusing the commercial tracts that
passed through his father's publishing house. At twenty-eight he succeeded his father as
1
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a partner in the firm. In 1834 Carey retired from the printing business to launch a career
as a public intellectual. He enjoyed a moderate celebrity during his time, writing
numerous books and dozens of articles. In protectionist circles Carey was an icon. His
economic ideas were widely circulated. Carey’s works were translated into several
languages. And when Lincoln ascended to the White House Carey became one of the
President's chief economic advisors.2
Carey’s intellectual development in some ways was analogous to the historical evolution
of antebellum political economy. Early in his career Carey professed the principles of Smithian
laissez-faire. In 1840 he completed a three-volume work illustrating a commitment to free-trade
maxims. He admired Smith deeply, and extolled him as "the great father of political economy."3
But as Carey matured, he distanced his thought from the works of Malthus and Ricardo. “Need
we then wonder,” Carey wrote, “that by that school the field of economical science has recently
been so reduced in its proportions that it is now limited to the consideration of the mere acts of
buying cheaply and selling dearly, having thus become a sort of shopkeeping science.”4 If Smith
were alive in the mid-nineteenth century, Carey posited, the Scotsman would oppose the very
science attributed to him.5 The decisive moment in Carey’s intellectual life came one morning in
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the 1840s when, as if struck by an epiphany, he "jumped out of bed, and dressing myself, was a
protectionist from that hour."6
Indications of Carey’s liberal apostasy were communicated in his 1835 Essay on the Rate
of Wages. Like most Americans, he did not find evidence of Ricardo’s conclusions in prevailing
domestic conditions. For Carey, American industrialization would follow an alternative course
from the British model. Carey’s rebuke of Ricardian theories of distribution hinged on a belief in
the exceptional circumstances enjoyed by American labor. American workers were eager to
contribute to the nation’s unprecedented productivity precisely because they were justly rewarded
with a sizable share of profits. "No people," Carey found, "ever had stronger inducements, so
none ever pursued their avocations with more earnestness."7 Contrary to Ricardo, higher wages
did not take from profits. Neither did wages come from a fixed wages-fund. Instead, wages drew
from a rapidly increasing pool of profits and capital. "Where wages are highest," Carey wrote,
"there capital increases most rapidly."8 Advances in manufacturing technologies promised
increasing returns. Ricardo’s so-called Iron Law of Wages and Law of Diminishing Returns were
not evident in the American economy. Indeed, Carey found that the value of labor increased over
time, or put another way, became more effective at exploiting capital. Therefore, capitalists and
workers enjoyed higher yields and greater access to the comforts of life.
Carey's theory of wages reflected protectionist claims that America lacked a permanent
class structure. By the 1850s protectionists took an increasingly whiggish tone in their
interpretations of American industrialization. This was a strikingly different interpretation of
economic development from the Ricardian model. Carey celebrated free-labor mythology and
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touted social mobility as hallmarks of the American economic experience. His wage doctrine
also helped further the divided between protectionism and classical doctrine over theories of rent
and profit. Ricardo maintained that as population and capital increased humanity moved to
cultivate less fertile lands, dwindling returns on capital and labor. Carey rejected this historical
narrative. He criticized Ricardo for presuming that the earliest settlers cultivated the most fecund
lands. Instead, Carey argued that the most fertile lands were rarely the first to be tilled. Early
settlements, often times selected for their strategic positioning, required little clearing, seldom
occupied a region's most alluvial soils, and generally afforded a small return to labor. These
settlements were typically founded during the primitive stages of civilization and were therefore
ploughed using experimental tools and archaic agronomics. Only after a community felt secure
did men venture out, from the "hills and mountains toward the rich lands at their feet: and
everywhere, with the growth of number, penetrating the earth to reach the lower soils."9 With
each passing generation more fertile lands were discovered, cultivated with more effective
implements that facilitated larger returns to labor and capital.
Carey’s interpretation of migratory patterns pointed to human agency as the determining
factor in rents. Carey’s theory of rent reflected the prevailing optimism Americans harbored over
their ability to control the economic fate of the nation. He rejected the Ricardian assumption that
rent was dependent upon the "original and indestructible powers of the soil." For Carey,
agricultural yields were controlled by man's imposition of their labor and capital on nature.
"Labor and skill have been applied, and the difficulty is removed, a consequence of which is that
they are becoming very valuable, although their fertility is no greater than before."10 The
development of technology and the ability of man to employ its labor more effectively meant that
the greatest returns lay in the distant future. Carey infused his theory of rent with a buoyant
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optimism. "We possess no means of measuring the extent of the powers of the earth. It produces
now vastly more than it did half a century since, and the close of the present century will see it
rendered greatly more productive than at present."11 Each successive generation builds upon the
improvements of the previous, promising humanity greater command over natural resources.
Carey’s confidence relayed antebellum attitudes on the ability of Americans to mold the
continent to their liking and shape their nation’s economic destiny. The optimism he expressed in
his theories of distribution was radically different from the ominous features of classical doctrine.
Increasing returns were accelerated or slowed depending upon society's ability to, according to
Carey, "combine their exertions for the increase of production and for mutual production, thus
rendering their labor more productive, and promoting the further increase of production."12
Heightened production rates were precipitated by the inclination in all men to gravitate toward
one another and form associations that pooled together human energies. Human association was
inherent to the march of civilization, engendering a greater social diversity of productive powers
and a more refined division of labor. The latter enlarged what Carey referred to as concentrated
"motion" or "local action."13
With the help of his disciple E. Peschine Smith, Carey’s theory of association was
formulated into an economic law of human society based on organic chemistry and ecological
studies.14 In the antebellum literature, Smith and Carey helped establish a new approach to
economic inquiry. Carey undermined classical conventions by presenting an alternative
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understanding of the natural economic order. Extracting the nutritional values from land,
digesting those nutrients, and recycling residual refuse back into the ecosystem was not only the
natural sequence, but a strategy that promised unprecedented returns. Recycling nature's store
was for Carey fundamental to civilization’s progress. The intensification of association, or, the
increase in exchanges generated by bringing together within a restricted area the forces of
production and consumption advanced the accumulation of wealth. "The more distant the loom
and the anvil, the more labor and manure are wasted…The nearer the place of exchange, the less
labor are wasted on the road, and the more uninterruptedly is labor applied…"15 When producers
trade goods in distant markets they forfeit valuable residuals that would have otherwise been
credited to a community’s local resources. In short, distance precluded regeneration, for "the
manure cannot be returned to the land."16
For this reason Carey chided merchant trade for inhibiting the process of association and
thus slowing the accumulation of wealth. His theory of association struck at Ricardian notions of
comparative advantage and complimented the protectionist home-market argument. Carey also
illustrated an intellectual debt to Adam Smith. The Scotsman had noted the efficiencies of
domestic markets in his Wealth of Nations.17International trade widened the space between
producers and consumers, limiting the extent of human association and exchange within a
community. On various occasions Carey backed the abolition of long-distance merchant
trade.18The "converters and exchangers" of the world reaped what the farmer sowed, stole from
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labor’s wage, and imposed an "exhausted tax" on consumers. British laissez-faire led to what
Carey called the "centralization" of the forces of production and consumption.19 In other words,
by restricting the diversity of national production a population became more specialized in certain
industries, encouraging dependence on foreign trade and preventing localized action from
enhancing the regenerative powers of a community. By widening the gap between producers and
consumers national economies in general and labor especially, becomes "more completely an
instrument of trade."20 A protective tariff was the most efficient measure at blocking the
destructive tendencies of international trade. Tariffs helped establish a national economy with
regionalized divisions of labor, secured for workers and capitalists higher returns, and stalled
domestic migration to western lands. Most importantly for Carey, tariffs liberated America from
the fetters of foreign markets.21
Although Carey claimed his theory of association was a natural economic law, like most
protectionists his political economy rested on an understanding of economic development that
was peculiar to antebellum America. The association theory expressed contemporary cultural
perceptions of how Americans might employ technology against the natural environment. During
the antebellum era industrial technologies were thought by many the harbingers of the modern
age.22 The ultimate expressions of human reason, machines took on a progressive metaphysical
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idealism. Machinery was the "great instrument of civilization," empowering Americans in their
historical quest to tame nature and bring the earth’s resources under their control.23
For Carey the earth was a passive agent; its wealth depended upon man's ability to
combine his powers of production and consumption. The rate at which these powers were
coordinated determined society's technological potency, which in turn established the American
capacity to mine from nature its wealth. "The earth is a great machine, given to man to be
fashioned to his purpose. The more he fashions it, the better it feeds him, because each step is but
preparatory to a new one more productive than the last; requiring less labor and yielding larger
returns…He is obtaining a daily increased power of the various treasures of the earth."24 There
was no way to tell how much from nature's store labor and capital could extract. In the distant
future, Carey conjectured, Americans will employ technologies to subjugate the unknown powers
of the earth, "powers so wonderfully great that it would be absurd, with our present limited
knowledge, to attempt a definition of their extent."25
Carey’s ideology of optimism contrasted starkly with the laissez-faire tradition. It was
based largely on the belief that Americans had at their disposal the power to direct nature’s
course. Contrary to classical political economy, the natural economic order was not beyond
man’s control. Neither was nature something to fear. Rather nature’s immeasurable treasures
were open to man’s exploit. "To the power of the earth…there are no limits. Her treasury
overflows with the raw materials of food and clothing, and all she asks is that he will come and
take them."26 Malthus and Ricardo, Carey argued, failed to comprehend man’s ability to wring
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from nature what he desires. British classicism described man as a “mere brute animal.” “The
real man,” Carey declared, “the being made in the image of his creator, fitted for becoming
master of nature and an example worthy to be followed by those around him.”27 In an explicit
rebuke of Malthus, Carey figured "twice, or thrice, ten, or twenty, or fifty times the population
could be supported, even with our present agricultural knowledge…we cannot hesitate to admit
that the productive power of land exists in measureless quantity."28 The English economist had
made the profound mistake of underestimating the powers of man over nature. Malthus and
Ricardo were blind to the “breath of the spirit” in man.29 "Mr. Ricardo makes him,” Carey wrote,
“throughout, the victim of a sad necessity that precludes the existence of hope. He is destitute of
power over the land, or over himself, and he can have no confidence in the future. The machine
he uses must deteriorate."30
Carey’s brand of protectionism stretched beyond economic analysis toward a theory on
human evolution. His inflated assessments of man’s position vis-à-vis nature were central to his
economic philosophy and an explicit rebuke of British classicism. Classical political economy,
Carey found, "teaches, that all the evils of society are the result of one great force constantly
impelling man in a wrong direction─increasing the number of mouths, as the machine by help of
which, alone, they can be fed, diminishes."31 Beginning with Smith, laissez-faire posited a belief
in a natural order governed by laws that, if they were even discernable to man's fickle
understanding, exercised absolute command over the course of human existence. According to
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the British authorities, "the power of nature over man [was] steadily increasing," Carey wrote,
with man becoming "more and more her slave."32
Carey transformed the economic relationship between man and nature. Nature and
humanity were not aligned so that the order established by Providence devolved toward selfdestruction, leaving men weak and destitute. "The great Architect of the universe was no
blunderer," Carey posited, "can it be, then, that after having given to man all the faculties required
assuming the mastery of nature, it has been a part of his design, to subject him to absolute and
irreversible laws, in virtue of which he must inevitably become nature's slave?"33For Carey man
reigned over nature. Her order was understood, its once troubling mystical and subliminal
powers made "to serve the purpose of man─and with his coming we find the important difference
that whereas all other animals were bound to continue forever the slaves of nature, he alone was
gifted with the faculties required for enabling him to become her master, and to make her do his
work."34 While Malthus and Ricardo looked to "the ultimate enslavement of man by nature,"
Carey reversed the sequence.35 He recounted a sweeping historical narrative of the epic struggle
between the physical powers of the earth and the intellectual powers of humanity. "Matter and
mind were to be brought face to face with each other, contending for mastery of the world; the
former armed with powers so prodigious that words scarcely suffice for their enumeration and
description; the latter at first so weak as to be deficient in many of the qualities by means of
which even the lowest animals had been fitted for self-preservation." Nature's colossus bore
down heavily on man's frail and feeble intellect, bringing distress and privation to the early
human condition. With time civilization's march began, and "step by step, mind is seen gaining
32
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on its opponent, seizing his outworks and on the instant turning upon him the captured gains, each
forward movement proving thus by simple preparation for a new and greater one."36
In Carey's dialogue with laissez-faire the destiny of man held an inestimable
improvement in the human condition. The industrial revolution was the catalyst in Carey's
narrative. Industrialization accelerated humanity’s exploitation of nature, "constantly battering at
her gates, and overthrowing her walls."37 History was the story of man's progress. Carey's work
is very much a solicitation for political economy to recognize man's newly acquired dominance
over nature. Americans’ ability to employ technology over nature was an increasingly popular
concept by the end of the antebellum period.38 "At every step there is an increased consciousness
in man of the existence of power to improve his condition, producing increased desire of
improvement. Desire produces determination, and determination creates power."39 A more
effective deployment of industrial technologies left nature subject to man’s will. "With each
addition thereto, he finds less resistance to his further efforts; and hence it is, that each successive
discovery proves to be but the precursor of new and greater ones.” “Each successive year” Carey
continued, “thus augments the power of man, and with every new discovery utility is given to
forces that now are being wasted. The more they are being utilized─the more nature is made to
labor in man's service─the less is the quantity of human effort required for the reproduction."40
Market forces and the natural economic laws that Smith, Malthus and Ricardo had argued
humanity was powerless over were cast in a new light by Carey. The market could be controlled,
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the natural order fashioned to the benefit of man, and nature’s forces brought under man's
dominion. The pessimism of the classical school seemed if not entirely unwarranted, then
certainly excessive. Carey premised his political economy on the economics of affluence. He
offered an alternative to the British political economy of poverty. "The whole English politicoeconomical system," he maintained, was "invented for the purpose of accounting for the poverty
and wretchedness which are its results."41
This belief contributed to calls for a distinctly American political economy. A "really
American policy," Carey wrote just after the Civil War.42 The success of protectionist ideology
in the antebellum and post-Civil War periods indicates that American economic culture was
primed for a paradigmatic alternative to British laissez-faire. For an American system of
economic thought protectionists believed the native mind needed to turn inward. Carey’s
protectionism reflected an understanding that the United States advanced toward unchartered
economic territories of unprecedented material prosperity. The American experience required a
nuanced intellectual framework, one radically different from Old World traditions, and one that
reflected the economics of the American conscience.
Although Carey’s brand of protectionism was in the main an expression of Northern
economic ambitions, it drew from an assortment of cultural and intellectual traditions that
permeated much of American intellectual and economic history. Under Carey, protectionism
combined various strains of the American economic mind into a single ideology. It made
American exceptionalism the central piece of an overtly optimistic political economy that
rebuked the dismal forecasts of Malthus and Ricardo. In doing so, protecitonists helped relieve
domestic anxieties over the negative social consequences of industrialization. Protectionism
promised that the tariff would serve as a practical measure to soften labor’s transition into the
41
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industrial age. In no way did the protectionists wish to overturn free-market institutions in the
domestic economy. Instead, they challenged the agrarian disposition of the antebellum free-trade
movement by formulating a political economy aimed at hastening the proliferation of industrial
capitalism in domestic markets. The protectionists also relied on an understanding of
international relations that legitimated contemporary concerns of foreign aggression. Finally, the
protectionists constructed an economic ideology unequivocally opposed to the extremism of
Southern reactionaries. By fusing these components into a unified school of economic thought
the protectionists believed their ideology met American aspirations for industrialization, and
political and economic independence.
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Chapter VIII
Liberalism, Republicanism, and Finance
Had a committee of clever men been selected to devise means by which the
public might be tempted to engage in all manner of absurd projects, and be most
easily duped and swindled, we do not know that they could have hit upon
anything half so likely to effect their object as the existing American banking
system. It has no one redeeming quality about it, but is from beginning to end a
compound of quackery and imposture.1
Henry Carey cemented the divisions between American laissez-faire and protectionism.
The distinctions in antebellum discussions of trade did not, however, extend to every aspect of the
economy. When it came to finance and financial markets, Americans entertained a variety of
perspectives, few of which conform to the conventional understanding of economics and
ideology. Most expressed feelings of skepticism and suspicion, but the opposition to finance took
on several shades of theoretical nuance. Critics described financial institutions as obscure,
shadowy and not quite legitimate, a position that even the most dedicated pro-market economist
shared. Indeed, the opposition to finance sprung typically from the most ardent supporters of
free-market economics. Likewise, advocates of finance encouraged state intervention. In short,
Americans constructed as dynamic a discourse on finance as they had on industry and trade.
Opponents and supporters drew ambiguous ideological lines unique to the antebellum discourse.
In both cases, the literature lacked a definitive consensus, showcasing the general discord that
marked antebellum political economy.
Historians of antebellum finance tend to simplify the complexities of the financial
discourse. One interpretation posits a neat division between two rival camps. These historians
define the differences as a kind of class warfare, with those opposed to the expansion of finance
pitted against an enterprising elite bent on modernizing financial institutions at the expense of the
common man. According to this interpretation, lower class urban workers and farmers joined
1
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forces to wage war on financial capitalism; Andrew Jackson led them. The resistance crystallized
in 1832 with Jackson's veto of the Bank of the United States. The president's use of class rhetoric
lends credence to the class-conflict interpretation. In his bank veto message to the Senate,
Jackson lamented "that the rich and the powerful too often bend the acts of government to their
selfish purposes...make the rich richer and the potent more powerful."2 Suspicions of an
aristocracy of banking marauders led King Mob, according to one historian, to whip up into a
frenzy "a democratic challenge to bourgeois/middle class hegemony that is unparalleled in
presidential annals" and "politicize popular resistance to capitalist transformation by mobilizing
patriarchal democracy against the money power."3 In short, opposition to finance precipitated a
wider struggle against capitalism.
Other historians have found less class conflict in Jacksonian America. What Jackson
wanted, they argue, was more not fewer banks. Jackson exemplified an incipient bred of
bourgeois individualism intent on democratizing capitalism, liberating markets, and facilitating
access to cheap credit. All Americans desired a thriving financial sector; they did not organize
against it. An authority on this interpretation, Bray Hammond, writes, "The millionaires created
by the so-called Jacksonian revolution of 'agrarians' against 'capitalists'―of the democracy
against the money power―were richer than those they dispossessed, they were more numerous,
they were quite as ruthless; and laissez faire, after destroying the monopolies and vested rights
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the Jacksonians decried, produced far greater ones."4 Jackson's veto message, according to
Richard Hofstadter, "is not the philosophy of a radical leveling movement…What is demanded is
only the classic bourgeois ideal…This is the philosophy of a rising middle class; its aim is not to
throttle but to liberate business, to open every possible pathway for the creative enterprise of the
people."5
This chapter argues against both of these interpretations. It introduces a middle variant
expressed by most antebellum political economists. Though liberal in most aspects of their
economic philosophy, these moderates opposed financial capitalism (even while they celebrated
markets and capitalism in all other aspects). Most possessed not an anti-capitalist nerve in their
body, but all dreaded the moral, social, political, and economic consequences of financial
institutions. Indeed, opposition to finance was testament to an economist’s devotion to free
markets. The opposition literature also drew inspiration from a classical republican tradition
whose origins stretched to Augustan England.6 Antebellum critics of finance fused laissez-faire
and classical republicanism to form a financial opposition ideology unique to America.
The seminal event in antebellum finance was Jackson’s veto of the Bank of the United
States. "I do not dislike your Bank any more than all banks," Jackson wrote BUS president
Nicholas Biddle in 1829, "but ever since I read the history of the South Sea Bubble I have been
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afraid of banks."7 Jackson was referring to England’s first major financial crisis in the early
eighteenth century.8 The South Sea Bubble of 1720 incited a republican style of economic
thought that had at its center opposition to finance.9 Jackson’s republican political economy was
likely informed by the English protest writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. From
1720 until 1724 they penned essays for the London Journal later published as Cato's Letters.
Trenchard and Gordon were the principal fund from which most Americans learned of English
opposition thought.10 Whether Americans realized it or not, they repeated the same arguments
and used almost identical rhetorical strategies as England's classical republicans. The migration
of English opposition thought to America points to a fairly consistent attempt at the formulation
of a decidedly anti-finance strain in republican political economy.11
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In America, republican opposition to finance first surfaced in response to Alexander
Hamilton’s program for financial modernization. Presented in the early 1790s, Hamilton’s plan
included the assumption of states’ debts, discrimination in the repayment of revolutionary debt,
increases in domestic excise and tariffs, the funding of the national debt, and the establishment of
a national bank.12 He declared credit the “invigorating principle.”13 And Hamilton’s brainchild, a
national bank, was touted as “an institution of primary importance to the prosperous
administration of the finances" that encouraged "the augmentation of active or productive capital"
and provided a boom to the national economy.14 His scheme was based in part on the
controversial point that "public debts are public blessings."15 In his view, the modernization of
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domestic finance would improve America's credit rating.16 Trust in the nation's financial
institutions was, according to Hamilton, "the palladium of public safety."17 By attracting the
interests of financiers, the republic’s strongest economic supporters would come from the
financial sector. "To promote the increasing respectability of the American name,” Hamilton
wrote, “to cement more closely the union of the states…[and] to add to their security against
foreign attack."18
The sharpest critique of Hamilton’s agenda came from John Taylor of Caroline. Taylor
was born in 1753 into the political elite of Virginia’s gentry. A distant cousin of James Madison,
a confidant of Thomas Jefferson, and son-in-law to a signee of the Declaration of Independence,
Taylor served in the Virginia House of Delegates and in the U.S. Senate. He authored a number
of political, social, and economic tracts that exemplified Southern republican opposition to the
expansion of finance.19 Taylor died in Port Royal, Virginia in 1824, not far from where Fitzhugh
took up residence five years later. Taylor established a pattern of oppositional thought that
anticipated the anti-finance movement of the later-antebellum period. Thus, he embraced the
principles of laissez-faire economics, at the same time, he repudiated financial institutions.
Taylor’s opposition to finance rested on a laissez-faire-republican critique of the
relationship between financial institutions and legislatures. "By incorporations, great bodies
politic, whole parties, and entire states, may be degraded into clientage, and bribed to obedience;
16
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and legislators themselves may participate in every bonus they bestow."20 And like most early
antebellum republican opponents of finance, Taylor incorporated a pastoral idealism into his
critique of financial institutions. Combining laissez-faire with agrarianism was common in the
antebellum movement against finance. The expansion of finance hastened "a decay and
impoverishment both in mind and fortune of the landed gentry, and an exchange of that honest,
virtuous, patriotic and bold class of men, for an order of stock-jobbers in loans, banks,
manufactories…and an infinite number of inferior tricks to get money, calculated to instill
opposite principles."21 In republican political economy, agriculture provided the source of
wealth; therefore, the prosperity of financiers came at the expense of farmers. "Hence we see
capital flying from the fields,” Taylor wrote, “to the legal monopolies, banking and
manufacturing. The laws have established a thousand modes by which capital will produce
quicker and larger profits, than when employed in the slow improvement of agriculture."22
Taylor’s agrarianism should not discount his attachment to free markets. A disciple of
Adam Smith, according to one historian, Taylor “applauded economic ambition, consumptive
goals, and profits as high as one can earn by honest labor and fair exchange.”23 His dedication to
laissez-faire did not interrupt his opposition to what was becoming a fixture of free-market
economies─financial capitalism. To suggest, as Hammond has, that Taylor’s opposition was
based on an agrarian “ignorance of banking” is inaccurate. Neither is it correct to imply that
Taylor’s opposition lent itself to an unbridled entrepreneurialism.24 These characterizations
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minimize the complexities of Taylor’s republican distrust of finance. It was entirely possible to
champion free markets while simultaneously attack finance. Taylor’s republican economic
thought was a prominent strain in the antebellum literature, one that embraced a nuanced version
of laissez-faire-republicanism and expressed concerns of Americans genuinely bothered by
financial institutions. His economic thought was at the crossroads of republicanism and
liberalism. He did not attack free markets; he made war on financial corporations.
The laissez-faire, anti-finance position of Taylor reflected structural changes taking place
in the antebellum economy. Opponents like Taylor struggled to reconcile their attachment to free
markets with financial institutions. The modern financial economy, with its regional, national,
and sometimes global credit networks tied even the most disconnected market participants to the
complexities of finance. Credit as form of social mutuality, or trust, facilitated network-building
in the commercial community, and credit offered numerous economic opportunities. But credit
also made individuals vulnerable to an interdependent and sometimes arbitrary economic order
where mutuality felt like dependency. Only recently have historians started to explore the effects
of financial institutions on the social and cultural character of antebellum America. Public
attitudes toward finance, particularly debt and insolvency began to change during the early
1800’s. The traditional understanding of economic failures as consequence of personal
indiscretions and moral culpability was replaced by an awareness that insolvency could result
from market pressures outside an individual’s reach and that failure was to some degree inherent
to antebellum commercial enterprises.25
Republican anti-finance showcased the trouble many Americans had in accepting the
social externalities of the financial revolution. Their commitment to an idealized past
characterized by hierarchical relations was shaken at its very foundations by the expansion of
25
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financial capitalism. To some historians, this has been taken to mean that republican economic
thinkers were backward looking in all aspects of their thought. Gordon Wood argues that the
republican synthesis of the antebellum period was "essentially anti-capitalistic." According to
Wood, republicanism represented "a final attempt to come to terms with the emergent
individualistic society that threatened to destroy once and for all the communion and benevolence
that civilized men had always considered to the be the ideal of human behavior."26 In fact,
however, Wood’s interpretation of republican ideology in early America simplifies the
ideological retinues of Taylor and other republicans. Wood and other historians fail to
understand the republicanism of America that both accepted free markets yet held finance
capitalism in contempt.
The South Carolina economist Thomas Cooper exemplifies this point. Cooper in many
ways stands as the essential representation of how free marketers treated finance. As we saw in
chapter 3, Cooper vigorously advanced laissez-faire principles. He attacked financial institutions
for the same reason he criticized tariffs. Finance and tariffs derived from corrupt legislatures
pandering to the interests of capitalists. Cooper, however, broke from the earlier generations of
republicans like Taylor in distinct ways. He integrated into his opposition to finance a more
explicit defense of free-market institutions. Cooper also neglected to engage in the type of
romantic eulogies of an agrarian, pre-capitalist, primitive economy that were characteristic of
Taylor’s thought.27
Cooper’s republican opposition to finance was also based on political and social theory.
He opposed the incorporation of banks on constitutional grounds. "I am unshaken in my
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opinion,” Cooper argued, “that every bank charter is unconstitutional: depriving the great
majority of citizens, of rights...and conferring exclusive privileges on another class, upon motives
and pretense often fraudulent, seldom excusable, never justifiable.” Bank speculators and
legislators, Cooper found, "have too much of a fellow feeling."28 Corporate limited liability
especially, he charged, sanctioned "a mode of swindling" that sacrificed the earnings of decent
laborers to the risks and misjudgments of others.29 "I REST ON REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES,"
Cooper declared, "a monopoly of privilege, with power of acquiring profit without limitation,
conferred on persons whose liability to pay their debts does not extend beyond the share of which
they posses in a joint stock of a privileged company, is a fraud on the honest and confiding part of
the public."30 Corporate proprietors accumulated debts without incurring any responsibility
beyond their invested stake. For Cooper, this standard corporate practice discouraged community
trust. Absolving a man from repaying debt flew in the face of traditional standards of social and
moral justice. "How then are they to know to what extent to trust this company, who may (as
often has been done) divide their principal, as a dividend of annual profits, and then sell out to
unsuspecting purchasers not in the secret?"31
Cooper represents a shift in the intellectual development of American republican
criticisms of finance.32 Cooper’s critique of finance relied less on the agrarian values that
characterize Taylor’s work. His Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy was published
the same year as Jefferson’s death (1826), and the work signifies a kind of changing of the guard.
As the nation matured Southern economic thought grew attached to an anti-statist disposition.
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Although Taylor railed against state intervention in financial markets, his opposition to finance
was not tied to a defense of slavery. For Cooper, opposition to finance was couched in a statesrights, pro-slavery ideology. Southern political economists employed republicanism more as a
supplement to laissez-faire. Cooper developed this line of thought by synthesizing anticorporatist republicanism and laissez-faire arguments for a circumscribed federal government.33
Cooper’s opposition to finance was also focused more on the corporatist model of bank
charters. He favored free-banking, or, the end of chartered corporations with debt liabilities
limited to their subscriptions. Like many republicans of the Jacksonian era, Cooper recognized
finance as an integral piece of the nineteenth-century economy. Thus, his reforms aimed at
limiting the influence financial institutions had on legislatures. Free-banking, Cooper argued,
would encourage conservative lending practices and institute in banking a renewed ethic and
responsibility. "I have no objection in great and expensive undertakings to joint stock
companies,” Cooper wrote, “but the common law of partnership is equity, viz: those who claim a
dividend of unlimited profits, are liable to the loss.” “All this can be managed well enough
without the interference of government or the legislature,” Cooper continued, “who are seldom
known to meddle but to do mischief…we may surely venture in this new country to say, when
our rulers attempt to regulate the private investment of capital, 'let us alone.'"34
Cooper's free-banking approach reflected a society growing more accepting of the
economic benefits afforded by financial institutions. By 1820 there were over 350 banks in the
United States. In the five years that followed Jackson’s so-called war on banks, an additional 200
banks were established.35 During this period, in the South there was a 130% increase of notes in
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circulation; in the wild-cat West a 100% increase; and in the more conservative East a 50%
increase.36 All the while specie reserves in most cases hovered around 4%. The proliferation of
banks corresponded with the expansion of other financial and monetary institutions. By 1830
there were approximately 10,000 business corporations in the United States. Stock exchanges in
New York and Philadelphia traded securities, debt, and commercial notes on margin and were
informed by credit reporting agencies. A seemingly perpetual call for more credit could be heard
for much of the antebellum period. The financial sector responded accordingly by facilitating
information symmetry and licensing some 1500 banks by 1857, all of which helped monetize and
integrate a financial system that by 1860 had over $6 billion invested in the American economy.37
The financialization of the antebellum economy is not, however, evidence that American
hostility toward finance was insignificant. Financial institutions developed in spite of the antifinance consensus that marked the period’s economic literature. Indeed, even the advocates of
finance agreed that certain tendencies of financial institutions were damaging to the social and
economic fabric of America and thus required state oversight.
During the second-half of the antebellum period Whigs were consistently the group that
advocated the development of American finance.38 And like the laissez-faire republicans, Whigs
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blurred the lines of economics and ideology. The Whigs backed the modernization of American
financial institutions, but they did so from a decidedly anti-market position. The Whig model for
developing antebellum finance was driven by state initiatives. In the antebellum economic
discourse, arguments in favor of expanding finance were typically set in a broader economic
agenda that was hostile to market imperatives. Put differently, the champions of American
finance were often the enemies of free markets.
This is not to say all Whigs conformed to a statist program. Whigs exhibited flexibility
in their policy and ideological positions toward finance. And while Whigs were in the avantgarde of the movement to modernize the domestic economy, many within the Party expressed
serious reservations over the social externalities associated with the expansion of finance.39
Whigs had the appetite for the financial capitalism, but only so long as finance was carefully
managed by legislatures.
The New Englander Nathan Appleton exemplified Whig ambiguities toward finance. A
‘cotton Whig,’ financier, merchant, and principal of the ‘Boston Associates,’ Appleton articulated
the Whig case for restricting the expansion of banking. Born in New Hampshire in 1779,
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Appleton became a leader in American industry. He was one of the founders of the
manufacturing complexes at Waltham and Lowell. Appleton also served in the Massachusetts
House of Representatives, was elected to Congress in the early 1830s as an anti-Jacksonian, and
later in the 1840s as a Whig. He died in 1861.40
Appleton’s critique of antebellum banking echoed the concerns of America’s commercial
and industrial elite. He was suspicious of the entrepreneurial nouveau riches that the domestic
banking system encouraged. Appleton’s criticisms were different from republican opponents.
Agrarian hostility toward banks, he wrote, derived “from a superficial view of the subject.”41
Still, Appleton criticized the role of reckless bank directors for abandoning moral responsibility in
their business practices. Suspension of payments in particular, once a rarity that he considered
“an opiate, which if justifiable at all, can only be justifiable where the paroxysms are so violent as
to endanger life,” Appleton chided for having become a regular fixture of the domestic
economy.42 In this way Appleton confirmed the social concerns of Taylor. Bank suspensions
amounted to an act of ethical impropriety. “It is difficult to perceive how honorable men,”
Appleton wrote, “holding the office of bank directors, can reconcile a continued suspension to a
proper sense of moral obligation.”43
Appleton broke with republican critics, however, by attaching to his paternalistic review
of banking upstarts a discussion of the wider social and economic benefits provided by sound
financial institutions. Credit was fundamental to the national economy, as was paper currency, he
40
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argued. Contrary to hard-money activists, paper currency was more practical than a metallic
medium. Neither were currency brokers parasites preying on an unsuspecting public. They
afforded a legitimate public service in exchanging notes disfavored by the community. To
counter the negligent bank directors of the so-called ‘wildcats,’ Appleton recommended, in the
words of one historian, “mechanisms for enforcing responsibility.”44 He suggested restrictions on
the ability of banks to issue currency with a stringent specie-to-note ratio of 20% and a 3% tax on
circulating notes.45 Appleton figured the latter would reduce the profitability of banks whose
only function was issuing notes for circulation. His aim was to abolish banks established for
speculative purposes. The merits of market competition, according to Appleton, should not
preclude the establishment of highly capitalize national and regional banks from policing the
smaller country banks.
Appleton’s position reflected the entrenched financial and industrial interests that
populated the elite ranks of the New England Whig party. Their opposition did not originate
from republican concerns. And, unlike Cooper, they exhibited little confidence in market
mechanism to facilitate financial expansion. Appleton did however, share with republican and
laissez-faire opponents anxiety over certain social effects of finance. Indeed, their call for state
management over financial markets indicates that even within the New England Whig business
mainstream, there circulated serious reservations over the nature of financial institutions.46
Not all Whigs shared a statist perspective on financial matters. Richard Hildreth, for
instance, offered what stands as the most acute Whig endorsement of free-banking. For Hildreth,
support of financial institutions did not necessitate abandonment of laissez-faire principles. His
dedication to free markets, yet his opposition to financial corporatism conflicted with
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conventional Whig thought. Hildreth’s free-market critique of finance indicates that some Whigs
corresponded to the republican anti-finance movement. Born in 1807, Hildreth’s seminal work
was a six-volume History of the United States published between 1849 and 1852. Harvard
educated, abolitionist, poet, essayist, moral philosopher, and founder and editor of the Bostonbased Whig paper the Atlas, Hildreth presented his views of American finance in his 1840 Banks,
Banking, and Paper Currencies.47
Although Whigs normally supported state intervention in the economy, for Hildreth,
however, the financial sector had been ruined by state meddling. He criticized state and national
legislatures for disrupting the otherwise natural and sound operations of financial institutions.
State intervention in the financial sector was originated from strictly political motivations,
Hildreth concluded. Jacksonian opposition to finance was, Hildreth argued, “for the purpose of
creating a new bank, the stock of which might be shared among their friends and partisans.” The
state banks that fought against Biddle were rewarded the following year with the redistribution of
federal deposits, the “spoils of victory” according to Hildreth.48 This was not unusual, for no
matter their political disposition “it was most amply justified by the practice of all our legislative
bodies, which have ever been in the constant habit of confining the grant of bank charters to
influential persons of the prevailing political party.”49
Hildreth’s rebuke of political finance was rare for antebellum Whigs. His anticorporatist, laissez-faire criticisms of the BUS showcased the complexities in the Whig financial
discourse. It also indicates a lack of consensus within the pro-finance movement. Hildreth
advocated banking be controlled not “at the mercy of ignorant and reckless politicians, or at the
mercy, no less to be deprecated, of a few purse-proud, domineering, dictatorial bank directors,”
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but by the “Laws of Trade─laws which do not act by jerks and starts…but by a constant, steady,
gentle, yet inevitable pressure.”50Hildreth’s recommendations amounted to free banking. He
disparaged the national bank, referring to the institution as a “sort of absolute monarch.” Hildreth
argued that by eliminating the monopoly control of the national bank, along with promulgating
general laws for bank incorporations, market forces would check profligate circulation of notes
through regular calls for redemption.51Hildreth was aware of the speculative and corrupt
tendencies of financial institutions. However, his admiration for banks as agents of economic
progress combined with his desire to see the financial sector expand freed from the fetters of state
makes Hildreth something of an anomaly in the antebellum discourse.
The reforms suggested by Whigs like Appleton and Hildreth were amplified by the
opposition movement of the later-antebellum period (1830-1860). The later-antebellum
opponents of finance expressed a dedication to laissez-faire principles by advocating the absolute
withdraw of state intervention from the financial sector. But by forcing banks to conform to
market forces, opponents aimed at limiting the social, political, and economic influence of
financial institutions. The central features of this literature drew on the republican style of
thought that harkened back to John Taylor. "The great banking bubble of American was the same
in principle as the South Sea Bubble," a Jacksonian noted, "but of longer continuance, and
involved in it the fortunes of the whole community."52 Other later-antebellum opponents widened
criticisms of earlier republicans to challenge the foundational principles on which antebellum
finance rested.
Republican political economy continued to serve critics as a vehicle to attack finance.
But in this case republicanism was not engaged as a medium to articulate an agrarian hostility
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toward capitalism. More than the Augustan English and Southern detractors like Taylor, the
later-antebellum critics recognized finance as a permanent staple of a free-market system most
cherished. Like Cooper, they fused a more explicit and thorough synthesis between
republicanism and laissez-faire.
The later-antebellum critics certainly found the same reasons as earlier republicans to
condemn the moral dangers of finance. Financial institutions were responsible for engendering a
social psychology marked by a frantic mental state that surrendered all rational thought.
Financiers employed "every art of cajolery and allurement…excited a thirst for speculation…until
it increased to a delirious fever, and men, in the epidemic frenzy of the hour, wildly rush upon all
sorts of desperate adventures."53 Profligate extensions of credit and specious expansions of paper
money induced "a reckless fanatical spirit of speculation, unparalled, perhaps, in the history of the
world."54 Finance also normalized a debased ethic in commercial affairs that undermined social
morality and justice. The financial system "is wrong in principle, and must be ruinous in its
effects on the integrity, the morals and the ultimate prosperity of a people."55
Antebellum critics kept to the traditions of republican political economy by focusing
much of their contempt on credit. Credit created a socio-economic order based on fantasy and
delusion. "A very uncertain and fluctuating thing," credit contorted reality by distoring personal
and social estimations of an individual’s wealth.56 Mental and emotional psychoses were
offshoots of a frenzied credit-filled atmosphere “that madden the brains of whole communities,”
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casualties of a banking system that served as "the insane root that takes the reason
prison."57Credit also transformed the social division of labor by promoting speculation and
encouraging Americans to avoid traditional forms of labor. The plough stood idle, the merchant
square vacated, and the workshop fell silent, "while to those employed in the paper money
laboratories, the temptations to fraud and peculation are so strong, and the opportunities so
inviting, that many men of ordinary honesty are thereby turned into rogues."58 In short, credit
slowed the progress of market-driven economic development. Credit was also damned for its
association with debt. Indebtedness was akin to slavery; the person and property of debtors
subjugated to the whims of creditors. A source of humiliation and shame, debt signified the worst
kind of oppression, for a debtor was always "reduced to the condition of his bondsman or serf."
"The prolific mother of crime," debt "taints the course of life in all its streams."59
Later-antebellum opponents used similar rhetorical strategies as earlier republican critics,
but they also broke from earlier traditions by intensifying the claim that finance undermined freemarket institutions. As they grew more familiar with the internal operations of banks they began
to detect the ways, as they saw it, that banks violated the basic principles of the free market.
They harbored special animosity toward the practice of limited liability.
Condy Raguet offered the period’s most developed critique of limited liability. Born in
Philadelphia in 1784, Raguet was a merchant and journalist by trade, served several terms in the
Pennsylvania state senate as a Federalist, and had a brief stint as American consul to Brazil.
After diplomatic service, Raguet returned to Philadelphia in 1827 and found himself in the lion’s
den of protectionism. To counter the protectionist movement, in 1829 Raguet established the
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Free Trade Advocate. Two years later he organized a Free Trade Convention in Philadelphia
attended by the leading laissez-faire spokesmen of the period.60
Raguet’s criticisms of limited liability were articulated as affirmation of laissez-faire
principles. Confidence and responsibility were critical social values in a market economy, both
of which were undermined when legislatures failed to hold banks accountable for their debts.
Releasing corporate bodies from discharging their debts was an affront to commercial and social
integrity. "To destroy all moral sense of justice and rectitude by absolving each individual from
personal liability” Raguet wrote, “as if a legislative act could absolve men from the discharge of
their moral duties, or which the payment of debts, where there is ability, is one."61
Raguet’s desire for strengthening ethical standards in the financial sector sprung from a
laissez-faire disposition. Free markets were effective only in so far as they helped balance private
and public interests. Indeed, he held bankers to a higher set of socially responsible values in
order to foster healthy and honest competitive financial markets. Acts of incorporation did not
pardon men for acts of impropriety. Raguet suggested enforcement of strict convertibility of
paper notes. By holding corporate investors and bank directors responsible for their paper
obligations, "the over-trading of each particular bank would be checked by the prudent regard to
self-interest which would operate upon its managers; and if recklessness should characterize the
conduct of one, or a dozen, or a hundred, it or they would simply fail, like individual traders."62
Raguet contributed to a widening literature in the later-antebellum period that highlighted
the social injustices perpetuated by financial institutions. These tendencies, according to Raguet
and others prevented the expansion of market economies. Much of this literature focused on the
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supposed evils of paper currency. Paper notes represented fictitious values, at times redeemable
for fractions of their alleged worth, at other times not redeemable at all, but at all times a
"fraudulent system of money making out of rags." A bank note was simply a debt, a "paper
trash" containing "no intrinsic value and which a breath of public suspicion may at any time
destroy."63 Moreover, critics charged that specie convertibility was a farce. It was tacitly
understood that paper notes were not backed by bullion. "All men of ordinary sagacity know that
the representative character of convertible paper money is, in part at least, an ingenious
fiction."64Indeed, as one cynic wrote, "the whole amount of the precious metals scattered
throughout the world, would scarcely be sufficient to redeem the paper credits of the United
States."65
Later-antebellum opposition to paper currency should not be confused for an anticapitalist ideology. Indeed, the opposition literature insisted that by revolutionizing financial
institutions a more durable free market would emerge, promoting the interests of business and
labor and encouraging economic growth. Wild fluctuations in currency values traumatized
market participants. "Its tendencies are eminently demoralizing. By its alternate and ever
recurring expansions and contractions of the money machine, it keeps the standard of value
constantly vibrating. This unsettles business as well as prices; it makes fortunes and mars them;
it excites men's gambling propensities...it leads to recklessness, extravagance, and immoral
practices."66
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William Gouge was the period’s most distinguished laissez-faire opponent of paper
money. Born in 1796, his 1833 The Curse of Paper Money and Banking: or A Short History of
Paper Money served as "the bible" of the Jacksonian hard-money movement, was widely read,
and earned Gouge an international reputation on banking.67 A journalist and publisher by trade,
Gouge also worked intermittently in the Treasury Department for 30 years.68 In 1841 he edited
the Jacksonian Journal of Banking. There he repeated the standard Jacksonian maxim, "we are
friendly to free banking." But Gouge was referring only to banks of deposits, lending and
discount, not to the free issue of notes. "Free competition in paper money banking would be little
more than a competition of cunning," fostering a commercial environment that was "essentially
evil."69
Gouge exhibits the various shades of ideological distinctions that Americans harbored in
their opposition to finance. He imagined himself a "disinterested political economist" responsible
for helping Americans understand that prevailing economic difficulties were the effects of"a
Banking system resting on principles fundamentally erroneous."70 Gouge was not anti-capitalist.
Rather he defended adamantly the sanctity of private property and the accumulation of wealth.
His denunciations of corporate banks and demands for replacing the paper currency with a
metallic medium were couched in a Smithian laissez-faire ideology. These associations were not
incompatible in the antebellum discourse. Neither was Gouge’s hard-money program suggestive
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of a labor/agrarian extremism as some historians have implied.71 “Make gold and silver coins the
exclusive money of the country,” Gouge declared, “and the evils of the system would be greatly
diminished.”72 He genuinely believed paper currency hindered economic growth. Gouge helped
bring legitimacy to the hard-money movement by outlining the feasibility of abolishing paper
money. What he and other hard-money advocates expressed was a growing desire among
Americans of various classes and politics for a practical though revolutionary alternative to the
prevailing monetary order.73
Gouge’s writings demonstrate that the hard-money movement articulated criticisms
entirely compatible with laissez-faire values, and thus centered squarely in the antebellum
mainstream. Most Jacksonian opponents were not radical outliers. Neither were opponents
necessarily interested in reforms intended to democratize and cheapen access to credit markets.
The opposition movement was led by individuals who found finance anathema to both social
justice and laissez-faire principles, and thus sought reforms aimed at preserving market
institutions.
The Massachusetts lawyer Lysander Spooner illustrates this point. Spooner’s criticisms
were reminiscent of republican conventions; however they were marked by an exaggerated
commitment to laissez-faire values. Born in 1808, as a young man he spent years under the legal
tutelage of future Chief Justice Charles Allen. Although he served for a short period as a clerk at
Albert Gallatin’s National Bank of New York, Spooner’s understanding of American finance was
reached during the Panic 1837. At the time, Spooner was speculating in Ohio land. The crisis
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sent Spooner back to his father’s farm in rural Massachusetts to contemplate transformations in
finance. Spooner published his ideas in Poverty, Its Illegal Causes and Legal Cure (1846) and
later The New System of Paper Currency (1861).74
Today Spooner is remembered as one of America’s most prolific philosophical
anarchists. He was in essence, an anarcho-capitalist determined to maximize individual
sovereignty through an extreme form of free-market economics. His commitment to laissez-faire
principles was unequivocal. Spooner’s devotion to free markets motivated his distrust of finance.
To reform financial markets, Spooner suggested significant alterations to the procedures
behind debt collection. These measures were reminiscent of earlier republican demands to
reestablish credit networks on a more intimate basis. Spooner’s program would have
revolutionized the financial order. Still, Spooner’s reforms had as their ultimate goal a financial
system constructed along strict laissez-faire models. At the maturation of a debt, Spooner argued,
the borrower was liable only for what could he could muster up at that moment. Debt, Spooner
figured, "has no legal obligation, and generally no moral one, beyond the means of the debtor to
pay at the time the debt becomes due." Since none could predict what might become of an
enterprise, all contracts and obligations made without provisioning for "all the contingencies and
accidents that may occur to defeat his purposes" were "void from the beginning."75 According to
Spooner debt was the equivalent of a value purchased by creditors subject to rise or fall
throughout the term of the loan. The value of a debt, like all property, was exposed to market
risks and thus carried the potential for variation. A lender assumed as much risk and
responsibility for a debt as the borrower. In short, Spooner called for the abolition of laws in the
collection of debt. Doing so would tighten credit and incline lenders to investigate the substance
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of a borrower's plans. Spooner articulated absolute confidence in the market to provide creditors
with perfect information on individual borrowers. "When a capitalist loans money to a
laborer...he does not look, for himself, into the merits of the enterprise as he would if he knew
that his ultimate security for his capital depended solely upon the success of the enterprise,
instead of depending also upon the subsequent earnings of the laborer."76
Spooner is the essential representation of an exaggerated free-banking ideologue. At the
core of his analysis is the desire for credit networks that operated on a more personal level. This
was in line with both classical republican and free-market values. Opponents of finance typically
eulogized the economic tranquility of times past, where credit relations were shared between
intimates rather than unfamiliar, corporate institutions. "In the old fashioned way of credit,” one
critic figured, “few men were enabled to go so much in debt, as that they would not be detected in
time to save their creditors."77 Spooner’s desire to restore personal credit relations was not a
manifestation of an anti-market ideology. Indeed, state intervention on behalf of financial
institutions in the processes of debt collection undermined the free-market order.
George Opdyke, one-time mayor of New York City and prominent figure in the Free Soil
and Republican parties, also worked to tighten the bonds between creditor and borrower as a
means to advance laissez-faire principles. Born in 1805 in New Jersey he grew familiar with
finance through his business associations in New York City’s Chamber of Commerce.78 He
presented his views on finance in his 1851 A Treatise on Political Economy. A dry goods chain
storeowner turned self-made millionaire, for a time Opdyke’s textile and merchandising
businesses were the largest in New York City. He died in 1881.
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Opdyke was no extremist, but his suggested reforms were nothing short of radical. He
epitomized the slippery ideological disposition of republican critics of finance. The anti-tariff,
anti-slavery, big-city businessman who as a Republican would later call for an irredeemable
national currency was not anti-capitalistic; nor does he come across as an entrepreneur thirsting
for cheap credit. Rather Opdyke is genuinely interested in removing the socially damaging
features of antebellum finance. He employed traditional republican rhetorical strategies in his
description of financial institutions. Opdyke likened credit markets to a game of hide and seek.
"As the matter now stands…it is accounted meritorious to evade the payment of an honest debt.”
“Creditors look more to the law than to honesty or honor of their debtors for the enforcement of
payments,” Opdyke continued, “and while such is the case we must expect that evasions of
payment will be regarded as skillful achievements over the law and the sagacity of creditors,
rather than as acts of dishonor." Under existing circumstances the abolition of laws for the
collection of debt seemed the only viable option. This would ensure that creditors had adequate
knowledge of a borrower's capacity for repayment. Extensions of credit would rest on the
decency and moral constitution of men rather than legal recourse. "Increase the demand for
integrity of character, frugality, and diligence, by basing credit exclusively upon them, and you
will soon stimulate and develop these desirable qualities of character to such a degree that any
one who should prove so far deficient therein as to refuse payment of a debt…would be utterly
discountenanced in all respectable society."79 Curtailing state involvement in creditor-debtor
disputes and forcing lenders to employ discretion in their credit extensions promised a moderate,
more prudent set of lending standards. "Increase the demand for virtue and you will increase the
supply; enlarge its reward and you will not fail to improve its quality, and thereby elevate the
national standard of morality."80
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The desire to reinstate traditional methods of credit networks based on intimate relations
harkened back to earlier republican criticisms. But in removing legal institutions from the
process of debt collection, later-antebellum opponents placed greater emphasis on market
imperatives than earlier republican like Taylor. Spooner and Opdyke employed republican values
as a medium to advance laissez-faire principles. Their ultimate goal, unlike earlier republican
critics of finance, was not necessarily the construction of an agrarian ideal. Rather republicanism
was a means to a distinctly modern free-market economy. The emphasis given to laissez-faire by
later-antebellum critics was also supplemented by traditional republican-based anxieties over
state interference in the economy. The fear of financial institutions corrupting legislatures was
the most enduring theme of the opposition literature. In this way, laissez-faire and classical
republicanism formed its strongest intellectual bond.
The synthesis between liberal-republicanism was given further impetus by William
Leggett. Leggett lived an eventful yet shortened life. Born in 1801 in Savannah, Georgia, as a
young man he attended Georgetown College. The failure of his father’s business curtailed his
enrollment, and shortly after Leggett joined the Navy. In 1828 he moved to New York City
where he found work as a theatrical and literary critic for local papers. William Cullen Bryant
recognized talent in the young man, hiring Leggett as a writer for the Evening Post. Leggett was,
however, hindered by Yellow Fever contracted while he was in the Navy. He later became a
leader in New York’s Locofoco movement, but the disease ended his life just before his fortieth
birthday.81 Leggett’s critique of finance was expressed in two widely-read periodicals that he
established in the late-1830s, the Plaindealer and the Examiner.
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Leggett solidified the union between laissez-faire and republican principles in the
opposition discourse. His writings are further indication that antebellum opposition to finance did
not advance an anti-market agenda; rather it served as reaffirmation of the market regime. By
resisting the spread of financial institutions Leggett aimed at encouraging competitive markets.
These values were hardly outside of the antebellum intellectual mainstream. Indeed, they were
fundamental to American economic heritage. For Leggett, the “sister doctrines" of republicanism
and laissez-faire were reciprocating ideologies. A stubborn, unbending commitment to Smithian
free trade was the driving force behind Leggett’s pleas for republican equal rights.82Laissez-faire
and republicanism, he declared, advance "the largest liberty…both are equally opposed to all
special privileges and immunities; and both would leave men to manage their own affairs, in their
own way, so that they did not invade each others natural rights."83 Mixing government and
business inevitably led to special legislation that corrupted markets and ruined republican polities.
Purge society of the "unholy alliance between politics and banking," Leggett demanded, and "let
commerce, and let the currency…regulate themselves."84
Historians have minimized the intellectual affinities between liberal-republicanism and
anti-finance. They have failed to note the compatibility between antebellum laissez-faire and
anti-finance. In doing so, they have also largely ignored important theoretical developments in
the antebellum discourse. Criticisms of finance provided a medium for opponents to articulate
broader economic philosophies. Liberal-republicans drew most heavily on contemporary laissezfaire ideology to attack financial institutions. State intervention in the banking system through
corporate legislation was thought by most liberal-republicans obstructions of a natural financial
order. The state tarnished an otherwise flawless natural system governed by immutable laws and
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universal principles. "If we do die," Gouge wrote, "it will be of the doctor not of the disease."85
To be sure, critics were convinced that there existed an intrinsic evil in finance. But legislative
interference exacerbated financial vices by disrupting organic processes with artificially contrived
institutions. "If there is something essentially bad in fictitious money, there seems to be
something in human nature which prevents it being properly managed."86
Leggett gave this strain of thought its most lucid expression. His criticisms of finance
were comparable to Smith’s censures of mercantilism. In an 1837 Plaindealer article Leggett
explained the omnipotent character of the natural economic order and the shortcomings of human
institutions in their attempts to manage economic phenomena. "While trade is in prosperous
operation, it seems governed by laws as fixed and harmonious and to most minds as inscrutable,
as those of the universe. Each link in the mighty chain, each part of the prodigious whole,
performs its allotted office, and contributes to the grand result─the improvement of the physical
and intellectual condition of mankind." Employing language analogous to Smith, Leggett
continued, "But when derangement takes place, when any thing occurs to interrupt the
harmonious movement, such are the mutual relations and dependence of the various parts, that the
inquirer is bewildered in his attempts to investigate the cause of the confusion…"87 "Ignorant
legislators" promulgated directives in an "attempt to control what is in its nature uncontrollable,
and should be as free as air."88 In short, markets worked best when left alone. "Leave trade to its
laws, as we leave water to the laws of nature, and both will eventually be equally certain to find
their proper level."89 Rather than liberating finance the state "forces credit out of its natural
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channel."90 Leggett argued that by freeing financial markets from state management "the simple
order of nature" would find encouragement. The financial system would be left to bend naturally
to universal directives. "That is most excellent,” Leggett declared, “which comes nearest to the
simplicity of nature."91
Leggett’s admiration for laissez-faire values demonstrates that the supposed bond
between free markets and finance in the popular historical imagination did not exist in the
antebellum discourse. The dichotomy maintained in the historiography between republicanism
and capitalism masks the complexities of the anti-finance movement. The antebellum economic
mind was not shaped by distinct ideological lines. Indeed, support for the expansion of financial
institutions was normally espoused by individuals partial to state intervention in the economy.
The historiography has also misrepresented opposition as a pretense for unbridled financial
entrepreneurialism. Opponents were genuinely disturbed by the moral, social, and political
externalities attendant to the spread of financial institutions. Neither were the opponents of
finance always militant laborites or radical outliers. The anti-finance movement was inclusive of
a wide-range of positions and personalities, few of which operated on the fringes of antebellum
intellectual culture. Even high-brow free-trade academics articulated misgivings toward finance.
Henry Vethake, for instance, complained of banking speculation as having excited "a corrupt
spirit of gambling."92 And Jacob Cardozo disparaged paper money for having afflicted the world
"with a moral evil" more "pestilent and dreadful" than anything that had passed before it.93 On
the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, George Frederick Holmes denounced “the financial
dragons” as “absolutely fatal to public morals...utterly antagonistic to political order or the
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permanent prosperity of States, and must prove the ruin of all governments...They are consuming
the vitals of society, and rendering the continuance of social order an impossibility.”94
Then, as in more recent times, serious hostility was directed at financial institutions.
Opposition toward finance was so widespread in the antebellum discourse that if anything, the
opposition literature constituted American convention. This is not to say the movement to
modernize American financial institutions was without support. America’s emergence in the
twentieth century as a leader in global financial markets shows that pro-bank interests were well
represented. What the antebellum discourse on finance illustrates is a deep division in the
American economic mind between ideology and practice. Like the debate over industry and
trade, the financial literature was marked by a diversity of thought reflective of the broader lack
of consensus that permeated the economic discourse.
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Chapter IX
Conclusion: The Old and the New in American Economics

The appointment of Charles Dunbar to the chair of political economy at Harvard in 1871 initiated
a new era of economic study in the United States. Other institutions followed suit, establishing
and later expanding their political economy departments. While the professionalization of
economic analysis may have then begun in earnest, this dissertation shows that during the
antebellum period the discipline was pursued with comparable levels of intensity. Antebellum
political economists demonstrated originality, inquisitiveness, and were relevant participants in
the public sphere. Antebellum economic thinkers worked toward the formulation of an economic
science suited to the domestic experience, but in no way was American thought insulated from
Old World influence. The American writers reviewed in this dissertation were in constant
dialogue with European, particularly British thinkers. Although British laissez-faire influenced
the antebellum economic thought, classical orthodoxy never dominated the American discourse.
In the post-Civil War period this trend continued. Following the conflict, the influence of
laissez-faire classicism over the American economic mind proved just as tenuous as it had been
during the antebellum era. Although instruction in political economy after the war was delivered
mostly by professors of the laissez-faire persuasion, within the free-trade movement there was
sharp disagreement over important principles.1 By the early 1870’s classical economics began to
rapidly lose its credibility. The same year Dunbar assumed his post at Harvard, the Englishman
Stanley Jevon’s theory of marginal utility dealt a decisive blow to classical convention by
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discounting Ricardian models of distribution and value.2 The collapse of Ricardian orthodoxy, on
both sides of the Atlantic, was nothing less than an intellectual revolution.
In America the marginalist movement was largely a home-grown phenomenon. A
similar theory was elaborated in John Bates Clark’s 1885 The Philosophy of Wealth. The
Columbia University professor found value a measurement of utility determined by a series of
subjective calculations, both individual and social.3 Clark’s criticizing of classical orthodoxy was
not limited to the theory of value, however. He saw in the industrial and financial behemoths of
the Gilded Age reason to question the classical assumption of perfect competition and he also
thought humanity driven by motives other than pure economics.4 When Clark did finally depose
Ricardo’s principal tenets of their authority, the American was adapting to an established
domestic tradition of subjecting classicism to critical revision. Malthus experienced a similar fall
from theoretical grace in the late nineteenth century. Rising standards of living and improved
agricultural productivity had proven Malthus’ conclusions about population outrunning the food
supply wrong. European political economists began to realize what American thinkers had long
argued with respect to population.
The post-Civil War breach initiated by Clark was complimented by a methodological
rift. Clark, like thousands of other American students during the post-Civil War period studied in
Germany and brought back to the United States an appreciation of historical economics. German
universities were then captivated by the historicism of Leopold von Ranke, and students of
Gustav von Schmoller and Wilhelm Roscher in particular were instructed to challenge the

2

T.W. Hutchison, On Revolutions and Progress in Economic Knowledge (Cambridge, 1978), chapters 3
and 4; Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought (New York, 1942), pp. 417, 79.
3

George Tucker had made similar arguments with his psychological theory of value.

4

Richard Ely, “A Decade of Economic Theory,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science (March, 1900), pp. 96-101

168

precepts of ahistorical classicism.5 American students of the historical school imported the
German Methodenstreit to the domestic discourse. The controversy over method came to a head
in 1885 when the ‘New School’─young economists influenced by German
historicism─established the American Economic Association. The organization’s founding
constitution declared, among other things, “the state as an agency whose positive assistance is one
of the indispensable conditions of human progress.” And on the progression of the economics
discipline, the ‘New School’ conceded that they “appreciate the work of former economists,”
however “we look not as much to speculation as to the historical and statistical study of actual
conditions of economic life…”6
There are obvious but largely neglected ties between the principles of the ‘New School’
and antebellum protectionism. Friedrich List is the obvious conduit, but Henry Carey was also
celebrated in Germany for initiating a revolution in economic theory.7 Like the antebellum
protectionists, the New School economists clamored for a revised and socially engaged political
economy. Both envisioned the state as facilitator of economic development and both believed
democratic institutions should be employed to promote the people’s economic interests. Each
gave special emphasis to the inductive method, found economic theory dependent upon
prevailing social, political and economic conditions, and both favored practical solutions over
academic abstractions.8
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The New School economists of the late nineteenth century have received more attention
in the historiography than their protectionist predecessors. Historians continue to slight the
contributions made by antebellum protectionists. But in the antebellum battle of economic ideas
it is clear the protectionists triumphed. The promulgation of Treasury Secretary Robert Walker’s
liberal tariff schedules in 1846 was an American laissez-faire moment in a century otherwise
dominated by protectionism. The post-Civil War debate over trade policy further
institutionalized the protectionist agenda as the United States did not effectively participate in the
global trading community until the early twentieth century.9
The primacy of protectionist policy certainly contributed to American industrialization,
as well as the expansion of state authority in the economy. The failure of antebellum
protectionists to recognize the potential threats to individual liberty by state interventions and to
labor by industrial conglomerations speaks more to their lack of perfect foresight and their
acceptance of American exceptionalism than a concerted effort to advance the agendas of
Republicans and Robber Barons.10 Only in the decades that followed the Civil War did most
American thinkers begin to believe that the course of American industrialization would follow the
British model. The United States, it seemed, was not exceptional. The social difficulties
associated with industrialization were criticized most poignantly in the post-Civil War era not by
the disciples of Carey but by an expanding body of labor/socialist literature, much of which was
anticipated by George Fitzhugh, George Frederick Holmes, Langton Byllesby and Thomas
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Skidmore.11 Ironically, voices that were counted as the least progressive with regard to
economics before the Civil War were seen as prophetic of the need for a socialist economics to
replace capitalism after the Civil War.
Perhaps the single element that draws the rather different antebellum reactionaries
together with the postbellum socialist was their questioning of American exceptionalism.
Fitzhugh, Holmes, Byllesby, and Skidmore were part of a larger corps of domestic thinkers
familiar with European, particularly British patterns of industrial development. They rejected
what they considered were the negative social, moral, and political residuals of industrialization.
They found significance in the gloomy forecasts of Malthus and Ricardo and were convinced the
consequences of industrial capitalism knew no national boundaries. My dissertation shows that
the Northern and Southern reactionaries were not alien intruders to an otherwise optimistic
liberal-capitalist discourse. Their brand of economic thought was widely circulated, helped shape
the contours of the antebellum economic dialogue, and would prove to have an enduring appeal
by resurfacing with greater tenacity later in the century.
Industrialization and the organization and efforts of labor in the post Civil War period, J.
Laurence Laughlin wrote in the inaugural 1892 issue of the Journal of Political Economy, were
largely responsible for broadening American curiosities in political economy. Industry was,
however, not the primary feature in the postbellum discussion. Laughlin attributed what he called
“the new-born interest in economics” to public outrage over currency and banking.12 During and
after the Civil War financial institutions expanded rapidly, hastened by Republicans and
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Northeastern businessmen eager to mobilize the nation’s capital, offer the public a cheap and
stable medium of exchange, and transform the United States into a financial hegemon.13
Since this nation’s founding the nature and responsibility of financial institutions have
provoked a complex and energized agitation among economic thinkers. Antebellum attitudes
toward finance reflected cultural and historical traditions deeply rooted in the American
experience. Those who embraced much of the free-market agenda often stopped their celebration
when it came to financial markets. In America, it was entirely possible to be a devoted champion
of laissez-faire and simultaneously abhor finance.
After the Civil War the American economic discourse expressed a similar ambiguity
toward financial institutions. Americans debated the advantages of a redeemable national
currency, the intrinsic value of hard money, the dangers of bank monopolies, and the
government’s role in regulating financial markets. Financial issues were tied to moral concerns
on the distribution of wealth, interest rates, the nature of private property, and the accumulation of
profits. Industrialists, merchants, agrarians, and labor vacillated in their support for various
financial schemes, often employing rhetorical strategies and a manner of thought that echoed
antebellum economic thinkers. There was conflict over financial policy, and in words of the
historian of Reconstruction finance Irwin Unger, “often it generated frustrations and aggression
just short of the social flash point.”14 As was the case in the antebellum period, it is hard to find
consensus in the postbellum financial discourse.
My dissertation shows antebellum political economy was inclusive of an extensive and
dynamic range of ideological and theoretical positions that made consensus. The American
discourse was not dominated by British laissez-faire, and was routinely inviting of an economic
13
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thought that complimented both the style and substance of the American experience. An
awareness of these differences provide a clearer measure of American intellectual history and can
improve our appreciation of how the economic dialogue helped set the narrative for the political
discord that culminated with the Civil War.
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